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Abstract 
 
Numerous studies examining affective reactions to emotional expressions find 
that humans show concordant reactions to the emotions of others: Positive 
facial expressions activate positive affective reactions whereas negative facial 
expressions activate negative ones. It has been argued that these reactions are – 
at least in part – triggered by the intention signaled by the emotional 
expression. This arguing suggests that each emotion signals a specific intention 
leading to a specific reaction. However, we argue that the link between 
emotional expression, intention, and affective reaction is much more flexible: 
Depending on situational and social factors, the same emotional expression can 
be interpreted as signaling different intentions and therefore trigger different 
reactions. One of these social factors influencing the interpretation of an 
emotion might be the group membership of the expresser of the emotion. Since 
group membership influences the relationship between individuals, it 
influences the light in which the intention of the emotional expression is seen. 
If expresser and perceiver of an emotion share group membership, their 
relationship will be friendly and cooperative; accordingly, the intention 
signaled by the emotional expression will be seen in this light and elicit a 
concordant reaction. On the contrary, if expresser and perceiver are members 
of different groups, they will have a negative and competitive relationship. As 
a result, the intention signaled by this emotional expression should be 
interpreted in this light and elicit a divergent reaction.  
This assumption was examined in the experiments conducted for this 
thesis. The results show that approach and avoidance reactions to in-group and 
out-group emotions are indeed influenced by the intention signaled by the 
emotion: Emotions (happiness and fear) expressed by the in-group elicited 
concordant approach and avoidance reactions. Emotional expressions 
(happiness and fear) shown by out-group members, in contrast, elicited 
divergent approach and avoidance reactions. Since approach and avoidance 
reactions are influenced by the intention of the emotion, these results support 
our arguing that group membership influences which intention is inferred from 
an emotional expression. This conclusion is supported further by an experiment 
V 
 
employing the reversed correlation technique. The results demonstrate that the 
mental representations of in-group smiles are associated with benevolent 
intentions and that of out-group smiles with malevolent ones.  
Importantly, the results of our experiments show that the influence of 
group membership on affective reactions to emotions is based on an automatic 
process: The interaction between group membership and emotional expression 
occurred in spite of the emotional expression (Experiment 1, Experiment 3b, 
Experiment 4), and the emotional expression and group membership 
(Experiment 2, Experiment 5) being task irrelevant. Additionally, group 
membership in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was manipulated by employing 
images of ethnical in-group and out-group members. Assuming that 
participants would be motivated to control their responses towards ethnical out-
group members in order to not appear prejudiced, we conclude that the 
observed influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotions 
cannot be controlled.  
In sum, employing different paradigms, groups, and dependent variables, 
our results show that group membership influences automatic affective 
reactions to emotions. Furthermore, they provide evidence that this effect is 
caused by an influence of the relationship between expresser and perceiver of 
an emotion on the interpretation of the intention signaled by the emotional 
expression. 
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Preface 
 
Imagine you are walking down the street and come across a middle-aged blond 
guy, who reads the newspaper waiting at a bus stop. As you pass by, the guy 
briefly looks up and flashes a smile at you. Then he continues reading. What 
reaction would this short expression of emotion elicit? How would you feel or 
behave? The answer is simple: Most likely, this smile would elicit positive 
reactions in you; it would probably make you feel good and happy and maybe 
it would also make you smile.  
Reactions like this are part of our everyday life and everybody has 
experienced them before: We feel good if we see one of our friends laugh and 
sad if we see her or him cry. We are drawn towards smiling people but retreat 
if they show fear. We mimic facial expressions, postures, voices. These and 
other effects are documented by numerous studies which show that emotions of 
others elicit concordant reactions in us (e.g., Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 
2000; Dimberg, Thunberg, Grunedal, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 
1992; Lundquist, & Dimberg, 1995; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Rotteveel, & 
Phaf, 2004). Interestingly, these reactions do not only occur after conscious 
deliberation and in interactive settings, like most people would assume, but can 
also be elicited in a very controlled experimental set-up with voice samples or 
photographs of strangers displaying emotional expressions. Participants in such 
studies reported a more positive mood state after being repeatedly exposed to 
facial expressions of happiness or after listening to a happy voice than after 
watching negative facial expressions or listening to a threatened voice 
(Neumann & Strack, 2000). This mood contagion occurred even though the 
emotional content of the stimuli was very subtly manipulated: Participants 
were not instructed to pay attention to the emotional expression in the picture 
or to the tone of the voice but rather to other features of the image or the voice 
sample. Other studies show that emotional expressions can also trigger 
behavioral reactions: Participants were faster in initiating a step towards a 
happy face compared to an angry one (Stins, Roelofs, Villan, Kooijman, 
Hagenaars, & Beek, 2011). Similar results were obtained with even more 
artificial movements like pushing or pulling a joystick to categorize 
Preface 
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photographs of emotional faces appearing on the screen (Rotteveel & Phaf, 
2004; Seidel, Habel, Kirschner, Gur, & Derntl, 2010; Marsh, Ambady, & 
Kleck, 2005; but see Wilkowski & Meier, 2010). Studies like these show that 
reactions to emotions are very basic and occur automatically. Interestingly, 
almost all of them show that humans react with a concordant behavioral 
reaction to emotional expressions of others. 
However, is it plausible that we always react with a concordant 
affective reaction? Are there no possible situations in which a divergent 
reaction would be more sensible? Imagine a situation slightly different from 
the one described at the beginning of this chapter: Again, you are walking 
down the street and pass the bus stop. This time, however, the guy smiling at 
you is black haired with darkish skin, maybe of Arabic origin. How would you 
react in this situation? Would his smile still make you feel good and happy? Or 
would it rather make you suspicious and assume that the guy is up to no good? 
And if your answer is yes – how automatically would this inference occur? 
Broadly spoken, this question sums up the topic of this thesis: It 
examines the influence of group membership on automatic reactions to 
emotions and the possible mechanism underlying this influence. Importantly, 
the emphasis is on automatic reactions – reactions that occur without deliberate 
intention and sometimes even unconsciously. We will argue that these 
automatic reactions to emotions differ if the expresser is a member of the in-
group compared to if he is an out-group member. Whereas in-group members’ 
emotions typically elicit concordant affective reactions, emotions expressed by 
out-group members should elicit divergent reactions. We suggest that the 
reason for this is that reactions to emotions are influenced by the intention 
signaled by the emotion. Depending on the group membership of the expresser 
of an emotion, the same expression might be interpreted as signaling different 
intentions. Whereas the smile of the blond guy at the bus might be understood 
as a sign of affiliation, the smile of the Arabic looking man in contrast might be 
seen as signaling dominance, arrogance, or Schadenfreude. As a result, the 
same expression might activate different reactions. 
There are already a couple of studies examining the influence of group 
membership on reactions to emotions. A study conducted in the aftermath of 
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the European Championship 2000 in soccer, for example, found that Dutch 
soccer fans reported an increase of Schadenfreude (an emotion defined as 
“malicious pleasure at an out-group’s misfortune”) after the rival Italy lost in 
the finals against England (Leach & Spears, 2009; Leach, Spears, Branscombe, 
& Dosje, 2003). Another study – related to the ones examining mood contagion 
mentioned above – found that participants experienced a concordant mood 
state after watching facial expressions shown by a same sex person but a 
divergent one if the emotion was expressed by a member of the opposite sex 
(Epstude & Mussweiler, 2009). These studies (and a couple of others) present 
some evidence that group membership influences reactions to emotions.  
However, most of the studies examining the influence of group 
membership on reactions to emotions did not provide sufficient evidence 
explaining which underlying mechanism caused the divergence of reactions. 
Even though in most studies an explanation for the effects is offered, these 
differ between studies and fail to explain various results. It is therefore 
necessary to further examine the exact mechanism underlying the influence of 
group membership on reactions to emotions. A second problem of the studies 
reporting an influence of group membership on reactions to emotions is that 
they fail to show if these divergent reactions occur automatically or if they are 
caused by conscious considerations. In most of the studies which manipulated 
the group membership of the expresser, the intergroup situations created for the 
experiments were very competitive and extremely salient (e.g., Epstude & 
Mussweiler, 2009; Bourgeois, & Hess, 2008; Leach & Spears, 2009; Leach, et 
al., 2003; Ruys, Spears, Gordijn, & de Vries, 2007; Weisbuch & Ambady, 
2008). Therefore, it seems likely that participants paid extra attention to the 
expressers and their emotions, reflected on the meaning and the implication of 
these expressions, and then altered their responses. In order to overcome this 
problem, studies controlling for the automaticity of the observed effects are 
needed.  
The studies conducted for this thesis fill these two gaps: We examined 
the mechanism underlying the influence of group membership on reactions to 
emotions and assessed the automaticity of it. In order to test our hypothesis that 
group membership influences reactions to emotions because it influences the 
Preface 
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intention which is inferred from an emotional expression we followed two 
different approaches. First of all, we examined approach and avoidance 
reactions to emotional expressions (Experiments 1 – 3). Since it has been 
argued that these reactions are activated by the intention inferred from the 
emotional expression, finding an influence of group membership on approach 
and avoidance reactions to emotional expressions would allow us to conclude 
that group membership influences the intention which is inferred from an 
emotion. Second, we conducted an experiment in which we visualized the 
mental representation of in-group and out-group smiles (Experiment 4) and 
assessed the intention associated with these mental representations.  
In order to face the second problem we created intergroup situations in 
which emotional expression (Experiment 1, Experiment 3, Experiment 4) or 
emotional expression and group membership (Experiment 2, Experiment 5) 
were not task relevant, examining the intentionality and goal-dependency of 
the interaction. Moreover, group membership was rather subtly manipulated 
and mostly based on ethnicity. Due to the social norm not to appear prejudiced 
(e.g., Banse, & Gawronski, 2003; Dunton, & Fazio, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, 
Duntion, Williams, 1995; Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1986), participants’ motivation 
to control their reactions should be high in such a situation. Finding an 
influence of group membership nevertheless would therefore allow us to 
conclude that the effect could be controlled.  
 
Layout of the thesis 
The layout of this thesis is as follows: The first chapter will give a short 
introduction into automatic categorizations and group membership. It will 
thereby mainly focus on the influence of group membership on the relationship 
between group members. Chapter 2 will present research that examined 
affective reactions to emotional expressions. Importantly, only studies looking 
at automatic reactions will be discussed here. While Chapter 2 solely focuses 
on studies in which the group membership of the expresser of an emotion was 
held constant, in Chapter 3 we will present those studies that manipulated the 
group membership of the expresser and examined the influence of this 
manipulation on affective reactions to emotions. In this chapter, studies most 
Preface 
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relevant for the experiments conducted within the framework of this thesis will 
be described in detail and subsequently critically discussed. The main emphasis 
will be on the degree of automaticity of the observed effects. Subsequently, an 
overview of the mechanisms which were proposed as driving the results will be 
given. At the end of Chapter 3 we will present our own reasoning regarding the 
mechanism underlying the influence of group membership on affective 
reactions. We will then present our hypotheses. In Chapter 4, the material 
developed for and employed in the conducted studies will be presented. The 
following chapters will then present the empirical studies conducted for this 
thesis.  
 
1 Categorization and group membership 
1 Automatic categorization and group membership 
 
We all are group members: We are students, teachers, psychologists, Germans, 
Europeans, women, or men. These (as well as many other) memberships come 
to mind easily and we have no problems in classifying ourselves as well as 
others as belonging to one group or the other. Interestingly, identifying 
yourself as a group member influences your perception and cognition, and it 
also influences your attitude towards the members of the same group (called in-
group members) and – more importantly for the present context – towards 
members of different groups (called out-group members).  
In the present chapter, we will present an overview of the findings 
about group categorization and its influence on the relationship between in-
group and out-group members. The focus thereby will be on the most popular 
experiments and definitions, and on those most relevant for the topic of the 
thesis; an extensive overview covering all points of discussion and competing 
definitions would be beyond the scope of this work (for an overview see, for 
example, Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995; Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005; 
Petersen, & Six, 2008).  
It has repeatedly been shown that humans constantly categorize others 
and themselves into groups on the basis of visible (e.g., skin color) or invisible 
features (e.g., voting behavior); it has been argued that this process helps to 
organize the social environment (e.g., Allport, 1954; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). This occurrence of categorization can be 
demonstrated – amongst others – with the so-called “Who said what” paradigm 
(Tyler, Fiske, Edcoff, & Ruderman, 1987): In an experiment employing this 
paradigm, participants see photographs of individuals combined with 
statements by these persons. These individuals are members of different social 
categories (e.g., gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.). However, this group 
membership is – if at all – only casually mentioned and not task relevant. 
Subsequently, after this presentation phase, the statements and photographs are 
shown again, but this time separately. The task of participants is to indicate 
which statement was uttered by which individual in the previous presentation 
phase. The errors occurring in this recall test can be classified into two kinds: 
1 Categorization and group membership 
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Within-category errors and between-category errors. Within-category errors 
refer to confusions within one social category, meaning that a statement was 
ascribed to a person who did not utter it but belongs to the same category as the 
actual speaker. Between-category errors are confusion between speakers of 
different categories meaning that a sentence, which was actually said by a 
member of one category, was erroneously assigned to a speaker of the other 
category. Typically, within-category errors are much more frequent than 
between-category errors. This has been demonstrated for many different 
categories in numerous experiments (e.g., Judd, & Park, 1988; Gawronski, 
Ehrenberg, Banse, & Klauer, 2003; Klauer, Wegener, & Ehrenberg, 2002; 
Strangor, Lynch, Dua, & Beth, 1992; see Klauer & Wegener, 1998, for an 
overview) and supports the notion that humans categorize others into groups.  
The process of categorization is not only helpful in organizing the 
environment but also influences the relationship between humans. It has been 
repeatedly shown that group situations typically lead to liking of in-group 
members and (at least relative to the in-group) disliking of out-group members 
(e.g., Fazio, et al., 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, and Flament, 1971; Tajfel, & Turner, 1986). In a classic 
experiment conducted by Tajfel and colleagues (1972), for example, pairs of 
paintings from Klee and Kandinsky were shown to a group of pupils without 
informing them which paining was created by which artist; they were only 
asked to indicate which one of the two they preferred. Afterwards, the pupils 
received an ostensible feedback telling them that they either belonged to the 
group of people which preferred Klee or to the one which preferred Kandinsky. 
No further information about the Klee- or Kandinsky-lovers was given. 
However, through this simple manipulation, two groups were created. 
Subsequently, the pupils completed another task in which they allocated 
rewards and punishments to members of the respective in-group and out-group. 
These allocations did not affect their own outcome. The results show that the 
pupils assigned more rewards and fewer punishments to in-group compared to 
out-group members. Furthermore, when given the chance to either maximize 
their in-groups’ but also the out-groups’ outcome or to maximize the difference 
between the rewards allocated to the in-group and the out-group, they chose the 
1 Categorization and group membership 
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second option even if this meant assigning less outcome to their in-group. 
Importantly, all these effects occurred even though group membership was 
only established after the arrival to the lab and based on an arbitrary feature. 
This in-group favoritism has been repeatedly shown and can be seen as an 
automatic process which is not based on conscious reasoning (e.g., Otten & 
Wentura, 1999). This has been demonstrated with experiments employing an 
evaluative priming task (see Chapter 2.1 for a detailed description of the 
procedure): In these experiments, participants completed a minimal group 
manipulation similar to that employed by Tajfel and colleagues (1971). 
Subsequently they worked through an evaluative priming task with the 
category labels and unambiguous positive and negative words as primes and 
positive and negative words as targets. The results show that the labels 
describing the respective in-group and out-group category (primes) speeded the 
categorization of positive and negative words (targets) just as unambiguously 
positive and negative words did. Importantly, in these experiments, the primes 
were subliminally presented so that participants were not able to consciously 
process them. These results show that the in-group and its respective members 
automatically elicit a positive evaluation whereas the out-group and its 
members automatically elicit a negative one. 
Both the finding that humans repeatedly and automatically categorize 
themselves and others into groups, as well as the finding that group 
membership influences the relationship between group members are very 
important for the arguing of the present thesis: They allow us to predict that our 
participants will categorize the expressers of emotional expressions into in-
group and out-group members, even if group membership is not task relevant. 
Moreover, and even more importantly, they let us assume that the group 
membership of the expresser then influences the reactions to emotions because 
it influences the relationship between expresser and perceiver of an emotion. 
We assume that – depending on the relationship between expresser and 
perceiver of an emotion – the same emotional expression will be interpreted as 
signaling a different intention and will consequently activate a different 
reaction. 
2 Affective reactions to emotions 
2 Affective reactions to emotions  
 
The question of how humans react to emotions of others has been a subject of 
interest in many fields of psychology (e.g., evolutionary psychology, 
developmental psychology, cultural psychology, social psychology). With this 
question, the focus in emotion research has moved from the expresser of the 
emotion to the perceiver (Hess, Philippot, & Blairy, 1998). Examining 
reactions of others to emotional expressions is of big interest because the 
results can tell us something about the function of emotions for the individual 
as well as for the dyad (Keltner & Gross, 1999). 
This chapter will give an overview of research examining affective 
reactions to expressions of emotions. The chapter thereby covers three broad 
research areas, namely mimicry and mood contagion, priming, and approach 
and avoidance behaviors. With affective reactions we refer to responses to the 
stimuli that are directly associated with the valence or emotion specific content 
of the emotional expressions, such as evaluations, facial muscle activity, or 
approach and avoidance reactions. Studies looking at dependent variables that 
are only indirectly associated with the valence or emotional content (e.g., 
reaction times in cueing experiments and visual search) were excluded
2
. 
Moreover, the chapter will only cover reactions that are assumed to occur – at 
least in part – automatically. That means that many studies whose results are 
based solely on self-report will not be described.  
An automatic process is usually defined through the presence of one or 
more separate features such as fast, efficient, unconscious, unintentional, 
uncontrolled, goal independent, autonomous, and purely stimulus driven (e.g., 
Bargh, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Even though there is some debate 
about the conceptual overlap of these features, research suggests that a 
distinction is feasible (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Automaticity can therefore 
be established by introducing conditions that hinder non-automatic processes, 
                                                 
2
 By employing the term affective reactions we do not want to suggest that these reactions 
are necessarily associated with affective feeling states, even though some might be. We chose 
the term to imply that the respective reactions are affective or emotional in nature, rather 
than cognitive. We are, however, aware that drawing a distinction between cognition and 
emotion is also problematic (see Eder, Hommel, & De Houwer, 2007; Moors, 2007).   
2 Affective reactions to emotions 
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for example by forcing participants to speedy answers, by making critical 
features task irrelevant, or by heightening the motivation of participants to 
control their responses. If an effect occurs under such conditions, it is most 
likely that it is (at least in regard to the intended feature of automaticity) 
automatic. In the framework of this thesis we will call a process automatic even 
if only one of the features listed above is given. When referring to the process 
driving the results of our experiments, we will use automatic in the sense of 
unintentional, goal independent and (to a lesser extent) uncontrollable. In the 
context of the theoretical overview, we will specify to which component of 
automaticity we refer to. 
However, before giving an overview of studies examining affective 
reactions to emotions, we will define the use of the terms emotion and 
expression of emotion in this thesis because these terms will be repeatedly 
employed. Furthermore, some information about theories of emotion and its 
functions are given. 
 
2.1 Defining the subject 
Emotions are a part of our everyday life and people continuously talk 
about them. However, even though most people seem to understand what the 
communication partner refers to when employing the term emotion, there are 
various different definitions of emotions. Within the scope of this thesis we 
will adopt a component oriented view which states that there is not one single 
“thing” which is an emotion. Rather, emotions can be described as “an episode 
of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of five 
organismic subsystems (cognition, neurophysiological support, motivation, 
motor expression, subjective feeling)” (Scherer, 2005, p. 696). This definition 
therefore states that emotions consist of several components. The subjective 
state, which is often used synonymous to the term emotion in everyday 
theories, is only one of them. This multi-component view is shared by many 
researchers (see also Frijda, 1986; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). It assumes that 
these components can, but do not need to, be activated at the same time. This 
notion is supported by experiments conducted in the laboratory which find that 
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the components of an emotion do not always cohere (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 
2000). Why the components of an emotion are not always synchronized is 
subject to some debate: The role of social norms as well as the unnatural 
situation in the laboratory has been discussed here (see Niedenthal, Krauth-
Gruber, & Ric, 2006). However, research shows that people associate the 
components with each other and can also allocate them to the respective 
emotional label: People reliably recognize the subjective emotional feeling 
from facial expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 
1969; Izard, 1971) and assign the respective expression to the subjective 
feeling (e.g, Ekman, 1973) They are also able to indicate which motivation is 
signaled by a facial expression of emotion (e.g., Horstmann, 2003; Yik & 
Russell, 1999). 
Once we have defined the subject of interest, the next question arises: 
Why do we experience and express emotions? Are emotions functional? Again, 
there is a debate regarding the answer to this question which ranges from the 
view that emotions have no function at all, to the perspective that they once 
had an adaptive function which they no longer hold, on to the notion that they 
serve the same purpose as they did when they evolved (e.g., Keltner & Gross, 
1999; Niedenthal, et al., 2006). This later view is now shared by most scholars 
in the field of emotion (Niedenthal, et al., 2006) and supported by many 
studies. These find that emotions are functional for the individual, the dyad and 
the group (for an overview see Keltner, & Haidt, 1999). In the context of this 
thesis, however, only the function of emotions for the dyad is of interest since 
this is most relevant for the topic of the thesis: It has been argued that emotions 
and their expressions inform the opponent (the perceiver) about the feelings, 
the intentions as well as the orientation towards the relationship of the person 
experiencing and showing the emotional expression (the expresser) as well as 
about dangers and benefits in the environment (see Keltner & Haidt, 1999 for 
an overview). A fearful expression, for example, signals that the expresser feels 
frightened, has the intention to flee and feels low dominance. It also indicates 
that there is danger in the environment and therefore acts as a warning. These 
different messages and functions will be further addressed in Chapter 3.3. 
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The functionality of emotions for the interaction partner though 
depends on his ability to recognize the emotion of the expresser. This brings us 
to the topic of facial expressions of emotions, because these constitute one 
important way of communicating the emotion. Facial expressions of emotions 
can be allocated to the motor expression component of an emotion. It has been 
repeatedly argued that there is a limited number of facial expressions of 
emotions which are shared by all humans (eg., Ekman, 1992; Frank & Stennett, 
2001; Izard, 1971; Matsumoto, 1990). This view, known as universality 
hypothesis, has been supported by cross-cultural studies finding recognition 
rates for emotional expressions in secluded cultures that were comparable to 
those of western cultures (e.g., Ekman, 1972, Ekman, et al., 1969; Izard, 1971). 
Inhabitants of Papua New Guinea, for example, who were asked to match 
photographs of facial expressions to a short vignette describing an emotional 
event, selected the same expressions as did inhabitants from western cultures 
(Ekman, 1973). Those expressions which are reliably recognized across 
cultures are labeled basic emotions. There is relatively high consensus that 
these are happiness, surprise, fear, anger, sadness and disgust (see Figure 1 for 
examples for these expressions). Contempt, interest, shame and embarrassment 
have been additionally suggested by other researchers (e.g., Ekman, 1992; 
Izard, 1971; Keltner, 1995).  
However, even though the cross-cultural studies show that there are 
emotions that are universally recognized, recognition rates vary between 
cultures (e.g. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002) and there are also culture specific 
interpretations of certain expressions (Haidt & Keltner, 1999). Therefore, most 
researchers acknowledge that culture influences the expression of emotion.  
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Figure 1 Examples for the basic emotional expressions happiness, surprise, 
fear, disgust, sadness and anger (clockwise). Taken from Paulus, Rohr, 
Neuschwander, et al., 2012. 
 
This leads to another question (which is also related to the discussion 
regarding the function of emotions): What do facial expressions of emotions 
express? Do they signal the subjective component of the emotion (i.e., the 
feeling) or a social motive (i.e., intention, orientation towards relationship, 
information about environment)? To cut a long story short, both views have 
been supported by empirical results. On one hand it was found that 
participants’ facial reactions correlate with their emotional states (e.g., Ekman, 
Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980; Cacioppo, Bush, & Tassinary, 1992), which supports 
the view that emotional expressions are a “read out” of subjective states. On 
the other hand, the occurrence and intensity of emotional expressions are also 
influenced by social motives such as the relationship between expresser and 
perceiver (e.g., Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, 
& Weyers, 2008) or the nature of the situation, for example its sociality (e.g., 
Buck, Losow, Murphy, & Costanzo, 1992; Hess, Kappas, & Banse, 1995; 
Wagner, & Smith, 1991), or if it is competitive or cooperative (Weyers, 
Mühlberger, Kund, Hess, & Pauli, 2009). Additional support for the notion that 
facial expressions of emotions signal a feeling as well as a social motive stems 
from the finding that people agree in assigning emotional labels as well as 
2 Affective reactions to emotions 
14 
 
behavioral intentions to facial emotional expressions (e.g., Horstmann, 2003; 
Yik & Russell, 1999).  
In the empirical studies conducted for this thesis, mainly visual signs of 
emotions (i.e., facial expressions) were used. Therefore, we have to address 
one problem which arises when employing emotional expression as stimuli: 
Since people not only reliably recognize the subjective feeling (e.g., Ekman, 
1972) but also the motivation (e.g., Horstmann, 2003; Yik & Russell, 1999) 
associated with the respective emotion from emotional expressions, one can 
hardly discern which component of an emotion triggered the measured 
response. Therefore, it is possible that reactions to emotions are not solely 
triggered by the facial expression per se but by other components of an 
emotion, even though these are not presented. This question has hardly been 
addressed with empirical methods. Only few of the recent approach and 
avoidance experiments try to shed some light on this question. Wherever 
available, results that allow drawing conclusions on the triggering component 
will be introduced.  
 
2.2 Empirical findings 
In the course of this chapter, empirical studies which examined automatic 
affective reactions to emotional expressions will be presented. This overview 
will first describe findings regarding mimicry and mood contagion, then those 
from priming experiments. Finally, studies employing approach and avoidance 
paradigms will be presented. 
 
2.2.1 Mimicry and mood contagion 
Affective reactions to expressions of emotions have often been 
examined in experiments looking at mood contagion and mimicry. The term 
mood contagion (also termed emotional contagion, affective contagion, 
emotional resonance) describes the transfer of an affective state from one 
person to another (e.g., Neumann & Strack, 2000). As a result, the perceiver 
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experiences the same mood or emotion as the expresser. Mimicry refers to the 
(conscious or unconscious) imitation of another person in regard to his/her 
posture, behavior or emotional expression (e.g., Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 
2005). In the context of this thesis, the overview of studies examining mimicry 
will be limited to those that study the imitation of emotional expressions. Mood 
contagion and mimicry were often seen as closely related concepts and defined 
in overlapping terms (e.g., Hatfield, et al., 1992). However, in more recent 
studies, mood contagion is used to describe an affective state (i.e., the 
subjective feeling component) whereas mimicry refers to the expressive 
behavior (i.e., the motor expression component; see Hess & Blairy, 2001; 
Neumann & Strack, 2000). Mimicry and mood contagion will be reported 
together in this chapter because many theories assume that mood contagion is 
caused by mimicry.  
Mood contagion effects showing that humans experience a concordant 
affect after interacting with an emotionally attuned person have repeatedly 
been reported (for an overview see Hatfield et al., 1992; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1993). However, even though it has been argued in many studies that 
mood contagion occurs without intention, most studies failed to test this 
assumption (Neumann, & Strack, 2000). This was finally accomplished by the 
study conducted by Neumann and Strack. In this study a situation was created 
in which the emotional experience of the other person was barely noticeable; 
then it was assessed if mood contagion occurred nevertheless. The logic was 
simple: If mood contagion occurs even though participants do not consciously 
recognize the emotional experience of the other person, then an intentional 
process cannot be responsible for this effect. In a number of experiments the 
authors measured mood contagion after participants had listened to emotionally 
colored voice samples. Importantly, the emotional coloring of the tone was so 
subtly manipulated that it was not apparent to participants who were not 
instructed to recognize the emotion expressed by the speaker but could be 
recognized by participants who were instructed to pay attention to the 
emotional coloring. Neumann and Strack found that participants reported a 
more positive mood after listening to happy voice samples compared to sad 
ones. This finding shows that mood contagion effects can occur in situations in 
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which the perceiver of the emotional expression does not recognize the 
emotion consciously and has no intention in experiencing the same emotion as 
the expresser.  
Mimicry has also been examined for many years now. The results of 
numerous studies show that humans tend to react with concordant muscle 
activity when watching facial expressions of emotions (e.g., Dimberg, 1982; 
Dimberg, 1990; Lundquist, & Dimberg, 1995). Images of smiling individuals, 
for example, reliably elicit an activation of the Zygomaticus Major muscle 
which lifts the corner of the mouth in a smile, whereas the presentation of 
angry faces activates the Corrugator Supercilli muscle which pulls the 
eyebrows together in a frown. In most of these studies examining facial 
mimicry, muscle activity was recorded with facial Electromyography (EMG), a 
method which measures the activity of the facial muscles with the help of small 
surface electrodes that are attached to the skin above the muscles and 
connected to an amplifier and recorder.  
The imitating reactions to emotional expressions are assumed to occur 
reflex-like and automatically. This assumption is supported by studies finding 
mimicry effects even if participants are instructed to inhibit their reactions 
(Dimberg, et al., 2002) or in cases in which the emotional faces were presented 
under conditions of limited awareness (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehet, 2000). 
In the experiments conducted by Dimberg and colleagues (2000), images of 
angry, happy and neutral expressions were presented for 30 milliseconds and 
masked by a neutral expression for 5 seconds. A pretest had shown that these 
conditions prevent the recognition of the emotional expressions. Interestingly, 
the participants nevertheless reacted with a concordant muscle activity. The 
Zygomaticus Major muscle showed stronger activation after the presentation of 
happy faces compared to angry and neutral faces. The Corrugator Supercili, on 
the other hand, showed more activation after the presentation of angry 
compared to happy and neutral expressions. This finding is a strong support for 
the automaticity of facial mimicry.  
It has been argued that facial mimicry is caused by the wish to affiliate 
(e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand, et al., 2005; Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). Indeed, studies show that 
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that the nature of the relationship between expresser and perceiver of an 
emotion influences mimicry: Disliking the other or being in a competitive 
relationship diminishes the imitation reaction (e.g., Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; 
Likowski, et al., 2008; Weyers, et al., 2009). Additionally, it was found that 
people are liked more if they mimic others’ smiles (Van der Velde, Stapel, & 
Gordijn, 2010). The findings that mimicry reactions are influenced by social 
factors contradict the notion that mimicry reactions constitute a reflex-like 
process. Accordingly, there is now a discussion going on regarding the 
processes underlying facial reactions to emotions (e.g., Likowski, Mühlberger, 
Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2011).  
One point of this discussions concerns the question if facial reactions to 
emotional expressions are triggered by the subjective feeling or the intention 
signaled by the emotional expression. One hint to this question stems from a 
study conducted by Moody and colleagues (Moody, McIntosh, Mann, and 
Weisser, 2007): They examined facial reactions to emotional faces after a fear 
induction and found enhanced fear reaction to angry facial expressions 
compared to neutral ones. This finding shows that facial reactions to emotional 
expressions might be part of an affective process and – most importantly – that 
they are triggered (maybe amongst others) by the intention signaled by the 
facial reaction, in this case the intention to attack signaled by an anger 
expression. This result is further supported by the finding that divergent 
reactions to emotional expressions (i.e., a relaxation of the Corrugator 
Supercilli muscle in response to angry and sad expressions) are mediated by 
affective reactions, like the feeling of joy (Likowski, et al., 2011). 
Regarding the relationship between mood contagion and mimicry, 
many theories assume that mood contagion is caused by mimicry via a 
feedback process (e.g., Hatfield et al., 1992; Lipps, 1907; Neumann & Strack, 
2000). This arguing is supported by studies showing that adopting postural and 
facial expressions can influence subjective feeling states (e.g., Stepper & 
Strack, 1993; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Participants in the study by 
Strack and colleagues, for example, rated comic strips as more funny when 
holding a pen between their teeth in a way that the Zygomaticus Major muscle 
was activated, compared to holding a pen such that the Zygomaticus Major 
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muscle was inhibited or holding no pen at all. Accordingly, it has been argued 
that mimicking facial expressions will lead to the respective emotional feeling, 
ergo to mood contagion. 
However, even though the reasoning is convincing, studies yield mixed 
results. Support for the notion that mimicry causes mood contagion is found in 
one of the studies conducted by Neumann and Strack (2000) (see beginning of 
this chapter for a description of the other studies). In order to examine if a 
mimicking process was responsible for the mood contagion effect that occurred 
after participants listened to emotionally colored voice samples, the authors 
had participants vocally copy these voice samples. The copying was recorded 
and later replayed to a second sample of participants which rated the emotion 
of the copiers. The results show that the participants who had copied the happy 
voice sample were judged as being happier and less sad than participants who 
had copied the sad voice sample. This finding was interpreted as supporting the 
notion that mimicry causes mood contagion. However, examining mimicry and 
mood contagion after the exposure to emotional facial expressions, Hess and 
Blairy (2001) found significant mimicry as well as mood contagion effects but 
no correlation between these two measures. Participants in their study watched 
short video clips of relatively weak and idiosyncratic dynamic facial 
expressions of sadness, anger, disgust and happiness and indicated after each 
video clip which emotion was expressed and how they felt. Results show that 
displays of sadness, anger and happiness were mimicked and that displays of 
sadness and happiness also elicited a concordant affect in participants. These 
measures, however, were not correlated. This result is interpreted as 
contradicting the notion that mimicry causes mood contagion (e.g., Lishner, 
Cooter, & Zald, 2008; McIntosh, 2006; Van der Schalk, et al., 2011). 
Taken together, it has repeatedly been demonstrated that humans 
experience a concordant affect after being exposed to an emotional other and 
that they also show concordant facial reactions. There is some support for the 
notion that these are signs of an affective reaction to the intention signaled by 
the emotional expression. Both processes can occur automatically. The 
connection between these two concepts, however, is still unclear. 
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2.2.2 Priming with emotional expressions  
Automatic affective reactions to expressions of emotions are also often 
examined in studies employing priming paradigms related to the classical 
affective priming paradigm. In these paradigms, broadly spoken, two stimuli 
are presented consecutively, the prime – an emotional expression in this case – 
and the target. Typically, the participants’ task is to ignore the prime and to 
respond to the target only. The required response is mostly an evaluation of the 
target. Of interest is if and how the prime influences this evaluation.  
Originally developed to examine the representation of attitudes (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), this priming procedure has been 
employed to examine reactions to emotional expressions for nearly two 
decades now. Typically, it is labeled affective priming or evaluative priming in 
the literature. However, two different kinds of paradigms hide beneath this 
label. Whereas in experiments of the one kind unambiguously positive and 
negative stimuli are employed as targets and the required response is a 
categorization of the valence or the emotion (e.g., Carroll, & Young, 2005; 
Pell, 2005; Rohr, Degner, & Wentura, 2012), in experiments of the other kind 
ambiguous images constitute the targets and the task of participants is to rate 
the valence or the pleasantness of the image along a continuous dimension or 
with a dichotomous response (e.g., Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008; 
Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Sweeny, Grabowecky, Suzuki, & Paller, 2009). Both 
procedures examine the response to the target as a function of the prime; the 
exact logic of the respective paradigm, however, is quite different. It will be 
described in more detail below. However, by looking at the reaction to the 
target, both paradigms examine the hypothesis that the valence or the specific 
emotional content of emotional expressions is processed automatically (i.e., 
unintentionally and maybe unconsciously) and that this processing influences 
consecutive responding. Since they are both often labeled affective priming in 
the literature, we will refer to the former procedure as evaluative priming and 
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to the later as affect misattribution procedure
3
 to avoid confusion. We will first 
present results obtained with evaluative priming paradigms and subsequently 
those obtained with the affective misattribution procedure. 
The dependent variable in experiments employing an evaluative 
priming paradigm is typically the speed or accuracy of the categorization 
response. It is examined as a function of the prime: It has been argued that 
responses should be faster if prime and target display the same valence or 
emotion (congruent trials), compared to if prime and target differ along the 
critical dimension (incongruent trials). This arguing is based on the assumption 
that the valence or even the specific emotional content of the prime is 
automatically extracted and triggers the consecutive response (called response 
priming; Klauer, Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997; Wentura, 1999). The dependent 
variable of interest, namely the reaction time or accuracy, is thereby only a by-
product of the exact task participants’ are following. The assumption that the 
valence of the prime influences the performance to the target is supported by 
studies employing evaluative priming paradigms. They were able to show that 
participants are faster in categorizing positive targets after the presentation of 
positive emotional expressions and negative targets after the presentation of 
negative emotional expressions compared to cases in which the valence of 
prime and target did not match (e.g., Andrews, Lipp, Mallan, & König, 2010; 
Lipp, Price, & Tellegen, 2009). This effect was also present with inverted 
faces, showing that the recognition of emotional faces does not depend on 
holistic processing (Lipp, et al., 2009). Sometimes even emotion specific 
priming effects were found: Participants were faster in categorizing the specific 
emotion of a facial expression or word after the respective emotional 
expression was presented compared to if prime and target showed a different 
emotional expression (Carroll, & Young, 2005, Rohr, et al., 2012). This effect 
also occurred across modalities with auditory primes and visual targets (Pell, 
2005). Taken together, these results support the notion that the valence as well 
as the emotional content of the prime are excerpted and influence the 
                                                 
3
 We chose the term affect misattribution procedure because Payne, Cheng, Govoron, & 
Stewart (2005) chose this term for a related procedure designed to measure implicit 
attitudes.  
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consecutive responses even if the task is to ignore the prime (i.e. unintentional 
processing of the prime).  
However, it has been argued that emotional expressions should not only 
influence reactions unintentionally, but also in cases in which the prime is 
presented outside of conscious awareness (i.e., subliminal). Such a condition is 
usually created by employing a very short prime presentation and a masking of 
the prime. Some experiments examining this question found a priming effect 
under conditions of limited prime awareness (Rohr, et al., 2012; Neumann, & 
Lozo, 2012) whereas others failed to show priming (Andrews et al., 2010). 
What also remains unclear is if emotion specific priming effects can be 
observed if the prime is presented subliminally: Whereas Neumann and Lozo 
observed significant emotion specific priming effects, Rohr and colleagues 
found results suggesting that the valence as well as the relevance (i.e., whether 
the emotion expressed was mainly relevant for the expresser or for the 
perceiver) of the emotion prime influenced reactions to the target but not the 
specific emotional content. Taken together, results from studies examining the 
influence of emotional expressions with evaluative priming paradigms show 
that emotional expressions are processed automatically and trigger concordant 
reactions. What remains unclear is whether these also occur if the prime is 
presented unconsciously and if emotion specific priming effects can be 
observed under conditions of limited awareness.  
In experiments examining the influence of emotional expressions with 
the affective misattribution procedure, the rating of the valence or pleasantness 
of an ambiguous target (e.g., unknown Chinese character, surprise facial 
expression) constitutes the dependent variable. In contrast to the evaluative 
priming task, the variable of interest is therefore the direct response given by 
the participant and not a by-product of the task. The process which is assumed 
to underlie the effect is misattribution: It is suggested that the valence of the 
prime will be misattributed to the target, influencing its evaluation. Positive 
facial expression should therefore lead to a more positive rating of the target 
than a negative facial expression. This is exactly what has been found in many 
studies (e.g., Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Rotteveel, de Groot, Geutskens, & 
Phaf, 2001; Li, et al., 2008). Interestingly, and in comparison to studies 
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employing the evaluative priming paradigm, in most of these studies priming 
effects were observed even if the target was presented subliminally. The effect 
even seemed to be stronger under subliminal than under supraliminal 
conditions (Rotteveel, et al., 2001) and effect occurred mainly for participants 
who were not able to process the prime consciously (Sweeny, et al., 2009).  
Taken together, reactions to emotional expressions were examined with 
various priming experiments. The findings support the notion that emotional 
expressions are processed automatically (unintentionally and sometimes even 
unconsciously) and influence subsequent responses in a concordant way.  
 
2.2.3 Approach/avoidance experiments 
Affective reactions to emotional expressions are also examined by 
experiments which examined approach and avoidance reactions to emotional 
expressions. It has often been argued that humans are motivated to approach 
positive states and avoid negative ones (e.g. Darwin, 1872; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1990; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berndson, 1997; Davidson, Ekman, 
Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990). Accordingly it has been shown that positive 
stimuli elicit approach related behaviors whereas negative stimuli elicit 
avoidance related ones (Cacioppo, et al., 1997; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Solarz, 
1960). For example, participants were faster to pull a lever towards themselves 
in response to positive words than to push it away. The reversed pattern was 
observed for negative words (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Such effects have been 
explained assuming a direct link between evaluative processes and the 
appetitive and defensive motivational systems by which evaluations 
automatically trigger the associated behavior (Bargh, 1997; Cacioppo, et al., 
1997; Lang, et al., 1990; Neumann, 2003; Neumann, Förster, Strack, 2003). It 
has been argued that approach and avoidance behaviors serve an adaptive 
function since they help the individual to attain the most beneficial outcome. 
Following this rationale, it has been argued that positive emotions should elicit 
an approach related behavior, whereas negative emotions should elicit an 
avoidance related one.  
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Exactly this pattern was found by a number of researchers (Rotteveel & 
Phaf, 2004; Seidel et al, 2010; Stins, et al., 2011, Marsh, et al., 2005). In the 
study conducted by Rotteveel and Phaf, for example, participants had to push 
buttons that were perpendicularly aligned on a stand above and below a 
“home” button. Participants were instructed to categorize angry and happy 
faces appearing on the computer screen according to the emotional expression. 
The results show that an arm flexion – which is normally associated with an 
approaching behavior – was executed faster if the stimulus was a happy 
expression compared to an angry one. Arm tensions – typically associated with 
an avoiding behavior – were faster when categorizing angry expressions 
compared to happy ones. Interestingly, these results were only obtained in an 
experiment in which the emotional expression was task relevant. If the task 
was to categorize the gender of the face, no influence of emotional expression 
on behavioral reactions emerged. An influence of angry and happy facial 
expressions was also found if the approach avoidance reactions were executed 
with the whole body: In the study by Stins and colleagues, for example, 
participants were faster in initiating a step towards a happy face compared to 
an angry face.  
However, even though the result that negative expressions elicit an 
avoidance reaction are intriguing, other studies reported an approach related 
behavior to negative expressions such as anger (Wilkowski & Meier, 2010) and 
fear (Marsh, et al., 2005). These converging results can no longer be explained 
by the valence of the emotional expression. Instead, they were explained as 
being caused by the behavioral intention signaled by the emotional expression. 
As introduced above, facial expressions of emotions not only communicate 
affective information but also the expresser’s behavioral intention. Since 
behavioral approach and avoidance behaviors serve an adaptive function, it has 
been argued that behavioral reactions to emotional expressions are mainly 
influenced by these intentions, and not by the affective information (e.g. 
Marsh, et al., 2005; Wilkowski & Meier, 2010; Seidel et al, 2010.). This 
theoretical arguing is further supported by the results of a study which found 
that approaching behaviors are amplified by situational circumstances 
supporting this behavior. Wilkowski and Meier (2010) demonstrated that anger 
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leads to approach reactions particularly in situations in which this behavior is 
successful in overcoming the challenge implied by the angry expression. If the 
behavior is not successful in overcoming the challenge, an approach behavior 
is less likely. In their study, the authors manipulated the outcome that followed 
the reaction to an emotional expression: The anger expression changed to a 
happy or a fearful expression after the movement was initiated. The results 
show that approach related behaviors to angry expressions were faster if the 
anger expression changed to a fearful compared to a happy expression after the 
execution of the movement. The authors argue that the change from anger to 
fear signals submission of the expresser and therefore constitutes a success in 
overcoming the challenge signaled by the anger expression. On the contrary, 
the change from anger to joy signals high dominance and well-being of the 
expresser and therefore failure in overcoming the opponent. This results 
therefore demonstrates that it is actually the intention signaled by the emotion 
following the anger expression and not the valence of it that triggered the 
approach behavior. If valence was the critical factor, fear as a negative emotion 
would inhibit the approaching behavior whereas happiness as a positive 
emotion would facilitate it. 
If approach and avoidance reactions to emotional faces constitute a 
truly automatic process has not (yet) been thoroughly examined. However, it 
has been argued that the influence of emotional expression on these behaviors 
should be automatic because studies examining approach and avoidance 
behaviors to generally valent stimuli found an influence of valence even if it 
was not task relevant (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & 
Chaiken, 2002; Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, & De Houwer, 2010). However, the 
only study (that we know of) that examined if emotional expressions influence 
approach and avoidance reactions even if they are not task relevant, failed to 
find significant effects (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). Therefore, even though we 
cannot finally conclude that approach and avoidance behaviors to emotional 
expressions are based on an automatic process, there is reason to believe that 
they can occur automatically.  
Taken together, whereas all studies that we know of found an approach 
related behavior to happy expressions, the results regarding approach and 
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avoidance reactions to negative emotional expressions are rather mixed. 
Whereas some studies show an activation of avoidance behavior by negative 
emotions, there are some results suggesting that negative emotions (especially 
anger) can also elicit an approaching behavior. However, all researchers agree 
on the notion that approach and avoidance behaviors serve an adaptive function 
and the more recent studies also suppose that these behaviors are caused by the 
intention rather than the affect signaled by the emotional expression. 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that these reactions occur automatically, even 
though this assumption lacks definite evidence.  
 
2.2.4  Summary 
The influence of emotional expressions on affective reactions has been 
examined in various experiments employing different paradigms. Most results 
support the notion that humans react with concordant reactions to emotions of 
others: Priming experiments employing emotional expressions as primes found 
that those speeded the categorization of concordant targets and biased the 
ratings of ambiguous ones in a corresponding way. Experiments looking at 
mood contagion showed that emotional expressions induce a concordant mood 
or emotional experience in others. Additionally, it was shown that emotional 
expressions reliably elicit concordant facial reactions in the observer. 
Importantly, all of these effects can occur automatically, that is without 
intention and sometimes even without a conscious perception of the emotional 
expression.  
Shedding light on the question which component of the emotion 
triggers the reaction of the expresser stems for experiments looking at approach 
and avoidance reactions to emotional expressions: Whereas happy expressions 
reliably elicit a concordant approach behavior, angry and fearful faces can 
activate an approach as well as an avoidance reaction. It has been shown that 
situational cues as well as the outcome of the behavior influence which 
reaction occurs. These divergent reactions have been explained as being caused 
by the intention signaled by the emotion. The notion that reactions to emotional 
expressions are triggered by the intention and not by the valence or the 
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emotional experience of the expresser is (alone) also supported by an EMG 
study finding fear reactions to anger expressions (Moody, et al., 2007).  
Taken together, the results obtained from many experiments show that 
humans automatically react to emotional expressions of others. These reactions 
are often concordant to the expressed emotion and not only influenced by the 
valence of the emotion but also by the specific emotion and the intention 
associated with it.   
3 Group membership and emotion 
3 The influence of group membership on affective reactions 
to emotions 
 
The previous chapter presented evidence that humans automatically react to 
emotions expressed by others. Most of the times, these are concordant affective 
reactions: Positive emotional expressions speed up reactions to positive targets 
compared to negative ones, bring about positive ratings of ambiguous stimuli 
and result in an activation of the Zygomaticus Major muscle which is involved 
in smiling. Analogous results were obtained with negative emotional 
expressions. Explaining these findings, it has been argued that these reactions 
are (at least in part) triggered by the intention signaled by the emotional 
expression. The results from approach and avoidance experiments as well as 
facial mimicry support this assumption. 
The arguing that concordant affective reactions are triggered by the 
intention signaled by an emotional expression suggests that each emotion 
signals one specific intention, which then triggers a corresponding reaction. 
However, we argue – as was already argued in the introduction – that the same 
emotional expression can be interpreted as signaling different intentions. A 
happy facial expression, for example, might be seen as signaling a wish for 
affiliation, but can also interpreted as a sign of dominance or arrogance. 
Whereas a concordant reaction constitutes an adaptive reaction in the former 
case, a divergent reaction might be more sensible in the later. We argue that the 
interpretation of the intention of an emotion depends on situational and social 
factors. Such a social factor might the relationship between expresser and 
perceiver of the emotion. If this relationship is negative, the intention of the 
emotional expression will be interpreted in the light of this hostile relationship. 
On the contrary, if the relationship is friendly and cooperative, the intention 
will be seen in the corresponding light. Accordingly, the happy expression will 
be interpreted as signaling dominance or arrogance if the relationship is 
negative but interpreted as signaling a wish for affiliation if the relationship is 
positive. Since affective reactions to emotional expressions are influenced by 
the intention signaled by the emotion, we argue that divergent affective 
reactions to emotional expressions should occur if the relationship between the 
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expresser and the perceiver is negative and concordant reactions if the 
relationship is positive. 
One factor which influences the relationship between individuals is 
group membership (see Chapter 1): Whereas in-group members are typically 
evaluated positively and resources are cooperatively shared between members 
of the same group, out-group members are typically negatively evaluated and 
individuals will try to minimize the resources allocated to out-group members 
(e.g., Fazio, et al., 1995; Greenwald, et al., 1998; Tajfel, et al., 1971; Tajfel, & 
Turner, 1979). Following these findings and our arguing above, we assume that 
in-group and out-group members’ emotional expressions elicit different 
affective reactions because they influence which intention is inferred from the 
emotional expression. It was one of the main goals of this thesis to (a) show an 
influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotions and to (b) 
provide evidence that this effect is caused by a different interpretation of the 
intention signaled by an emotional expression. 
Importantly, we assume that the influence of group membership on 
affective reactions to emotional expressions occurs automatically, that is, 
unintentionally and maybe even uncontrollable. It was the second goal of this 
thesis to test this hypothesis. 
In the following paragraphs, we will first present an overview on 
studies in which the group membership of the expresser of an emotion was 
manipulated. This paragraph will be followed by a presentation of the 
mechanisms proposed as being responsible for the influence of group 
membership on reactions to emotions. In the last section, we will present our 
arguing that group membership influences affective reactions to emotions 
because it influences the interpretation of the intention signaled by an 
emotional expression in more detail.  
 
3.1 Empirical evidence for an influence of group membership on 
affective reactions to emotions 
Group membership influences reactions to emotions – evidence for this 
hypothesis will be presented in this section. The layout will thereby closely 
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follow that of Chapter 2.1: First, experiments examining the influence of group 
membership on mood contagion and mimicry will be presented, then those 
employing priming paradigms. Since no experiments (as far as we know) 
looked at the influence of group membership and emotional expressions on 
approach and avoidance reactions, this paragraph will be dropped.  
In comparison to Chapter 2, the studies presented in this chapter were 
not solely selected based on the automaticity of the underlying process. The 
reason for this is that there are only a small number of studies which examined 
the influence of group membership on reactions to emotions. Out of these, only 
a few directly addressed the question of automaticity. However, since one of 
the main aims of this thesis is to examine if the interaction between emotional 
expression and group membership can influence reactions automatically, the 
extent of automaticity will be intensively discussed for each result. 
Furthermore, since many studies in this chapter are of high relevance for the 
ones conducted within the scope of this thesis, those will be described in more 
detail than the studies presented in the previous chapters. 
 
3.1.1 Mimicry and mood contagion 
 Humans catch others’ emotions and imitate emotional expressions – 
evidence for this was presented in Chapter 2.1. However, what happens if the 
emotional expression is shown by an out-group member? Will this expression 
also activate a concordant mood state and a facial muscle reaction? This 
question shall be answered in the following paragraph. Therefore, we will first 
present studies that looked at the influence of group membership on mood 
contagion, then those that measured facial mimicry. Finally, we will present 
one study that examined the influence of facial mimicry on mood contagion in 
the context of in-group and out-group emotions.  
 
Mood Contagion. An influence of group membership on mood 
contagion (for a definition see Chapter 2.1) has been reported several times. 
The findings of those studies generally show that less concordant or even 
divergent affective reactions occur if emotions are expressed by out-group 
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members whereas emotions expressed by in-group members elicit concordant 
affective reactions (as discussed above). Interestingly, even completely 
divergent emotional (as opposed to affective) reactions have been reported as a 
response to out-group members’ emotions, for example, the experience of 
Schadenfreude by Dutch participants after the loss of the Italian soccer team in 
the European Championship 2000 (Leach, et al. 2003; Leach, & Spears, 2009). 
Preceding this match, the Italian team had defeated the Dutch team in the 
semifinals and was therefore responsible for its exit. Interestingly, this 
emotional reaction did not only occur after loss of the direct rival Italy, but the 
Dutch participants also reported Schadenfreude over the defeat of the general 
rival Germany, a team against which the Dutch soccer team did not compete 
during this tournament
4
. The results from these studies provide first evidence 
that negative emotions can elicit positive (i.e., divergent) emotional reactions 
in others if they are experienced by members of an out-group. However, they 
are only of limited relevance for the present research question since there is no 
reason to believe that this effect occurred automatically: In the experiment, 
participants were given enough time to think about the constellation and their 
feelings, were (most likely) not motivated to hide their emotions towards the 
defeat of the rivals, and probably recognized the intent of the study. Another 
limitation is that no actual emotional expressions or notion of emotional 
experience of the expressers were presented; we can only assume that the 
Schadenfreude experienced by the Dutch participants was elicited by the 
presumed negative emotional experience of the out-group members. Therefore, 
the applicability of this result to our research question is limited. 
However, there also are studies which examined the influence of group 
membership on mood contagion with more indirect manipulations or methods. 
One of these studies conducted by Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) also 
employed team allegiance to manipulate group membership; the assessment of 
mood contagion, however, was much more subtle: Participants read aloud a 
short story featuring a young man who was a supporter of one of two rival 
                                                 
4
 The German soccer team was eliminated by England before even reaching the quarterfinals. 
Even though Germany did not directly compete against the Netherlands, these two teams 
have always been strong rivals. Germany therefore constitutes a general rival who 
experienced a defeat and (most likely) negative emotions. 
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football teams (Red Sox or Yankees) and who experienced either a happy or 
fearful life event. All participants were supporters of one of the two football 
teams. Therefore, for them, the protagonist was either a member of the same or 
the rival group. During the readings, participants’ voices were recorded. The 
valence of the voice recordings was later rated by another sample of 
participants. The results show an interaction between emotion and team 
allegiance. For the happy scenarios, the voices were rated as more positive if 
the protagonist was a supporter of the same team as the reader compared to if 
he was supporting the rival team. For the fearful stories, the voices were rated 
as more negative if the protagonist and the reader shared team alliance 
compared to if they supported different teams.  
Similar results were found in a study reported in the same paper 
(Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2008) in which the emotional expression was more 
subtly manipulated but the assessment of mood contagion was much more 
direct. In this study, participants listened to a voice sample that was either 
spoken in a nervous or in a neutral way. In the voice sample, a male voice 
either stated that he was politically liberal or politically conservative and then 
indicated that he agreed with the respective party on many issues. The US-
American participants were all Democrats. After listening to the voice samples, 
participants rated their emotional state on several emotional adjectives. Again, 
an interaction between emotion and group membership occurred: Participants 
reported feeling more anxious after listening to the nervous voice sample in 
which the speaker stated that he held a liberal political attitude compared to the 
one in which he stated that he was rather conservative. Self-reported fear did 
not differ after the neutral voice samples as a function of political attitude of 
the speaker.  
A similar method to manipulate mood contagion was employed in a 
study conducted by Epstude and Mussweiler (2009; Study 2), which was part 
of a set of studies on comparison processes. In this experiment, participants 
were exposed to the images of emotional expressions shown by in-group and 
out-group members. Afterwards their current mood state was assessed. The 
emotional content of the images was not directly mentioned to the participants; 
their task was to rate the image quality of the pictures. In contrast to the group 
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manipulations reported above, group membership was operationalized through 
gender in this experiment. Accordingly, half of the images displayed the 
emotional expressions of females and the other ones expressions shown by 
males. Iin order to emphasize the intergroup situation, participants were asked 
to read a short paragraph describing the rivalry between men and women on 
the German job market before the image viewing procedure. The results show 
an influence of group membership on the mood ratings: If expresser and 
perceiver were of the same gender, positive emotional expressions elicited a 
more positive mood than negative facial expressions. If the gender of expresser 
and perceiver, however, differed, a divergent affect occurred. Positive 
emotional expressions elicited a significantly worse mood than negative 
emotional expressions.  
The studies reported above provide evidence that group membership 
indeed influences mood contagion. Importantly, the results of these studies 
occurred even though neither group membership nor emotional expression was 
directly relevant for the ongoing task, pointing to an automatic process. 
However, after taking a close look at the exact methods employed, we think 
that the automaticity of the effect can be questioned. In all of these studies, the 
intergroup situation employed was very competitive. Furthermore, the social 
norm regarding these groups asked for an open expression of the sympathy and 
antipathy towards the expressers, not for an inhibition. For example, since there 
is a strong, openly expressed rivalry between the two soccer teams employed in 
the study conducted by Weisbuch & Ambady (2008), the participants might 
have felt pressed to express their sympathy or antipathy towards the respective 
team and intentionally altered their voices. This seems even more likely if one 
keeps in mind that participants read the story into a microphone knowing that 
somebody would listen to them later. Furthermore, because the participants 
were strong supporters of one or the other team, the team allegiance of the 
protagonist in the story was very relevant for them. This might have let them to 
pay extra attention to the emotion experienced by the “friend” or “rival”. The 
same argument applies to the other experiments which examined the influence 
of group membership on mood contagion, for example the one conducted by 
Epstude and Mussweiler (2009): Participants might have paid extra attention to 
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the gender of the expressers, especially since the rivalry between men and 
women affected them personally. The emotional expression might then have 
been evaluated in the light of this very competitive situation (e.g., “this man is 
smiling because he got the job I wanted”) and thus activated a divergent affect. 
Another criticism of both of the studies conducted by Weisbuch and 
Ambady (2008) is that the analyses do not allow for a direct assessment if 
emotional expressions de facto elicited concordant and divergent reactions as a 
function of group membership. Apart from the significant interaction term, 
only the direct contrast between the reactions to in-group and out-group 
expressions of the same emotion were reported (e.g., in-group/fear vs. out-
group/fear). The simple tests comparing reactions to positive and negative 
emotions for the in-group and the out-group separately are missing (e.g., in-
group/happiness vs. in-group/fear). Since no standard deviations are available 
in the paper, it is not possible to assess if in-group members’ emotions actually 
elicited concordant reactions and – this point is maybe even more important – 
if emotions expressed by out-group members activated divergent ones. 
Therefore, it can only be concluded with certainty that out-group members’ 
emotions attenuated emotional reactions compared to those of in-group 
members.  
Taken together, a couple of studies show that mood contagion is 
influenced by the group membership of the person experiencing the emotion. 
Whereas emotions experienced by in-group members elicited concordant 
affective reactions in the observers, out-group members’ emotions brought 
forth a divergent affective experience. However, even though (in some studies) 
precautions were taken to keep the likelihood of intentional processes low, all 
studies fail to show that this influence can occur truly automatically.  
 
Mimicry. An influence of group membership on reactions to emotions 
has also been examined in the field of facial mimicry. In these studies, facial 
reactions to facial displays of emotions expressed by in-group and out-group 
members were measured.  
One of these studies looking at the influence of group membership on 
facial reactions of emotions varied the nature of the group membership. 
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Bourgeois and Hess (2008) examined the influence of group membership based 
on shared interest and group membership based on ethnicity on facial mimicry 
effects. In this experiment, participants passively watched angry, sad and 
happy facial expressions shown by African and White Caucasian men 
(ethnicity group membership). Half of the members of each of these ethnical 
groups were labeled basketball player and the other half non-basketball players 
(shared interest group membership). The participants were all White Caucasian 
men and either active basketball players or non-basketball players and no 
basketball supporters. Therefore, the expressers were either members of a 
double in-group (shared interest and same ethnicity), a double out-group 
(different ethnicity and differing interest) or a mixed group (same ethnicity and 
different interest or different ethnicity and shared interest). The results show 
that group membership based on shared interests influenced reactions to 
displays of sadness: If expresser and perceiver shared interests, more mimicry 
was elicited by the sadness of the expresser compared to if they had different 
interests. This was shown by a higher activation of the Corrugator Supercilii 
muscle compared to the Zygomaticus Major and the Orbicularis Oculi muscle 
(the muscle next to the eye which produces smile wrinkles) for in-group 
compared to out-group members. For the other two emotional expressions, no 
influence of group membership on the facial reactions of the observers 
emerged. Whereas happiness elicited a concordant mimicry reaction which was 
not qualified by group membership of the expressers, no mimicry effect 
occurred for the anger displays. The results show that facial reactions to 
expressions of emotions can be influenced by group membership. However, 
this effect was not very pronounced in this study. Group membership only 
moderated the reactions to displays of sadness, but not to those of anger and 
happiness. Additionally, only the group membership that was based on shared 
(or different) interests influenced the reactions. Ethnical group membership did 
not influence the reactions to the emotional expressions. The reason for this is 
not clear; it might be that shared interest was more salient than ethnicity in this 
experiment, since it was explicitly mentioned. However, it is also possible that 
participants consciously controlled their reactions to the ethnical in-group and 
3 Group membership and emotion 
 
35 
 
out-group displays in order to not appear prejudiced. Thus, regarding the 
automaticity of the effects, no final conclusion can be drawn. 
A very recent study examined the influence of group membership on 
facial mimicry, mood contagion, and the interaction between those two 
reactions to emotions (Van der Schalk, et al., 2011). Participants in this study 
passively watched images or video clips presenting angry, fearful and happy 
facial expressions shown by in-group and out-group members. Facial reactions 
to these stimuli were measured with EMG or coded with the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS; Ekman, & Friesen, 1978)
5
. Group membership was 
operationalized through subject of study (Experiment 1) or ethnicity 
(Experiment 2). After the presentation of each expression, participants were 
asked to indicate how much anger, fear, happiness and aversion they felt. The 
results regarding the facial reactions show that group membership influenced 
the imitation of fearful and angry expressions. Those emotions evoked a 
stronger activation of the respective muscle or Action Unit if shown by in-
group members compared to out-group members. Reactions to happy facial 
expressions were not influenced by group membership. Surprisingly, and in 
contrast to many other studies, no evidence for mimicry reactions to happy 
expressions occurred at all. Interestingly, in this study, out-group membership 
not only attenuated concordant mimicry emotional reactions but elicited 
divergent mimicry and mood contagion: Fear expressions shown by the out-
group evoked stronger facial reactions of aversion than the same emotion 
expressed by the in-group. Additionally, participants reported feeling more fear 
after anger expressions shown by out-group members compared to members of 
the in-group.  
The self-report data which were collected after each stimulus 
presentation were analyzed in order to assess the amount of mood contagion. 
The results show that participants experienced concordant emotional feelings 
after the presentation of the emotional expressions. These reactions, however, 
were not moderated by group membership. Looking at the interaction between 
                                                 
5
 The FACS is a measurement method based on observations of facial muscles. Specifically 
trained coders thereby rate if certain action units (AUs), which are associated with certain 
emotions, are activated. 
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mood contagion and mimicry, the authors found no evidence for an influence 
of mimicry on mood contagion. They argue that the reason for this might be up 
to the nature of the assessment of the respective variables: It is conceivable that 
self-reports are based on less automatic and more controlled processes than 
facial reactions.  
Taken together, the findings of this study support the notion that 
reactions to emotions are influenced by the group membership of the expresser: 
Emotions expressed by out-group members elicited less concordant reactions 
than emotional expressions shown by members of the in-group. Furthermore, 
truly divergent emotional reactions occurred to fear and anger expressions 
shown by out-group members. However, the automaticity of the results can be 
discussed again: Participants were instructed to rate the emotion of each 
expression after presentation. Combined with a long presentation duration, this 
focus on the emotional content might have triggered a conscious reasoning 
about the emotional expression. However, in comparison to the experiment 
conducted by Bourgeois and Hess (2008), ethnic group membership moderated 
facial mimicry in this study. Since it can be assumed that the participants were 
motivated not to appear prejudiced, they probably tried to control their facial 
reactions to ethnical out-group members. Therefore, one might argue that the 
influence of group membership was automatic in the sense of uncontrollable.  
To sum up, the results of the studies presented in this paragraph suggest 
that group membership influences mood contagion reactions and mimicry to 
emotional expressions: Whereas in-group members’ emotions typically elicit a 
concordant mood state and an imitation of the facial expression, these reactions 
are attenuated or even reversed for emotions expressed by out-group members. 
An influence of mimicry on mood contagion could not be found. However, 
even though a similar pattern of results was reported in all studies, the results 
also differ in detail. Whereas mood contagion was attenuated after happy 
expressions shown by out-group members (Epstude, & Mussweiler, 2009; 
Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2008), mimicry reactions to happy faces were not 
influenced by group membership (Bourgeois, & Hess, 2008; van der Schalk, et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, which negative emotion elicited different reactions for 
3 Group membership and emotion 
 
37 
 
in-group and out-group members also varied between studies (Bourgeois, & 
Hess, 2008; Van der Schalk, et al., 2011).  
 
3.1.2 Priming with out-group members’ emotional expressions 
There are also studies which examined the influence of group 
membership on affective reactions to emotion with experiments employing 
priming paradigms. This paragraph will present two sets of studies in which 
primes showing emotions expressed by in-group and out-group members were 
employed. The first studies implemented a procedure that was modeled based 
on the affective misattribution procedure, whereas in the second study an 
evaluative priming paradigm was realized. 
In the studies conducted by Ruys and colleagues (Ruys, et al., 2007), 
the authors examined if subliminal primes, consisting of emotional expressions 
shown by in-group and out-group members, influence the evaluation of 
subsequent neutral targets. The primes were angry and happy expressions 
shown by men and women of White Caucasian (Experiment 1) or White 
Caucasian and Asian origin (Experiment 2). Accordingly, an intergroup 
situation was created by making gender (Experiment 1) or ethnicity 
(Experiment 2) salient. The primes were presented for 31ms and 17ms, 
respectively, and subsequently masked. The targets were neutral expressions of 
men and women of White Caucasian (Experiment 1) and White Caucasian and 
Asian origin (Experiment 2). Participants were White Caucasian men and 
women. The design was realized completely between participants such that 
each participant was exposed to only one prime category (angry or happy 
emotional expression shown by either in-group or out-group members), and to 
targets showing either in-group or out-group members. The authors 
hypothesized that primes displaying angry out-group members would result in 
a more positive evaluation of the subsequent target than primes displaying 
happy out-group members. If the person expressing the emotion was a member 
of the in-group, however, the displayed emotion should influence the 
evaluation of the target in a concordant way. Importantly, the authors assumed 
that this effect would take place even though the primes were presented 
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subliminally. The results of both experiments mainly supported this hypothesis. 
The gender (Experiment 1), or the ethnicity (Experiment 2) of the expresser 
influenced the evaluation of a subsequent neutral target: Out-group members’ 
emotions led to a divergent evaluation of the primes, such that positive primes 
led to a more negative evaluation of the target than negative primes. Emotions 
expressed by members of the in-group, however, did not influence the 
evaluation of the primes at all. These results thus support the assumption that 
group membership influences reactions to emotional expressions, leading to 
divergent reactions if the expresser of an emotion is a member of an out-group. 
Importantly, the results obtained in the study point to the automaticity of this 
influence, since they occurred even though the primes were presented 
subliminally. However, although intriguing, the results should be treated with 
some caution since they entail several caveats: In Experiment 1, the influence 
of group membership and emotional expression on the evaluation of a 
subsequent target was only observed for participants who were in a neutral 
mood state. If participants were in a positive or negative mood, no effects 
occurred. Another caveat consists of the fact that a very hostile intergroup 
situation was created in Experiment 2: Before working on the priming task, 
participants watched a short film clip about the inhumanities committed by 
Japanese soldiers against Westerners during World War II. This film clip might 
have created a situation in which Asian individuals were highly relevant and 
negative for the participants. This manipulation therefore might have 
influenced the results. Most startlingly, however, is the finding that the group 
membership of the targets did not influence the evaluations of the targets in 
either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2. In both experiments, not only the primes, 
but also the targets constituted in-group and out-group members. However, the 
reactions to the targets only varied as a function of the group membership of 
the primes. Group membership of the targets did not influence the reactions. 
Why the group membership of the primes but not the one of the targets 
influenced the evaluation of the targets is in need of explanation, especially in 
Experiment 2, in which a very hostile intergroup situation was created. It seems 
illogical to us that the intergroup manipulation influenced the processing or 
evaluation of the primes but not of the targets. A last critical point in this study 
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is the finding that emotional expressions shown by out-group members led to a 
divergent evaluation of the target face, whereas no concordant reaction was 
found if the expresser of the emotion was an in-group member. In this case, the 
evaluation of the prime did not vary as a function of either the primes’ group 
membership or emotional expression. Taken together, even though the results 
of the study reported by Ruys and colleagues report an influence of group 
membership on reactions to emotions with an affective misattribution 
procedure, these seem to be (at least in part) disputable. 
Another set of studies examining the influence of emotional expressions 
and group membership as primes on reactions to targets was conducted by 
Weisbuch and Ambady (2008; two other studies presented in the same paper 
were reported in Chapter 3.1.1.). In contrast to the studies by Ruys and 
colleagues reported above, these studies employed variants of the evaluative 
priming paradigm: Unambiguously positive and negative images and emotional 
words served as targets in three experiments, whereas emotional expressions 
shown by in-group and out-group members served as primes. In Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2, the authors examined the influence of happy, fearful and 
anger expressions shown by White Caucasian and African American men and 
women on the time needed to categorize positive and negative images as 
positive and negative. The emotional expressions were either presented supra- 
(Experiment 1) or subliminally (Experiment 2). The participants were students 
of White Caucasian and African American ethnicity. In order to analyze the 
influence of the primes on the reaction times to the targets, affect scores were 
calculated by subtracting reaction times to positive targets from reaction times 
for negative targets for each prime category separately. The results show that 
group membership and emotional expression influenced the affect scores, 
resulting in an interaction: Happiness expressed by an in-group member 
elicited a more positive affect (i.e., speeded the categorization of positive 
targets compared to negative targets) than happiness expressed by an out-group 
member. Fear expressed by an in-group member, on the other hand, elicited 
more negative affect than fear expressed by an out-group member. For the 
neutral expressions, no influence of group membership was observed. The 
same pattern of results was found with supra- and subliminal prime 
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presentation and for White Caucasian as well as African American participants. 
In a third study, emotion specific reactions to emotional primes displaying fear, 
happiness and anger shown by in-group and out-group members were 
examined. As in Experiment 1 and 2, the emotional expressions shown by in-
group and out-group members served as primes. Targets, however, were words 
relating to the emotions happiness, fear, anger and sadness, and non-words 
consisting of the same letters. In order to analyze the emotion-specific 
influence of the primes on the targets, an emotion score was calculated for each 
prime and target category separately by subtracting the reaction times for 
words describing a certain emotion from the reaction times for non-words 
consisting of the same letters. The results show that emotion-specific reactions 
to the prime categories were influenced by the group membership of the 
expresser (see Figure 2): Happiness elicited more fear reactions if shown by an 
out-group compared to an in-group member. No other differences between in-
group and out-group expressers occurred for this emotional expression. Fear, 
however, activated stronger fear reactions if shown by an in-group compared to 
an out-group member. Again, no other differences between in-group and out-
group expressers reached significance. For anger expressions, more anger 
reactions occurred if it was expressed by an out-group compared to an in-group 
member. This was the only significant in-group/out-group difference for this 
emotional expression.  
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Figure 2 Reaction times to emotion words as a function of prime emotion and 
prime race. Higher scores indicate increased speed to the emotion words, 
relative to the matched control words. Solid gray bars = In-group; solid black 
bars = Out-group. From “Affective divergence: Automatic responses to others' 
emotions depend on group membership” by M. Weisbuch & N. Ambady, N., 
2008, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1063 – 1079. 
Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with 
permission. 
 
Taken together, the results of these three studies reported by Weisbuch 
and Ambady (2008; and the two others reported in the same paper described 
above) support the notion that group membership and emotional expression 
interact. The results of Experiment 1 and 2 show that out-group members’ 
emotions elicited less concordant affect than the same emotions expressed by 
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members of the in-group. This effect occurred even if the emotional expression 
was presented subliminally. Experiment 3 even presents evidence for emotion-
specific reactions to in-group and out-group emotions: In-group fear elicited 
more fear than out-group fear, whereas out-group happiness elicited more fear 
than in-group happiness. Anger, however, activated more anger responses if 
shown by an out-group member compared to a member of the in-group. 
Altogether, the studies therefore provide strong evidence that group 
membership influences reactions to emotions. However, the results also leave 
many questions unanswered: The analyses in Experiment 1 and 2 do not allow 
for an assessment of whether the emotional primes actually elicited concordant 
and divergent reactions as a function of group membership (Please note that the 
same argument was presented in Chapter 3.1.1 for the other two experiments). 
Only comparisons between reactions to in-group and out-group expressions of 
one certain emotion were reported. If, however, different emotions elicited 
different reactions for one certain group, is not possible to assess. Even though 
the graphs shown in the paper indeed indicate a concordant affect for in-group 
members’ emotions and a divergent affect for emotions expressed by the out-
group, the lack of a reference of standard deviations does not allow for an 
inference about significance. The same argument applies to the results of 
Experiment 3: The results section only reports comparisons between groups for 
one certain emotional expression and one emotional target. If in-group 
members’ emotions elicited concordant affective reactions (i.e., a fearful 
expression speeded responses to fear targets), and if the reactions were 
reversed for out-group members’ emotions, is not answered. The numbers 
displayed in the paper, however, do only show a concordant reaction for fearful 
expressions shown by in-group members. Images displaying in-group members 
expressing happiness and anger, however, did not activate concordant affective 
reactions (see Figure 2). In our view, the validity of the results can be 
questioned if the standard effect, that is, concordant reactions to in-group 
emotions, is not observed.  
Taken together, the two priming studies reported in this paragraph 
found that group membership and emotional expression interact and 
subsequently influence the evaluation and categorization of the targets. 
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Whereas happiness expressed by in-group members as well as anger and fear 
expressed by out-group members elicited positive reactions, negative 
expressions shown by members of the in-group and positive expressions shown 
by members of the out-group activated negative ones. This interaction seems to 
occur (at least in part) automatically since it was also obtained in cases in 
which the primes where presented subliminally. Both studies, however, entail 
some caveats which make it necessary to replicate and generalize the results. 
 
3.1.3 Summary and discussion of automaticity 
The results reported in this section show that group membership 
influences affective reactions to emotions. Whereas emotional expressions 
shown by the in-group typically elicit concordant reactions (more positive 
affective reactions after positive emotion, more negative affective reactions 
after negative emotions), these are reversed (or diminished) for emotions 
expressed by out-group members. This effect was observed with various 
methods such as EMG, priming and self-report. Therefore, even though the 
effects were sometimes small and the methods questionable, this cumulative 
finding shows that the influence of group membership on reactions to emotions 
is somehow reliable. It does not only occur for one specific reaction measured 
with one specific method, but shows itself in various reactions measured with 
various methods. Possible mechanisms for this effect will be described in the 
next paragraph. 
However, regarding the automaticity of the effects, no final conclusion 
can be drawn. Even though precautions were taken in most of the experiments 
to prevent intentional processes, these were (at least from our point of view) 
sometimes more and sometimes less successful. The most dominant caveat in 
the experiments examining the influence of group membership on mood 
contagion is that all results (that we know of) were observed in intergroup 
situations in which a strong, openly expressed rivalry between in-group and 
out-group members existed. This rivalry was either already preexistent (e.g., 
Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2008; Leach, et al. 2003) or created in the laboratory 
(Epstude, & Mussweiler, 2009). No results were reported in which the 
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intergroup situation was not explicitly mentioned or in which groups were 
employed for which participants would try to control their negative attitudes. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that intentional processes played a role in the 
observed effect.  
The priming experiments reported by Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) 
indicate that the observed interaction between group membership and 
emotional expression occurred automatically. The primes exerted an influence 
even though they were subliminally presented, the intergroup situation was 
created by employing ethnical out-group members, and the answers occurred 
rather fast. However, the conclusion that the effect observed here was truly 
automatic should also be treated with caution. In addition to the criticism 
pointed out above, it has to be noted that in Experiment 1 and 2, the 
participants’ task was to evaluate the targets. Research on evaluative priming 
shows that priming effects mainly occur in conditions in which the participants 
are asked to evaluate the target; if the task is to name the target or to classify it 
on another dimension (e.g., person vs. object) evaluative priming effects are 
rare (see Klauer & Musch, 2003, for a review; see also Spruyt, De Houwer, 
Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). Thus, a context in which evaluations are required 
seems necessary for the prime to exert its influence on the response. Therefore 
the priming effect observed in these experiments might depend on the 
conscious goal to evaluate, making the automaticity of the effect “goal-
dependent” (Bargh, 1989). Even though this point does not apply to 
Experiment 4, other caveats appear here, for example the limited number of 
trials and the simple comparisons. 
Taken all of these points into account, it seems necessary to examine 
the degree of automaticity behind the influence of group membership on 
affective reactions to emotional expressions further. Concretely, it would be 
interesting to assess if group membership influences mood contagion if the 
intergroup situation is not explicitly made salient. Furthermore, it should be 
examined if the interaction between group membership and emotional 
expression depends on a conscious goal to evaluate. It was one of the goals of 
the current thesis to investigate these questions. 
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3.2 Possible mechanisms underlying the influence of group membership 
on affective reactions to emotions 
Group membership can influence affective reactions to emotions as the 
previous paragraph showed: Whereas emotions expressed by in-group 
members typically elicited concordant affective reactions, out-group members’ 
expressions elicited divergent ones. However, what is the reason for this 
effect? Why does group membership influence reactions to emotions?  
We argue that group membership influences affective reactions to 
emotions because it influences which intention is inferred from an emotional 
expression: In an in-group situation, the intention of emotional expressions will 
be interpreted in the light of this positive, cooperative relationship. If shown by 
out-group members, however, the intention signaled by the same emotional 
expressions will rather be seen in the light of the hostile, competitive 
intergroup situation. Since empirical evidence suggests that emotional 
expressions are influenced by the intention signaled by the emotional 
expression, these different intentions should activate different reactions, 
resulting in a difference between reactions to in-group and out-group members’ 
emotions. This argument will be presented in more detail in this section. 
However, several other mechanisms were proposed to explain the 
influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotion, namely a 
comparison focus, the wish to affiliate and the social meaning of emotional 
expressions. These mechanisms nicely explain the findings of the studies in 
which they were introduced. However, they often fail to account for the results 
found in other studies. Before the presentation of our proposition regarding the 
mechanism underlying the interaction between group membership and 
emotional expression, these explanations will be presented and discussed in 
detail. 
 
3.2.1 Comparison focus 
Several researchers explain the influence of group membership on 
reactions to emotions by the human tendency to engage in comparison 
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processes (Epstude, & Mussweiler, 2009; Ruys, et al., 2007). Comparison 
processes influence judgments regarding the self and others in a variety of 
topics: It has repeatedly been shown that people use available comparison 
standards when making judgments regarding attitudes, person perception, 
decision making and the self (for an overview see Mussweiler, 2003). The 
result of such a comparison process can be contrast or assimilation, which 
means that the judgment is either contrasted away or assimilated towards the 
comparison standard. Interestingly, both contrast and assimilation can occur in 
the same field. It has been found, for example, that participants rate themselves 
as either less competent (Morse, & Gergen, 1970) or as more competent 
(Brewer, & Weber, 1994) if the comparison standard is a very competent 
individual compared to a less competent one. One factor that has repeatedly 
been proposed as determining if assimilation or contrast occurs is the perceived 
similarity or dissimilarity between the target and the comparison standard (e.g., 
Ruys, et al., 2007; Bless, & Wänke, 2000; Mussweiler, 2003): If both are 
judged as being similar, assimilation is likely. However, if target and 
comparison standard are judged as being dissimilar, contrast is more likely to 
be the result of the comparison process. Supporting this assumption, it has been 
shown that group membership, which has an impact on the perceived similarity 
between target and comparison standard, influences whether assimilation or 
contrast occurs in behavior (e.g., Schubert, & Häfner, 2003) or self-knowledge 
(Mussweiler, & Bodenhausen, 2002).  
Drawing back on these results, authors examining mood contagion 
argued that an evaluation of the own affective state can also be influenced by 
comparison processes (Epstude, & Mussweiler, 2009). Moreover, it was 
assumed that depending on the group membership of target and comparison 
standard, this comparison process can lead to assimilation or contrast (Epstude, 
& Mussweiler, 2009; Ruys, et al., 2007). Concretely, Ruys and colleagues 
argued that in a salient intergroup situation people will compare themselves 
with the out-group but to a much lesser extent with the in-group. This will 
result in a contrast effect for the out-group but assimilation for the in-group. 
They use this explanation to account for the priming effects reported above: 
According to them, the participants compared themselves with the expressers 
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of the emotion and resulting in a divergent response if the expresser is a 
member of the out-group and a concordant one if he is an in-group member.  
Epstude and Mussweiler (2009) also explain their results regarding 
mood contagion with comparison processes. However, they employ a slightly 
different argumentation: They assume that – depending on the group 
membership of the expresser and perceiver – different comparison processes 
are likely to occur. If the other person is a member of the in-group, the subject 
will focus on similarities between himself and the other; as a result, attributes 
that describe both the perceiver and the comparison standard will be activated 
and are therefore more readily available, resulting in a concordant affect. On 
the other hand, if the other person is a member of the out-group, the subject 
will rather focus on dissimilarities and such attributes that are not shared by the 
perceiver and the comparison standard will be activated; as a result, these are 
more readily available, resulting in a contrast effect. The findings of the study 
reported above support this hypothesis (see above). Furthermore, this arguing 
is supported by other studies in which the comparison focus was directly 
manipulated with a priming procedure. The results were comparable to those 
observed after the group manipulation: If the focus was on similarities, a 
concordant affective reaction occurred. However, if the focus was on 
dissimilarities, a divergent affective reaction was found. 
However, even though the assumption that a comparison focus is 
responsible for concordant and divergent reactions to emotional expressions 
shown by in-group and out-group members nicely explains the concordant and 
divergent affective reactions found by Epstude and Mussweiler (2009), and 
Ruys and colleagues (2007), it also entails some limitations: It has problems 
accounting for the occurrence of emotion-specific divergent reactions, like the 
fear reaction to out-group anger observed by Van der Schalk and colleagues 
(2011) and the difference between affective reactions to fear and anger found 
by Weisbuch and Ambady (2008). It is logical to assume that a general positive 
affect is the contrasting reaction to a negative emotional expression and vice 
versa, but what is the contrasting reaction to fear, anger, or joy expressions? 
This problem of the comparison focus explanation does not appear in the 
results reported by Ruys and colleagues since here only general evaluative 
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reactions were measured and not specific emotional ones. The same is true for 
the effect reported by Epstude and Mussweiler. Here, the influence of group 
membership was also only found on a general affective reaction and not on 
specific emotional measures. Thus, while the comparison focus constitutes a 
plausible explanation for the effect of group membership on general affective 
reactions to emotions, it has to be supplemented by a process explaining 
emotion-specific results.  
 
3.2.2 Affiliation 
A different process which has been proposed as being responsible for 
the influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotions arises 
from the findings that mimicry influences affiliation. It has been shown that 
mimicking your interaction partner increases liking and liked individuals are 
mimicked more (see Chapter 2.2). Since typically out-group members are liked 
less than in-group members, sending a sign of affiliation would be a 
counterproductive process. Accordingly it has been predicted that in-group 
members’ emotional expressions should be mimicked more than those shown 
by members of the out-group (Bourgeois, & Hess, 2008; Van der Schalk, et al., 
2011). This prediction was supported by the results of studies in which facial 
reactions to in-group and out-group members’ emotions were measured: 
Emotions expressed by in-group members elicited more concordant facial 
reactions than the same expressions shown by out-group members (Bourgeois, 
& Hess, 2008; Van der Schalk, et al., 2011; see above). The argument that it 
was actually the positive or negative attitude towards the expresser of the 
emotion which created the effect was further supported by a study in which the 
attitudes towards the expresser were explicitly manipulated before facial 
reactions were measured. The results show that happiness and sadness 
expressed by avatars which were associated with positive traits were mimicked 
more than the same emotions expressed by avatars associated with negative 
traits (Likowski, et al., 2008). However, this explanation entails the same 
problem as the one drawing on comparison processes. It cannot account for 
emotion-specific effects such as fear reactions to anger expressions (van der 
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Schalk, et al. 2011) and happiness to fear expressions (Weisbuch, & Ambady, 
2008). Accounting for this problem, several authors (e.g., Bourgeois, & Hess, 
2008; van der Schalk, et al., 2011) argued that an additional factor to affiliation 
was driving the results: The meaning of the expressed emotion. This argument 
will be presented in the following paragraph.  
 
3.2.3 Social meaning of the emotion 
It has been argued by various researchers that emotional expressions are 
social signals which inform the perceiver about the status of the social 
environment (e.g., Fischer, & Manstead, 2008; Fridlund, 1994; Keltner, & 
Haidt, 1999; van Kleef, 2009). In this view, emotions not only differ along the 
valence dimension but they also communicate information relevant for the 
perceiver – they have a social meaning (see also Chapter 2.1 about the function 
of emotions). A fearful expression, for example, signals to the perceiver that 
there is danger around, but also that the expresser feels threatened, has a low 
coping potential and intends to flee. Anger, on the other hand, signals that the 
perceiver experiences an obstacle blocking his goals, that he feels dominant 
and intends to attack (e.g., Horstman, 2003; Marsh, et al. 2005; Knutson, 
1996). These meanings have been used to explain the difference within 
affective reactions to in-group and out-group members’ emotions: Whether 
affective reactions to out-group emotions are attenuated in comparison to in-
group emotions should depend on the specific meaning of the specific emotion 
for the perceiver (Bourgeois, & Hess, 2008; Van der Schalk, et al., 2011; 
Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2008). It has been argued that a fearful expression, for 
example, should elicit less concordant reactions if shown by an out-group 
member compared to a member of the in-group because it is not only a threat 
related signal but also a sign of submission. Many or the empirical results 
reported above are in line with this arguing (e.g., Van der Schalk, et al., 2011; 
Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2008). The notion that affective reactions to emotional 
expressions are triggered by the meaning of the specific emotion also nicely 
explains the occurrence of a divergent affective reaction. A happiness reaction 
to the fearful face of a disliked out-group member, or a fearful reaction to the 
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angry face of this person constitute adaptive reactions to the specific meaning 
of the respective emotions.  
However, the argument that the specific social meaning of the emotion 
is responsible for the difference between reactions to in-group and out-group 
emotions also entails some problems. First of all, which reaction should be 
activated by the meaning of an emotion is not clear; therefore, this explanation 
can be adapted to flexibly explain diverging results. A closer look at the 
arguments of the researchers referring to the “meaning explanation” shows that 
this problem is (at least in part) caused by the fact that the respective authors 
interpret the meaning of an emotion differently: Whereas Bourgeois and Hess 
(2008), for example, argue that different emotions should be mimicked to a 
different extent because they vary in their affiliative content as well as in the 
costs associated with mimicking, Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) state that out-
group emotions signal relative group dominance and should therefore elicit 
different reactions. These two meanings might be correlated; however, they 
also differ in their predictions and explain contrary results. In the arguing by 
Bourgeois and Hess, reactions to happiness should not differ between in-group 
and out-group expressers because happiness signals a high wish for affiliation 
and a mimicking reaction is associated with low costs. This is exactly what 
they found. According to Weisbuch and Ambady, however, the emotional 
expression should be interpreted in the light of relative group dominance and 
out-group happiness should therefore be seen as signaling high dominance and 
elicit more negative reactions than in-group happiness. The findings by 
Weisbuch and Ambady support this notion. This example shows that the 
meaning of an emotion can be flexibly used to explain contrasting results. This 
problem of the meaning explanation is not only apparent between studies 
employing different dependent variables, but also between those examining the 
same reactions (e.g., mimicry). For example, both Van der Schalk and 
colleagues (2011) and Bourgeois and Hess explain the mimicry reactions to 
anger expressions observed in their respective study by the meaning signaled 
by the anger expression. However, the results which are explained by the same 
mechanism differ. Whereas Van der Schalk and colleagues found that out-
group anger elicited less concordant facial reactions than in-group anger, no 
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difference in reactions to anger expressions occurred in the study conducted by 
Bourgeois and Hess. Therefore, although the notion that affective reactions to 
emotions are influenced by the meaning of the emotional expressions is 
intriguing, it is unclear if it only constitutes an a posteriori explanation of 
observed, unexpected effects. It is therefore necessary to thoroughly test if 
reactions to emotions are actually influenced by the signaled meaning and by 
which specific component.  
Another limitation of the “meaning explanation” is that none of the 
authors specify how group membership influences which meaning is inferred 
from an emotion – why would in-group fear signal distress but out-group fear 
low dominance? Why would out-group anger elicit fear but in-group anger 
would not? The exact mechanism by which in-group and out-group emotions 
are interpreted differently has to be specified.  
It was one of the main goals of the experiments conducted for this 
thesis to overcome the problems of the meaning explanation. We therefore 
formulate a theory how and why group membership influences the meaning of 
an emotion. Concretely, we hypothesize that reactions to expressed emotions 
differ depending on the group membership of the expresser because the group 
membership influences the intention signaled by an emotional expression. 
Moreover, we posit that this is the case because the intentions of in-group 
emotions are seen in the light of the friendly, cooperative relationship that 
exists between in-group members, whereas the intention signaled by out-group 
members should be interpreted in the light of the hostile, competitive 
relationship which can be found between members of different groups. We will 
describe our argument in much detail in the next chapter.  
 
3.2.4 Intention 
As was already mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is now 
agreement that emotional expressions do not only carry affective information 
but they also provide information about the environment, about the expressers’ 
orientation towards the relationship and – most importantly – about his 
intention (Horstmann, 2003; Keltner, & Haidt, 1999; Yik & Russell, 1999). A 
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smile, for example, is seen as signaling the intention to affiliate, an anger 
expression the intention to attack and a fear expression the intention to flee. 
The view that emotions carry information about the expresser’s intention was 
firstly formulated by Fridlund (1994). According to his “behavioral ecology 
view”, emotional expressions evolved evolutionary. Consequentially he argued 
that emotional expressions convey intentions
6
 rather than feelings because 
expressing intentions and action requests might influence the behavior of the 
interaction partner; such an influence might be more beneficial than informing 
the other person about your feeling state. Accordingly, emotional expressions 
which were successful in changing the course of the interaction brought about 
evolutionary benefits and were further transmitted. This view was in contrast to 
Ekmans neurocultural theory (1972) stating that emotional expressions are 
readouts of internal feeling states. Bridging the gap, component oriented 
theories of emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984) see behavioral 
intentions and facial expressions as two components of an emotion, with 
physiological arousal, subjective feeling, and cognitive appraisals constituting 
the other ones. These theories suggest that the components of a specific 
emotion are correlated; hence the facial expression associated with one specific 
emotion is closely linked to the feeling state as well as the behavioral intention 
associated with this emotion. This arguing received empirical support (e.g., 
Scherer, & Grandjean, 2008). 
Since the intention signaled by the emotional expression informs the 
perceiver about the plans of the interaction partner, it makes sense to assume 
that reactions to emotions are influenced by this factor – it is just more sensible 
to respond to the intention to attack signaled by an anger expression than to the 
expressers’ subjective feeling of anger7. This arguing is also put forward by 
other researchers, especially those examining approach and avoidance 
                                                 
6
 With the term intention we refer to both action tendencies and behavioral requests signaled by 
an emotional expression. These are the two social motives of an emotional expression 
proposed by Fridlund (1994).  
7
 Precisely spoken, this means that reactions to emotional expressions are activated by the 
implication that they have for the perceiver. Since this implication is, however, a direct 
consequence of the intention, we will base our focus on the intentions signaled by an emotional 
expression. 
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reactions to emotional expressions (e.g., Marsh, et al., 2005; Wilkowski, & 
Meier, 2010; see also Chapter 2.3.). The results from these experiments show 
that approach and avoidance behaviors are influenced by the intention signaled 
by the emotional expression and not by the subjective feeling.  
However, if reactions to emotions are activated by the intention of the 
emotion, why do they differ if the expresser is an out-group compared to an in-
group member? What is the role of the group membership in this intention-
reaction link? We argue that group membership influences the reaction to 
emotions because it influences which exact intention is associated with an 
emotion. There already is some evidence that the same emotional expression is 
seen as signaling different intentions which then can accordingly trigger 
different reactions. A smile, for example, does not unconditionally signal the 
intention to affiliate; it might potentially signal shame and embarrassment, as 
well as high dominance and Schadenfreude (e.g., Ambadar, Cohn, & Reed, 
2009; Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010; Keltner, 1995). A 
fearful facial expression, by contrast, acts as a warning of threat but can also 
signal the intention to flee and to capitulate (Horstmann, 2003; Marsh, et al., 
2005).  
We now argue that factors such as the social situation influence how the 
perceiver of an emotion interprets the intention (see also Niedenthal, et al., 
2010). We suggest that in a friendly, cooperative interpersonal situation, the 
emotional expression will be interpreted in this light. If the situation is, 
however, hostile and competitive, the intention of the expresser will rather be 
seen against the background of this situation. Following this arguing, a smiling 
face, for example, should be interpreted as signaling affiliation if the 
relationship is positive and cooperative. In this case, a positive affective 
reaction should follow. If the relationship is, however, negative, it should 
rather be seen as indicating dominance, arrogance, and Schadenfreude. In this 
case, a negative affective reaction should occur. A similar logic can be applied 
to fearful expressions. In a friendly, cooperative situation this expression might 
be interpreted as a warning of a common threat. Since this threat has a potential 
negative implication for the perceiver, a negative affective reaction should be 
triggered. However, if the fearful expression is shown by a rival, it might rather 
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be interpreted as a sign of submission than as a cooperative warning. Since the 
implications of this sign are positive for the perceiver, a positive affective 
reaction should follow. 
As was already presented in Chapter 1, one factor that influences the 
relationship between humans is group membership. It has been repeatedly 
shown that group situations typically lead to liking of in-group members and 
(at least relative to the in-group) disliking of out-group members (Fazio, et al., 
1995; Greenwald, et al., 1998; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979). This is seen as an 
automatic process which is not based on conscious reasoning (e.g., Otten & 
Wentura, 1999). By determining the possible relationship between expresser 
and perceiver of an emotion, different group membership of expresser and 
perceiver of an emotion should therefore impact the intention signaled by an 
emotional expression and – as a consequence – influence following reactions to 
this expression.  
The assumption that group membership influences affective reactions to 
emotions because it influences which intention is inferred from an emotional 
expression overlaps with the explanation drawing back on the social meaning 
of an emotion to explain different reactions to in-group and out-group 
emotions: Both approaches refer to the implication of the emotional expression 
for the perceiver. However, they also differ in important points: First of all, in 
comparison to the “social meaning” approach, our theory specifies which 
component of an emotion should be responsible for the concordant and 
divergent reactions to emotional expressions, namely the intention signaled by 
an emotional expression. The intention might be closely related to other 
meanings of an emotion, for example dominance. However, in comparison to 
the other meaning dimensions, it is specific for an emotion. The intentions 
associated with anger and happiness, for example, are clearly different even 
though both emotions signal high dominance. Therefore, no other components 
than the intention have to be used to explain differences in the influence of 
group membership on reactions to these emotions. The approach formulated by 
Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) in comparison is mainly based on dominance. 
Explaining the different influence of group membership on reactions to anger 
and happiness expressions, they needed to draw back on specific differences 
3 Group membership and emotion 
 
55 
 
between those two emotions, complicating their theory. Second, our approach 
provides an explanation why in-group and out-group emotions are seen as 
signaling different meanings. We argue that (a) different intentions are 
associated with a specific emotion and (b) the relationship between expresser 
and perceiver of an emotion provides the background against which the 
intention of the emotion is interpreted. As a result – depending on the group 
membership of the expresser – different intentions are inferred from an 
emotional expression resulting in differing affective reactions. This theory is 
very precise in the underlying mechanism and responsible factors and therefore 
allows the formulation of precise hypotheses. It was one goal of this thesis to 
thoroughly test these hypotheses.  
 
3.3 Overview of Experiments 
The goal of the empirical work conducted for this thesis was twofold: 
First of all, we wanted to thoroughly test our hypothesis that group 
membership determines which intention is inferred from an emotional 
expression, influencing the affective reactions of the perceiver. Our hypothesis 
was that the intention of an in-group emotion should be seen in the positive and 
cooperative relationship which typically characterizes in-group situations. The 
intention of an out-group emotion, on the other hand, should be interpreted in 
the light of the negative and competitive relationship characterizing intergroup 
situations. Depending on the intention inferred from an emotional expression, 
the same emotion should thereby result in different reactions. 
The second goal of this thesis was to examine the degree of 
automaticity behind the influence of group membership on affective reactions 
to emotional expression. We thereby hypothesized that in-group members’ 
emotional expressions would elicit concordant affective reactions, whereas out-
group members’ emotions would activate divergent ones. This effect should 
occur even if no goal for an explicit evaluation is given and if conditions are 
created which prevent controlled processing.  
We conducted six experiments in order to test our two hypotheses: 
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Experiments 1, 2, 3a, and 3b examined approach and avoidance 
reactions to emotional expressions. In these experiments, participants 
responded to emotional expressions shown by in-group and out-group 
members by an approach or avoidance movement. With this paradigm we were 
hoping to gain insight into the question which mechanism underlies the 
influence of group membership on emotional expressions. Since it has 
repeatedly been argued that approach and avoidance behaviors are elicited by 
the intention signaled by the emotional expression (see Chapter 2.3), finding an 
influence of group membership on approach and avoidance reactions would 
provide strong evidence that group membership influences which intention is 
inferred from an emotion. A second goal of these experiments was to assess if 
the interaction between group membership and emotional expression depends 
on the exact task participants carry out. Therefore, emotional expression 
(Experiment 1 and 3) or emotional expression and group membership 
(Experiment 2) were task irrelevant. Should group membership influence 
affective reactions to emotional expressions even though one or both factors 
are irrelevant for the ongoing task, we could conclude that the effect occurred 
automatically in the sense of unintentionally.  
Experiment 4 was designed to obtain a more direct test of the 
hypothesis that in-group and out-group members’ emotions are indeed 
associated with different intention. Employing a reverse-correlation technique, 
we visualized participants’ representations of in-group and out-group smiles 
and assessed the intentions signaled by these images. This designed enabled us 
to further examine our hypothesis that group membership influences the 
intention associated with an emotional expression. Again, the emotional 
expression was irrelevant in this experiment; this allows us to conclude that the 
association between group membership and intention is activated automatically 
(i.e., unintentionally). 
The goal of Experiment 5 was to assess if the automatic influence of 
group membership on affective reactions to emotions also occurs if the 
material is presented in a non-visual modality. Furthermore, we wanted to 
employ a dependent variable in which the affective reaction was only a by-
product of a natural occurring behavior. Experiment 4 thus clearly differs from 
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that of the other experiments in material employed and dependent variable 
measured. Because this experiment is the only one employing these methods, 
and the results are comparatively weak, it should be seen as showing possible 
directions that the project could take rather than drawing final conclusions.  
Before the description of the experiments, we will briefly report the 
construction and validation of a stimulus set employing emotional facial 
expressions which we used in (most of) our studies. If the reader is impatient to 
find out about the experiments, however, this chapter can be skipped. 
   
4 Validation of stimulus material 
4 Stimulus material – Development and Validation 
 
Most experiments reported in this dissertation employed visual material: We 
presented photographs and short video clips of emotional expressions shown 
by men and women of German and Turkish/Arabic ethnicity to participants. 
These stimuli had to meet two crucial criteria: The emotional expression as 
well as the group membership of the expressers had to be highly recognizable 
and prototypical. This was especially important since the emphasis of the 
studies was on examining the influence of group membership on automatic 
reactions to emotional expressions; because of this, the emotional expression as 
well as the group membership of the expressers was neither task relevant nor 
explicitly mentioned in most of the experiments. Therefore, in order to exercise 
an influence unintentional, the emotional expression of the stimulus had to be 
highly recognizable and prototypical. Since group membership was 
operationalized through ethnic membership (Turkish/Arabic vs. German) in 
some of the experiments, it was also very important that the stimuli were very 
prototypical for the respective group.  
Unfortunately, only two of the available stimulus sets of emotional 
expressions (that we know of) employed individuals of Arabic origin (Langner, 
et al., 2011; Van der Schalk, Hawk, Fischer, & Doosje, 2011). Out of these, 
only a few of the photographs of Arabic individuals met our expectations: In 
many cases, the individual did not look like the prototypical Turkish/Arabic 
young man in Germany. In other cases, the recognition rates for the emotional 
expressions were not sufficiently high. Therefore, in order to overcome these 
limitations, we created a new stimulus set that employed men and women of 
German and Turkish/Arabic origin showing seven emotional plus one neutral 
facial expression. Since it is not of high relevance for the research questions of 
this thesis, the development and results of the stimulus set will be only briefly 
presented in this chapter. A more detailed description can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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4.1 Creation of the database 
43 individuals were videotaped for the stimulus set. However, 15 
individuals were excluded for the stimulus validation, resulting in seven 
German females, four Turkish/Arabic females, nine German men, and eight 
Turkish/Arabic men. Each expresser was videotaped while showing seven 
emotional and one neutral facial expression, resulting in 224 stimuli. However, 
in this context, only the validation data for the expressions employed in our 
experiments, which is happiness, fear, and neutral will be reported. 
 
4.2 Validation of the database  
4.2.1 Method 
Participants. The stimuli were rated by 112 students of Saarland 
University. Thereby 81 participants rated only a subset of the whole dataset. 
Each image was rated by at least 66 raters. 
 
Procedure. For the ratings, stimuli were presented in random order on 
the computer screen. Each participant indicated for each presented image 
which emotion was expressed and how intense, natural and arousing the 
expression was. Furthermore, attractiveness and typicality ratings for the 
respective group of the expressers were obtained with the neutral facial 
expressions. 
 
4.2.2 Results 
Raw recognition rates were calculated and arcsine transformed (Winer, 
1971). A 2 (Emotion: joy, fear, neutral) × 2 (Ethnicity: German vs. 
Turkish/Arabic) ANOVA with all factors varied between stimuli yielded a 
significant main effect of emotional expression: F (2, 78) = 116.55; p < .001, 
ηp² = ..75. No other significant effect emerged (Fs < 1.98; ps > .14). The means 
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show
8
 that joy had the highest recognition rate (98%), followed by neutral 
(74%), and fear (71%). These rates are comparable to those reported for other 
sets (e.g., Beaupré & Hess, 2005; Biehl, Matsumoto, Ekman, & Hearn, 1997; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008; 
Langner et al., 2010; Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009; Van der Schalk, et al., 
2011).  
In order to correct for response biases in the raw recognition rates, we 
also calculated unbiased hit rates (Wagner, 1993) for each participant and each 
emotion separately. A 3 (Emotion: joy, fear, neutral) × 2 (Ethnicity: German 
vs. Turkish/Arabic) ANOVA with all factors varied within participants yielded 
a significant main effect of emotion (F (2, 116) = 196.30; p < .001, ηp² = .77), 
and a significant main effect of ethnicity: (F (1, 117) = 9.65; p < .01, ηp² = .08). 
The means
9
 show that the emotions shown by the Turkish/Arabic expressers 
had higher unbiased hit rates (M = .73; SD = .13) than those shown by German 
expressers (M = .71; SD = .11). These main effects were qualified by a 
significant emotion by ethnicity interaction (F (2, 116) = 4.09; p = .02, ηp² = 
.07). Planned contrasts (Bonferroni corrected) comparing the unbiased hit rates 
between German and Turkish/Arabic expressers for each emotion separately 
showed that the neutral expression was recognized better if expressed by 
Turkish/Arabic (M = .71, SD = .24) than German expressers (M = .65, SD = 
.22): t (117) = 3.62; p < .001. No other comparison reached significance (|t|s < 
.175; ps > .08). 
In order to examine the ratings of arousal, naturalness, and intensity, we 
calculated a 3 (emotion: joy, fear, neutral) × 2 (ethnicity: German vs. 
Turkish/Arabic) between-subjects ANOVA with the images as cases on each of 
these variables. In the context of this thesis, only effects in which a significant 
main effect of ethnicity or a significant interaction with ethnicity emerged shall 
be reported. For none of those variables, a main effect of or interaction with 
ethnicity emerged (all Fs < 3.50; ps > .06). 
Comparing German and Turkish/Arabic expressers on their ratings of 
typicality and attractiveness revealed no difference in rating (|t|s < 1.6; p > 
                                                 
8
 For readability, the untransformed raw recognition rates are reported. 
9
 For readability, the untransformed unbiased hit rates are reported. 
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.14). The individuals of both groups were rated as rather typical for their 
respective group (German: M = 3.68, SD = .37; Turkish/Arabic: M = 3.28, SD 
= 1.24) and as averaged attractive (German: M = 2.61, SD = .55; 
Turkish/Arabic: M = 2.59, SD = .47).  
 
4.3 Discussion 
The validation data obtained for our stimulus set showed that we were 
successful in developing a new stimulus set employing German and 
Turkish/Arabic expressers. The recognition rates for the emotional expressions 
relevant for this thesis were comparable to those reported for other sets. 
Importantly, no main effect of ethnicity on the raw recognition rates was 
observed. The main effect of ethnicity obsereved with the unbiased hit rates 
shows that the emotions shown by the Turkish/Arabic expressers were even 
recognized better than those shown by German expressers. Furthermore, the 
expressers were rated as rather typical for their respective group. Therefore, we 
conclude that the stimuli are suitable for examine our research question.  
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5 Approach and avoidance reactions to emotions expressed 
by in-group and out-group members 
 
We conducted a series of four experiments employing an approach and 
avoidance paradigm in order to examine behavioral reactions to in-group and 
out-group members’ emotions. The main goal of these experiments was to 
examine our hypothesis that group membership influences which intention is 
inferred from an emotional expression. Since approach and avoidance reactions 
are seen as adaptive responses to environmental constraints, and it has 
repeatedly been argued that approach and avoidance reactions to emotional 
expressions are influenced by the intention signaled by the emotion (see 
Chapter 2.3.), we expected to find an interactive influence of group 
membership and emotional expression on these reactions. Finding concordant 
reactions to in-group emotions and divergent ones to emotions shown by the 
out-group would allow us to conclude that this pattern is caused by different 
intentions inferred from in- and out-group members’ emotions. 
Moreover, with these experiments, we wanted to examine the degree of 
automaticity driving the interaction between group membership and emotional 
expression. Therefore, emotional expression was never task relevant in the 
experiments. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, neither group membership nor 
emotional expression was task relevant.  
 
Overview 
We employed the same method in all four experiments reported below. 
Participants were instructed to push or pull the computer mouse along a 
straight line in order to categorize stimuli appearing on the computer screen. 
These stimuli constituted of photographs of in-group and out-group members 
displaying fear and happiness. Participants had to categorize stimuli depending 
on group membership (Experiment 1 and 3) or depending on an arbitrary 
feature (orthogonal to group membership; Experiment 2). The emotion 
displayed was never relevant for the task.  
We chose happiness and fear expressions as critical emotions for two 
reasons: First of all, since we argue that the group membership of the expresser 
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influences which intention is signaled by an emotional expression, we had to 
select emotional expression, which (a) signal different intentions which are (b) 
associated with contrasting behavioral tendency (i.e., avoidance instead of 
approach and vice versa). Finally it was important to assume that (c) the 
relationship between expresser and perceiver of an emotion influences which 
intention is inferred from the emotion. Fear and happiness fulfilled these 
requirements: Expressed by a positively evaluated in-group member, a smile 
should signal the intention to affiliate (which triggers an approach behavior) 
whereas a fearful expression in contrast should act as a warning (which should 
then trigger avoidance, at least compared to happiness expressions). On the 
other hand, if the same expressions are shown by a negatively evaluated out-
group member, they might dominantly signal dominance (which should trigger 
avoidance behavior) and submission (which should trigger approach).  
The second reason to choose happiness and fear was based on the 
consideration that these emotional expressions were differently strong 
associated with specific behaviors in past research: With happiness, we chose 
an emotion which has reliably elicited an approaching behavior (e.g., Rotteveel 
& Phaf, 2004; Seidel, et al., 2010; Stins, et al. 2011). Finding nevertheless an 
influence of group membership on this established emotion-behavior 
association would provide a strong support for our hypothesis that approach 
and avoidance behaviors constitute adaptive and flexible reactions to 
environmental factors and are not invariably linked to certain emotional 
expressions. The case is different for fearful expressions since experiments 
examining approach and avoidance reactions to this emotion yield mixed 
results (e.g., Marsh, et al. 2005; Wilkowski, & Meier, 2010). This might be 
caused by the relatively strong ambiguity of the meaning of this expression. 
We assume that manipulating the group membership of the expresser can help 
to dissolve this ambiguity: We argue that a fearful expression will rather be 
seen as a warning if it is shown by in-group members (and accordingly elicit an 
avoidance reaction) and as a sign of submission if it is expressed by out-group 
members (and accordingly elicit an approach reaction). Finding such a pattern 
would therefore support our notion that the group membership of the expresser 
influences which intention is mainly inferred from an emotional expression 
5 Approach and avoidance 
 
64 
 
which then influences the following behavioral reactions. Please note that we 
thereby do not assume that the group membership of the expresser will dissolve 
every ambiguity of an emotional expression but rather that it serves as an 
indicator which intention might be more likely to be signaled by an emotional 
expression.  
Following this arguing we predict an interaction between group 
membership and emotional expressions: Emotion-group combinations which 
are hypothesized to be approach related (in-group/happiness, out-group/fear) 
should activate more approach related behavior than avoidance related 
combinations (in-group/fear, out-group/happiness). 
The dependent variable in all of our studies constituted of the time 
between onset of stimulus presentation and the beginning of the first movement 
of the computer mouse. 
 
5.1 Experiment 1 
5.1.1 Method 
Participants. Sixty-two non-psychology students (34 females, 28 
males) at Saarland University, Germany, participated in the experiment. The 
age range was 18 to 31 years with a median of 23.5 years. All participants were 
native Germans. The experiment was the first part of a one-hour experimental 
session for which participants were paid eight Euros for compensation.  
 
Design. The design followed a 2 (Emotion: fear vs. happy) × 2 
(Stimulus Ethnicity: Turkish/Arabic vs. German) × 2 (Movement: approach, 
avoidance) × 2 (Block: Block 1 vs. Block 2) within-participants design.  
 
Material. Stimuli consisted of photographs of emotional expressions 
shown by White-Caucasian (German, Dutch) and Turkish/Arabic young men. 
Pictures were taken from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner, et al., 2010), 
the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (Van der Schalk, et al., 2011) 
and our own collection (Paulus, Rohr, Neuschwander, et al., 2012). We 
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selected fear and joy expressions from 10 White-Caucasian men and from 10 
Turkish/Arabic men, resulting in 40 pictures. Since it has been shown that 
emotional expressions by out-group members sometimes are recognized less 
accurately than the same expressions shown by in-group members (e.g., 
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), we carefully selected pictures on the basis of 
recognition rates for the critical emotional expressions (fear and joy), intensity 
ratings of emotional expressions, and on ratings of attractiveness and 
prototypicality for White-Caucasians and Turks/Arabs, respectively (if 
available). Importantly, Western European and Turkish/Arabic pictures did not 
differ significantly on any of these variables (all |t|s < 1.2, ns). Therefore, we 
could conclude that the different facial features of Western Europeans and 
Turkish/Arabic men did not influence the perception of the emotional 
expression itself. Pictures were edited in a way that the face and top of the neck 
were shown on a white background. All depicted headshots of target persons in 
a straight orientation and gaze directed at the viewer. They measured 400 by 
530 pixels and were presented on a CRT display set to a resolution of 1024 by 
786 pixels. The images are displayed in Appendix B. 
 
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of up to five individuals. 
They were seated individually in front of personal computers, separated by 
partition walls. On each desk, two parallel white lines with the length of 
approximately 40 cm marked the alignment along which the computer mouse 
had to be moved.  
Participants were instructed to categorize pictures of young men as 
being either of White-Caucasian or of Turkish/Arabic origin by moving the 
computer mouse away or towards themselves. The task consisted of two 
phases. In Phase 1, half of the participants were instructed to push the 
computer mouse away from them if the person on the picture was 
Turkish/Arabic (avoidance) and to pull the mouse towards them if the person 
was White-Caucasian (approach). The other half of participants was instructed 
to push the computer mouse away from them if the person on the picture was 
White-Caucasian and to pull the mouse towards them if the person was 
Turkish/Arabic. In Phase 2 the assignment for each group was reversed. Both 
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phases comprised two blocks. During the first block (Block 1) of each Phase, 
each stimulus was presented once and participants’ task was to categorize it 
exerting a certain movement. In the second block (Block 2) of each Phase, each 
stimulus was presented again and participants had to categorize it exerting the 
same movement as in the block before.  
Each trial started with a fixation cross displayed for 2600ms. The picture 
of a White-Caucasian or Turkish/Arabic man appeared in the middle of the 
screen in its original size. When participants moved the mouse, the picture 
increased or decreased in size depending on the direction of the movement. If 
participants pushed the mouse away from them the picture size decreased until 
it had reached 75% of its original size. Then it disappeared and the fixation 
cross appeared again. If participants pulled the mouse towards them the picture 
size increased until it had reached 130% of its original size; then the picture 
disappeared and the fixation cross was shown again. The speed of the change 
in size was dependent on the speed of the mouse movement. This increase and 
decrease in picture size created the illusion that the face would move towards 
or away from participants. This visual feedback was implemented in order to 
overcome the limitation that push and pull movements are ambiguous with 
regard to approach and avoidance movements (Eder & Rothermund, 2008; 
Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008), and has been successfully used 
before (Rinck & Becker, 2007, Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). 
Participants were instructed to move the mouse back to its original position 
while the fixation cross was displayed. 
Participants first completed 10 practice trials in which they categorized 
five White-Caucasian and five Turkish/Arabic men, displaying neutral 
expressions. Afterwards participants were informed that the main experiment 
would start and that the pictures would now show emotionally expressive 
faces. In Phase 1, participants worked through two blocks consisting of 40 
trials each. Within each block, each picture was presented once; pictures were 
presented in random order. For Phase 2 of the experiment, participants were 
informed that the assignment of movement to group membership was reversed 
for the following two blocks. Participants again received 10 practice trials, 
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categorizing five White-Caucasian and five Turkish/Arabic men. Then they 
worked again through two blocks consisting of 40 trials each. 
Throughout the experiment a feedback message (“Error!”) was 
displayed if the categorization of a picture was incorrect. In trials in which the 
mouse movement differed more than 5% on the y-axis from a straight 
movement, the message “Please move mouse straight” was shown. 
Reaction times (RTs) were recorded as the onset of the first mouse 
movement greater than 50 pixels. This was done to ensure that no artifacts like 
hand trembling were recorded as reaction times. 
 
5.1.2 Results 
Trials in which the stimulus was incorrectly classified were excluded 
from analysis (4.8%). RTs below 200 ms or above 1200 ms were discarded 
(1.7%).
10
 Mean reaction times are displayed in Table 1. 
In order to enhance comprehensibility, we subtracted RTs for avoidance 
movements from RTs for approach movements for each stimulus category for 
each block. These avoidance scores indicate the relation between approach and 
avoidance movements: A higher avoidance score indicates relatively more 
activation of avoidance compared to approach-related behavior by the stimulus 
whereas a lower score indicates relatively more activation of approach 
compared to avoidance-related behavior by the stimulus.
11
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 The same results reported here were found if other outlier criteria were employed.  
11
 In general, RTs for avoidance movements were shorter than RTs for approach movements. 
Therefore the Avoidance Scores are all positive. We argue that this effect occurred because 
pulling the computer mouse is easier to execute than pushing it. Due to this main effect, 
however, we never observed “true” approach related behavior. Therefore we only refer to more 
and less avoidance when describing the results. 
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Table 1 Mean RTs for approach and avoidance movement in the two blocks of 
Experiment 1(standard deviation in parentheses) 
    Movement  
Ethnicity  Emotion  Approach  Avoidance  
Block1 
White-Caucasian  Happiness  667 (77)  656 (108)  
  Fear  651 (83)  654 (99)  
          
Turkish/Arabic  Happiness  657 (112)  634 (84)  
  Fear  642 (100)  623 (87)  
Block2 
White-Caucasian  Happiness  649 (69)  640 (91)  
  Fear  638 (71)  621 (82)  
          
Turkish/Arabic  Happiness  639 (103)  617 (94)  
  Fear  619 (88)  615 (74)  
Note: Small deviations between the Avoidance Score and the difference 
between approach and avoidance RTs (as shown) are due to rounding.  
 
In a 2 (ethnicity) × 2 (emotion) × 2 (block) analysis of variance a 
significant triple interaction emerged, F(1, 61) = 4.61, p < .05, ηp² = .07. 
Analyzing each block separately, for Block 1 no significant main effect or 
interaction emerged (all Fs < 2.6; ps > .11) For Block 2, the expected ethnicity 
× emotion interaction reached significance, F(1, 61) = 6.35, p = .01, ηp² = .09 
(see Figure 4). A happy facial expression shown by a Turkish/Arabic men 
activated more avoidance compared to approach related behavior (M = 22 ms, 
SD = 72) than a fearful facial expression shown by the same persons (M = 4 
ms, SD = 52), t (61) = -2.31, p < .05. For the White-Caucasian stimuli, a happy 
facial expression activated less avoidance compared to approach related 
behavior (M = 9 ms, SD = 60) than a fearful facial expression (M = 17 ms, SD 
= 63). This difference, however, did not reach significance (t < 1.1).  
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A further analysis made clear that the moderation by block was 
dominantly due to the first block of Phase 2, that is, the block in which 
participants had to follow a new movement-to-category assignment after more 
than 80 repetitions of the opposing assignment rules. An overall analysis 
discarding data of this block yielded a significant emotion by ethnicity 
interaction, F(1, 62) = 8.69; p = .005, ηp² = .13.  
 
 
Figure 3 Interaction of emotion and ethnicity with regard to basic behavioral 
tendencies (Experiment 1; Block 2). The Avoidance Score is the difference in 
mean RT between approach and avoidance responses. 
 
5.1.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we provided first evidence that the behavioral 
tendency activated by an emotional expression depends on the social group 
memberships of the expresser and the perceiver. Emotion-group combinations 
that were supposed to be approach related (happiness/in-group, fear/out-group) 
activated more approach related behavior than avoidance related combinations 
(fear/in-group, happiness/out-group). Since approach and avoidance reactions 
to emotional expressions are most likely influenced by the intention signaled 
by the emotion, this finding shows that the influence of group membership on 
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reactions to emotions is caused by a differently evaluated intention inferred 
from the emotion. Moreover, these results demonstrate that approach and 
avoidance behaviors are not activated by the emotional expression or the 
intention per se but are more flexible responses.  
Importantly, we demonstrated an influence of emotion on approach and 
avoidance related behavior in a task in which emotion was not task-relevant. 
The only study known by the authors which examined approach and avoidance 
related behavior to emotional faces in a task in which emotion was not relevant 
did fail to find an influence of emotion on movement (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). 
Therefore, our experiment adds to the broader literature by showing that 
emotions can influence behavioral tendencies without being task relevant. 
However, Experiment 1 entails some caveats. We observed an influence 
of block on the interaction between emotion, ethnicity, and movement. The 
expected interaction between emotion, ethnicity, and movement only emerged 
after participants had repeatedly categorized stimuli by exerting a given 
movement. This is an unexpected finding since many studies examining 
approach and avoidance movements do not employ many repetitions and still 
find significant effects (e.g., Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Neumann, 
Hülsenbeck, & Seibt, 2004; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). However, this might 
depend on the exact task participants have to carry out. In a recent study 
examining different approach-avoidance methods, Krieglmeyer and colleagues 
showed that approach-avoidance effects are generally small if valence is 
irrelevant for the completion of the task (Krieglmeyer, et al., 2010). They 
suggest that the method used to study approach and avoidance behaviors has to 
be sufficiently sensitive in order to detect an influence of task-irrelevant 
valence on behavior. It might be that in our study the approach-avoidance task 
became more sensitive after participants had repeatedly categorized stimuli 
with a certain movement. It is conceivable that the behavior became more 
automatic and less controlled after learning the category-movement 
assignment. This assumption is supported by the finding that the interaction 
with Block is dominantly due to problems of relearning the movement-to-
category assignment in Phase 2. This might be owed to the fact that our design 
comprised of many trials employing the same movement but a relatively short 
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practice phase of only 10 trials. By this, participants might have internalized a 
certain category-to-movement assignment after Phase 1. To overcome this 
problem, it seems necessary to replicate results, preferably in a design in which 
no change of movement is required. 
A second caveat of Experiment 1 is that participants were instructed to 
categorize stimuli based on the ethnicity of the displayed person. Thus, 
attention was explicitly directed to this category which might increase 
evaluative effects of group membership. Therefore, with reference to Bargh 
(1989) the results might be of the “goal-dependent automaticity” type, that is, 
they depend on the conscious goal to categorize stimulus person according to 
their ethnicity (see Degner & Wentura, 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2003, for similar 
effects in evaluative priming studies). However, if the influence of group 
membership on the behavioral reaction to emotional expression serves an 
adaptive function it should also arise if attention is not directed to the group 
membership. Moreover, studies show that emotional expression as well as 
group membership can be processed automatically (e.g., Ruys, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, we wanted to examine whether the result found in Experiment 2 
would be replicated in a design in which attention was not explicitly directed to 
the ethnicity of the targets. We instructed participants in Experiment 2 to 
categorize the stimuli on the basis of an arbitrary feature, varied orthogonally 
to emotional expression and group membership. Finding an interaction in such 
a task would allow us to assess the level of automaticity driving our results.  
 
5.2 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was implemented to replicate and extend the results of 
Experiment 1. We employed the same design used in Experiment 1 with the 
difference that participants were instructed to categorize stimuli according to a 
(slight) blurring of one side of the face. This allowed us to assess the influence 
of group membership on the reactions to facial expressions without making it 
task relevant. Furthermore, this manipulation enabled us to examine approach 
and avoidance reactions to each stimulus category without having participants 
change the categorization movement throughout the experiment.  
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5.2.1 Method 
Participants. Sixty-two non-psychology students (30 females, 32 
males) of Saarland University participated in the experiment. The age range 
was 18 to 39 years with a median of 22 years. The data of one participant were 
excluded because he was identified as a multivariate outlier with regard to the 
four critical Avoidance Scores (i.e., in-group/ happy, in-group/fear, out-
group/happy, out-group/fear; Mahalanobis distance = 15.52, p = .004). All 
participants were native White-Caucasians. The experiment was the first part 
of a one-hour experimental session. Participants were paid eight Euros for 
compensation.  
 
Design. The design followed the same 2 (emotion: fear, happy) × 2 
(ethnicity: Turkish/Arabic, White-Caucasian) × 2 (movement: approach, 
avoidance) within-participants design as Experiment 2.  
 
Material. Stimuli consisted of the same 40 faces used in Experiment 1. 
The only difference was that we slightly blurred either the left or the right side 
of each of these faces, respectively, resulting in 80 pictures. The blurring was 
done in a way that it did not impair recognition of ethnicity or emotional 
expression but was strong enough to ensure an easy classification (see Figure 4 
for an example). 
 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 with the 
following exceptions: Participants were instructed to categorize pictures of 
young men depending on the blurry side of the face by moving the computer 
mouse away or towards themselves. The task consisted of four blocks with 40 
trials each. Throughout the experiment, participants categorized stimuli by the 
same movement. The allocation of right and left side to approach or avoidance 
movements, respectively, was varied between participants. Each block 
consisted of 40 trials; 20 of these trials required an approach and 20 required an 
avoidance movement. Within each of these movement conditions, each 
stimulus category was employed five times. Therefore, in one block, 10 
5 Approach and avoidance 
 
73 
 
pictures of each category were presented, five asking for an approach and five 
asking for an avoidance movement. Stimuli were presented in random order. 
After the first block, the second block presented the remaining 40 stimuli. That 
is, after two blocks each stimulus was once paired with an approach and once 
with an avoidance movement. The next two blocks were repetitions of the first 
two ones (with new randomization of trial sequence). Before the start of Block 
1, participants completed 12 practice trials, in which they categorized the 
pictures of six White-Caucasian and six Turkish/Arabic men displaying neutral 
expressions depending on the blurry side of the face.  
 
 
Figure 4 Examples of stimuli used in Experiment 2 (taken from our collection) 
with a slight blurring of one side of the face. 
 
5.2.2 Results 
As in Experiment 1, trials in which an incorrect movement occurred 
(4%) and trials in which the RT was below 200ms and above 1200 ms were 
excluded from analysis (3%).
12
 Mean reaction times are displayed in Table 2. 
                                                 
12
 The same results reported here were found if other outlier criteria were employed.  
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Table 2 Mean RTs for approach and avoidance movements of Experiment 2 
(standard deviations in parentheses).  
    Movement  
Ethnicity  Emotion  Approach  Avoidance  
White-Caucasian  Happiness  672 (82)  670 (94)  
  Fear  667 (89)  652 (85)  
          
Turkish/Arabic  Happiness  694 (96)  664 (80)  
  Fear  676 (84)  654 (86)  
Note: Small deviations between the Avoidance Score and the difference 
between approach and avoidance RTs (as shown) are due to rounding.  
 
Again we computed avoidance scores to enhance comprehensibility of 
the results. We subtracted RTs from avoidance movements from RTs from 
approach movements for each stimulus category for each block. Preliminary 
data analysis showed no interaction with the factor block. Therefore, this factor 
was dropped from further analyses. 
The 2 (ethnicity) × 2 (emotion) analysis of variance showed a 
significant main effect of ethnicity, F(1, 60) = 13.42, p = .001, ηp² = .18, 
indicating that Turkish/Arabic stimuli (M = 26, SD = 43) activated relatively 
stronger avoidance compared to approach-related behavior compared to White-
Caucasian stimuli (M = 8, SD = 48). No main effect for emotion emerged (F < 
.66, p = .59). Most important, the main effect of ethnicity was qualified by the 
expected ethnicity × emotion interaction, F(1, 60) = 5.59, p < .05, ηp² = .08 
(see Figure 5). A happy facial expression shown by a Turkish/Arabic men 
activated more avoidance compared to approach related behavior (M = 30 ms, 
SD = 55) than a fearful facial expression shown by the same persons (M = 22 
ms, SD = 53). However, this difference did not reach statistical significance (t 
< 1). For the White-Caucasian stimuli, a happy facial expression activated less 
avoidance compared to approach related behavior (M = 1 ms, SD = 58) than a 
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fearful facial expression (M = 15 ms, SD = 48). This difference reached 
significance: t (60) = 2.38, p < .05. 
 
 
Figure 5 Interaction of emotion and ethnicity with regard to basic behavioral 
tendencies (Experiment 2). The Avoidance Score is the difference in mean RT 
between approach and avoidance responses.  
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we replicated and extended the results of Experiment 
1. Experiment 2 demonstrates that group membership and emotional 
expression exert an interactive influence on approach and avoidance behaviors, 
even if both are task-irrelevant. In a task in which participants had to categorize 
targets on the basis of an arbitrary feature (orthogonal to the relevant 
manipulations) and not on group membership, behavioral reactions to facial 
expressions still differed for in-group and out-group targets. This finding 
further supports the assumption that the influence of group membership on 
reactions to emotional expressions serves an adaptive function. Group 
membership and emotional expression have to be processed automatically in 
order to allow a flexible adjustment of reactions. Taken together, Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2 therefore indicate that approach and avoidance behaviors to 
in-group and out-group members’ emotions are influenced by the intention 
signaled by the emotion and not by the emotion per se. They therefore support 
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our hypothesis that group membership influences which intention is inferred 
from an emotional expression. 
Additionally, Experiment 2 replicates previous findings demonstrating 
the activation of avoidance related behaviors by out-group members and the 
activation of approach related behavior by in-group members (Neumann et al., 
2004; Paladino & Castelli, 2008). This behavioral pattern has been found to 
correlate with implicit (Neumann et al., 2004) as well as explicit measures of 
prejudice (Wyer, 2010). The main effect for group membership found in 
Experiment 2 might therefore be an indicator that the interaction between 
group membership and emotion is caused by negative attitudes.  
However, both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 entail the caveat that 
they employed a quasi-experimental design. In both experiments, group 
membership was linked to a specific set of stimuli. One might therefore argue 
that the different pattern of approach and avoidance behaviors to the emotional 
stimuli was influenced by specific features of these sets and not caused by an 
influence of group membership on the evaluation of emotions. Therefore, we 
conducted two experiments in which we employed a traditional minimal group 
design and a variant of it. Despite controlling for the influence of stimulus set, 
this experiment allowed us to assess the generalizability of the results found in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  
 
5.3 Experiment 3a and 3b 
Experiment 3a and 3b were implemented in order to overcome the 
quasi-experimental nature of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 by employing a 
Minimal Group Paradigm. By varying the group membership of two sets of 
stimuli we were able to use the same pictures as in-group group as well as out-
group members. With this we were able to exclude that the interaction between 
group-membership and emotional expression observed in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 was caused by specific features of the stimulus sets. 
Participants in Experiment 3 were assigned to one of two groups, 
apparently based on their perceptional style (Experiment 3a) or their 
personality style (Experiment 3b). The minimal group manipulation in 
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Experiment 3a was a traditional one. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two arbitrary groups they had no previous experience with and whose 
labels were of neutral valence. In Experiment 3b, we implemented an 
additional manipulation in order to achieve a negative evaluation of the out-
group: Participants received information about the two groups, describing the 
in-group as positive and possessing majority status and the out-group as 
negative and possessing minority status. This manipulation was implemented 
because previous research has shown that minimal group effects are typically 
based on a positive evaluation of the in-group and not on an (absolute) negative 
evaluation of the out-group (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Otten & Wentura, 1999). 
However, we hypothesized that an influence of group membership on the 
evaluation of the intention signaled by an emotional expression might depend 
on a strong negative evaluation of the out-group. A positive evaluation of the 
low dominance signaled by a fearful expression, for example, should be most 
adaptive in cases in which the expression is shown by someone strongly 
disliked.  
 
5.3.1 Method 
Participants. Experiment 3a. Sixty-six non-psychology students (40 
females, 26 males) of Saarland University, Germany, participated in the 
experiment. The age range was 18 to 29 years with a median of 23 years. All 
participants were native Germans. The experiment was the first part of a one-
hour experimental session for which participants were paid eight Euros for 
compensation.  
Experiment 3b. Sixty-three non-psychology students (33 females, 31 
males) of Saarland University, Germany, participated in the experiment. The 
data from four participants (1 female, 3 males) were excluded because these 
participants indicated that the feedback about their personality style did not 
match their own observations about their personality and that the traits of the 
other personality style would be much more applicable. The age range of the 
remaining fifty-nine participants was 18 to 31 years with a median of 22 years. 
All participants were native Germans. The experiment was the first part of a 
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one-hour experimental session for which participants were paid eight Euros for 
compensation. 
 
Design. The design for both experiments followed the same 2 (emotion: 
fear, happy) × 2 (group membership: in-group, out-group) × 2 (movement: 
approach, avoidance) within-participants design as Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. Most important, facial stimuli that served as in-group and out-
group members were counterbalanced.  
 
Material. Photographs. Stimuli employed in the approach avoidance 
task in both experiments consisted of photographs of emotional expressions 
shown by White-Caucasian men and women. Pictures were taken from the 
same picture sets as those employed in Experiment 1 and 2. We selected fear 
and joy expressions from eight men and eight women, resulting in 32 pictures. 
We created two stimulus sets, each consisting of happiness and fear 
expressions shown by four men and four women. The recognition rates of the 
emotions as well as intensity ratings of emotional expressions and ratings of 
attractiveness did not differ between the two stimulus sets (all |t|’s < 1, ns). 
Pictures were edited in the same way as those employed in Experiment 2 and 2. 
All images are displayed in Appendix C. 
Group information. In both experiment participants received 
information about the so-called basal and focal perception (Experiment 3a) or 
personality (Experiment 3b) style. The meaning and the valence of the 
information about the two styles differed between experiments. 
In Experiment 3a we informed participants that one could distinguish 
between two perceptional styles, labeled basal and focal. Participants were 
given the information that people having a basal perception style processed 
stimuli in their environment starting from the background whereas people 
having a focal perception style processed stimuli in their environment starting 
from the salient features. 
In Experiment 3b we informed participants that one could distinguish 
between two personality styles, labeled basal and focal. The description of the 
basal style characterized people with that style as social, agreeable, social 
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thinking, and balanced, as well as sometimes imprecise and forgetful. People 
with the focal style were described as egoistic, reckless, sometimes aggressive, 
technically skillful and intelligent. We modeled the styles in a way that the 
majority of students would identify with the basal style and none with the focal 
one. Importantly, the basal style was clearly positive and the focal one clearly 
negative. The slightly negative features associated with the basal style – to be 
sometimes imprecise and forgetful – as well as the positive features associated 
with the focal style – to be technically skillful and intelligent – were added for 
reasons for plausibility of the cover story.  
The group information given to participants in Experiment 3a and 3b is 
displayed in Appendix D. 
 
Procedure. The procedure of both experiments basically consisted of 
three parts: The minimal group manipulation, a learning phase and the 
approach/avoidance task. 
Minimal group manipulation. At the beginning of the session, 
participants were informed that the first part of the experimental session would 
be an assessment of their perceptional (Experiment 3a) or personality 
(Experiment 3b) style. They were then seated in front of personal computers 
and the ostensible test was started.  
In Experiment 3a the minimal group manipulation consisted of an 
ostensible perception test (taken from Otten & Wentura, 1999). In this test 
ambiguous pictures (mostly taken from Escher, 1992) were presented to the 
participants on the computer screen followed by three alternative 
interpretations of the picture; their task was to indicate which interpretation 
matched their first perception. After the rating of the last picture, a message 
saying “Please wait! Your perception style is assessed” was shown for four 
seconds. Then participants received an ostensible feedback, telling them that 
they possessed a basal perceptional style or a focal perceptional style. 
Assignment to perceptional style was randomized. Finally the information 
about the perceptional styles was presented again.  
In Experiment 3b the minimal group manipulation consisted of an 
ostensible personality test. In this test, twenty self-describing statements (e.g., 
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“I am moody.”) were presented to the participants on the computer screen; 
their task was to indicate to what extend these statements applied to them 
personally. After the rating of the last statement, a message saying “Please 
wait! Your personality style is assessed” was shown for four seconds. Then 
participants received an ostensible feedback, telling them that they possessed a 
basal personality style. Finally they were given information about the basal 
and the focal personality style. The assignment of group label to personality 
style was fixed because we wanted to avoid confusion if participants talked to 
each other after the experiment. After the completion of the personality test 
participants filled out a questionnaire asking to what extend the results from the 
test matched the participants’ own observations about themselves. 
Learning Phase. After the minimal group manipulation, participants in 
both experiments were informed that the goal of the next part of the study was 
to examine the influence of perceptional/personality style on performance in a 
face learning task. They were shown the neutral facial expressions with first 
names of the members of the two sets as in-group and out-group members (Set 
1 and Set 2, group-membership counterbalanced). After the reckoning of the 
faces, participants completed several tasks in which they had to categorize 
these pictures, as well as two silhouettes presenting themselves as well as 
another anonymous participant as in-group and out-group members. We 
included the silhouettes in order to increase participants’ identification with the 
in-group. During these categorization tasks, participants categorized the faces 
while their first names were shown (minimum of three times) and without the 
first names shown (minimum of three times). They had to categorize each face 
correctly before the next task would start. If participants made an error, each of 
the 16 faces was shown again.
13
 
Approach/Avoidance Task. The procedure of the approach/avoidance 
task was the same as in Experiment 1 with the exception that participants 
completed 20 practice trials instead of 10. The main task consisted of two 
                                                 
13
 In Experiment 3b we also added a block of trials in which the faces were slightly blurred and 
one in which participants had to respond within 1000ms. These tasks were implemented in 
order to decrease the high error rate in the Approach/Avoidance task observed in Experiment 
3a. (Blurring and speed instruction were introduced to add some variety to the rather boring 
task.) 
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phases with two blocks each. Each block consisted of 32 trials. Assignment of 
group membership to movement was alternated after Phase 1 (see Experiment 
1 for details). Before the start of Phase 2, participants again completed 20 
practice trials.  
After finishing the entire experiment participants were thanked and 
dismissed. They were completely debriefed via email after the completion of 
the data collection. 
 
5.3.2 Results 
Trials in which the stimulus was incorrectly classified were excluded 
from analysis in Experiment 3a (12 %) and Experiment 3b (8 %). Trials with 
RTs 3 interquartile ranges above the third quartile with respect to the individual 
distribution (see Tukey, 1977) or below 200 ms were discarded from analysis 
(2 % in both Experiments). We defined individual cutoffs because average RTs 
and, more importantly, standard deviations of average RTs in these 
experiments (Experiment 3a: M = 874, SD = 164; Experiment 3b: M = 842, SD 
= 154) were higher than in Experiment 1 (M = 656, SD = 99) and Experiment 2 
(M = 695, SD = 106). Mean reaction times are displayed in Table 3. 
Again we computed avoidance scores to enhance comprehensibility of 
the results. We subtracted RTs from avoidance movements from RTs from 
approach movements for each stimulus category for each block. Preliminary 
data analysis showed no interaction with the factor block. Therefore, this factor 
was dropped from further analyses. 
 
Experiment 3a. The 2 (group membership) × 2 (emotion) analysis of 
variance showed a significant main effect of group membership, F(1, 65) = 
4.46, p < .05, ηp² = .06, indicating a successful minimal group manipulation 
with out-group stimuli (M = 56, SD = 107) activating relatively stronger 
avoidance behavior compared to in-group stimuli (M = -3, SD = 98). No main 
effect for emotion emerged (F < .1). Interestingly, no group membership × 
emotion interaction emerged (F < .1). A happy facial expression shown by an 
out-group member did not activate more avoidance compared to approach 
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related behavior (M = 40 ms, SD = 120) than a fearful facial expression shown 
by the same persons (M = 52 ms, SD = 128): t < .8. For pictures of the in-group 
members, a happy facial expression did not activate more approach compared 
to avoidance related behavior (M = -2 ms, SD = 93) than a fearful facial 
expression (M = -5 ms, SD = 140): t < .3. 
 
Table 3 Mean RTs for approach and avoidance movements of Experiment 3a 
and 3b (standard deviations in parentheses).  
    Movement  
Group-Membership  Emotion  Approach  Avoidance  
Experiment 3a 
In-Group  Happiness  838 (159)  840 (175)  
  Fear  855 (166)  860 (201)  
          
Out-Group  Happiness  866 (185)  825 (175)  
  Fear  872 (185)  820 (142)  
Experiment 3b 
In-Group  Happiness  804 (148)  825 (173)  
  Fear  815 (163)  818 (171)  
          
Out-Group  Happiness  852 (180)  780 (141)  
  Fear  838 (167)  786 (128)  
Note: Small deviations between the Avoidance Score and the difference 
between approach and avoidance RTs (as shown) are due to rounding.  
 
Experiment 3b. The 2 (group membership) × 2 (emotion) analysis of 
variance showed a significant main effect of group membership, F (1, 58) = 
8.1, p < .01, ηp² = .12, indicating that out-group stimuli (M = 62, SD = 107) 
activated relatively stronger avoidance behavior compared to in-group stimuli 
(M = -12, SD = 119). No main effect for emotion emerged (F < .01). Most 
important, the main effect of group membership was qualified by the expected 
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group membership × emotion interaction, F(1, 58) = 5.25, p < .05, ηp² = .08 
(see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6 Interaction of emotion and ethnicity with regard to basic behavioral 
tendencies (Experiment 3b). The Avoidance Score is the difference in mean RT 
between approach and avoidance responses. 
 
 
A happy facial expression shown by an out-group member activated 
more avoidance compared to approach related behavior (M = 72 ms, SD = 133) 
than a fearful facial expression shown by the same persons (M = 52 ms, SD = 
105). This difference failed to reach significance: t (58) = - 1.4, p = .07 (one-
tailed). For pictures of the in-group members stimuli, a happy facial expression 
activated less avoidance compared to approach related behavior (M = -21 ms, 
SD = 137) than a fearful facial expression (M = -3 ms, SD = 118). Again, this 
difference failed to reach statistical significance: t (58) = 1.55, p = .06 (one-
tailed). 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
With Experiment 3a and Experiment 3b we further extended the results 
found in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Using a Minimal Group Paradigm, 
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we employed two sets of stimuli and each set served as the in-group as well as 
the out-group in a balanced design. By alternating the assignment of stimulus 
set to group we were able to show that the interaction between group 
membership and emotion found in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was not due 
to specific features of the stimulus sets employed. Interestingly, this critical 
interaction was just obtained in Experiment 3b in which we induced a negative 
evaluation of the out-group. In Experiment 3a, which employed a more 
traditional Minimal Group Paradigm, no influence of group-membership on 
reactions to emotional expressions emerged. We argue that this is the case 
because a Minimal Group Manipulation typically results in in-group favoritism 
but not out-group derogation (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Otten & Wentura, 1999). 
Note that the absence of the group by emotion interaction in Experiment 3a 
cannot be attributed to an unsuccessful manipulation, since a main effect of 
group-membership was obtained. Out-group members elicited a higher 
avoidance score than in-group members. This main effect replicates previous 
findings (e.g., Paladino & Castelli, 2008) and shows that the minimal group 
manipulation was successful. However, this main effect was not moderated by 
emotional expression. The finding that a negative evaluation of the out-group is 
necessary to influence reactions to emotional expressions further supports our 
reasoning that reactions to emotions are triggered by the intention signaled by 
an emotional expression. 
Furthermore, this experiment shows that the influence of group 
membership on reactions to emotional expressions found in Experiment 1 and 
3 is not limited to the Turkish/Arabic versus White-Caucasian group situation 
but also arises for newly formed groups.  
 
5.4 General Discussion 
Behavioral reactions to facial expressions of emotions are influenced by 
the relationship between expresser and perceiver of an emotion; in three studies 
we provided evidence that the same emotional expression can trigger opposing 
behaviors depending on the group membership of the expresser. Emotion-
group combinations that were hypothesized to be approach related (in-
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group/happiness, out-group/fear) activated more approach related behavior 
than avoidance related combinations (in-group/fear, out-group/happiness). We 
suggest that this reversal of effects depending on the group membership of the 
expresser is due to an influence of the relationship between expresser and 
perceiver of an emotion on the intention inferred from the emotion. The results 
reported here therefore support our hypothesis that concordant and divergent 
reactions are caused by an influence of situational factors on the intention 
inferred from an emotional expression. It furthermore shows that behavioral 
reactions to emotional expressions are adaptive reactions and are therefore 
sensitive to situational and social factors. Such factors might also be 
responsible for the contrary behavioral reactions to anger and fear expressions 
reported in the literature (see Chapter 2.3). Our results show that – depending 
on the relationship between expresser and perceiver – the same emotional 
expression can activate contrary behaviors. Therefore, this finding highlights 
the importance of taking into account such factors when examining behavioral 
reactions to emotional expressions.  
Importantly, an influence of group membership and emotional 
expression of the targets on behavioral reactions was found even though one 
(i.e., emotion in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3a/b) or both (Experiment 2) 
features were irrelevant for the task at hand. Participants categorized targets 
depending on group membership (Experiment 1 and Experiment 3a/b) or based 
on an arbitrary feature (Experiment 2). The results for all three tasks were 
similar: Behavioral reactions to emotional expressions differed depending on 
the group membership of the expresser. Finding an influence of task irrelevant 
features on approach and avoidance allows us to assess the level auf 
automaticity driving our results. We conclude that the observed effects 
occurred unintentionally because participants exerted a task that was 
independent of group membership and emotional expression. The low error 
rates show that participants clearly attended to the arbitrary feature in 
Experiment 4. Thus, it is implausible that they intentionally controlled their 
behaviors with regard to emotion and ethnicity. Moreover, the interaction 
found in our studies is much more complex than just a linear effect of emotion 
or group membership on approach and avoidance behaviors. We think it is very 
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unlikely that participants influenced their behavior strategically to produce 
such a pattern. Therefore, the results show that the flexible adjustment of 
approach and avoidance behaviors to the situation occurs automatically. This 
again supports the notion that these behaviors serve an adaptive function. 
Moreover, the influence of group membership on behavioral reactions 
to emotions was also observed in an experiment in which the groups were 
newly formed and the same pictures served as in-group as well as out-group 
members in a balanced design. This finding provides evidence that the effect 
observed in Experiment 1 and 2 is not caused by the specific stimuli used and 
is not limited to the groups employed here. This further supports the notion that 
the interaction between group membership and emotional expression is caused 
by an evaluation of the intention signaled by the emotion. Behavioral reactions 
to emotional expressions are influenced by the relationship to the out-group 
and not by specific features of the groups employed. Most interestingly, we 
found this effect for newly former groups only if the out-group was negatively 
connoted. We will return to this issue below. 
Finding an influence of group membership and facial expression on 
approach and avoidance behaviors is interesting with regard to another topic: 
Studies examining the influence of irrelevant valence on approach and 
avoidance tasks so far have yielded mixed results. Whereas some groups were 
able to find an influence of valence on approach and avoidance reactions even 
if the task did not require attending to valence (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Duchworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010) others 
did not (e.g., Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). The only 
study known by the authors that employed emotional facial expressions 
without emotion being task-relevant failed to find an influence of emotion on 
movement (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). Therefore, our results add to the 
discussion by providing evidence that – under certain conditions – group 
membership and facial expressions can exert an influence on behavior without 
being task relevant. The possible reasons for this are twofold. First, one reason 
why we were able to observe these effects might be the visual feedback that 
was provided to participants during the task. A recent study demonstrated 
impressively that the same movement can be defined as approach or avoidance 
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behavior depending on the reference point (Seibt et al., 2008). Due to the 
increase and decrease of the size of the stimuli in our studies the assignment of 
movement to approach and avoidance was unambiguous. Thereby possible 
error variance that might have diminished effects in other studies could be 
reduced (see also Krieglmeyer, & Deutsch, 2010, for this argument). Second, 
our results show that it is important to take into account the relationship 
between expresser and perceiver when examining approach and avoidance 
related behaviors to facial expressions. Individual attitudes of the participants 
might influence their behaviors, especially on tasks in which emotion is not 
relevant. If emotion is relevant, individual characteristics of the expresser 
attract less attention and might therefore exert less influence on reactions 
compared to tasks in which emotional expressions are not task-relevant. 
However, this speculation needs further empirical support. 
Finally, our paradigm and our results add to the growing literature on 
implicit attitudes (i.e., automatically activated evaluations of attitude objects 
assessed by indirect measures like evaluative priming or IAT; see Degner, 
Wentura, & Rothermund, 2006; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). Previous 
studies found a correlation between approach and avoidance behaviors and 
implicit, as well as explicit attitudes. Participants with negative attitudes 
towards specific groups were faster in exerting avoidance than approach 
movements towards members of that group (e.g., Neumann et al., 2004; Wyer, 
2010). The main effect for group membership found in Experiment 2 and 3 
might imply that the majority of our participants held negative attitudes 
towards the respective out-groups. Therefore, the reversal of the emotion-
concordant behavioral pattern for Turks/Arabs might be caused by prejudice. 
More importantly, the effects of Experiment 3a and 3b suggest that the 
interaction between group-membership and emotional expression is caused by 
out-group derogation and not in-group favoritism since it was not obtained in a 
classical Minimal Group Paradigm that typically leads to in-group favoritism 
only. In Experiment 3b, in which we combined the minimal group 
manipulation with evaluative information about the groups, the interaction 
occurred. However, this assumption as well as the general influence of 
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prejudice on reactions to emotional expressions should be the subject of future 
investigations. 
Taken together, the experiments reported in this chapter provide strong 
evidence that the interaction between group-membership and emotions is 
indeed caused by the intention signaled by an emotion. However, one might 
argue that this conclusion is still based on an indirect inference: We did not 
directly measure the intention associated with an emotional expression but only 
approach and avoidance reactions which are assumed to be influenced by the 
intention. It is still possible that our results are caused by a different 
mechanism. It is, for example, conceivable that the emotions expressed by out-
group members were perceived as less intense than the in-group emotions; this 
difference might then have influenced approach and avoidance reactions. It is 
also possible that emotions expressed by in-group and out-group members are 
seen as signaling the same intention which is then evaluated differently. The 
results reported above cannot distinguish between the three different 
mechanisms. Therefore, we conducted an experiment in order to visualize the 
mental representations of in-group and out-group smiles in order to assess if 
they differ in expressed intentions, affect or none of the two. 
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6 Visualizing the mental representation of in-group and 
out-group smiles 
 
The purpose of this experiment was to further examine the mechanism that 
underlies the influence of group membership on automatic reaction to 
expressions of emotions. The results of the four approach-avoidance 
experiments suggest that group membership influences which intention is 
associated with an emotional expression. However, as was argued above, the 
results might also be explained by different mechanisms: It is, for example, 
conceivable that the emotions expressed by in-group and out-group members 
differ in perceived intensity, producing the observed effect. Moreover, it might 
also be that in-group and out-group emotions are seen as signaling the same 
intention which is then evaluated differently. Therefore, this experiment was 
designed to shed light into the exact mechanism underlying the interaction 
between group membership and emotional expression. We thereby 
hypothesized that in-group and out-group emotions are indeed associated with 
different intentions. 
In order to test this assumption we decided to visualize the mental 
representations of an emotional expression shown by in-group and out-group 
members, namely smiles. We hypothesized that the assumed association 
between group membership and intention of an emotion would influence the 
mental representation of this emotion: A smile shown by an in-group group 
member should be visualized as expressing benevolent intentions and that of an 
out-group member as showing malevolent intentions. This approach therefore 
allowed us examine if in-group and out-group emotions are indeed associated 
with different intentions, supporting our hypothesis, or if they are rather 
associated with the same intention or with a different underlying affect. 
Thereby we could test the competing explanation for the effect observed with 
the approach avoidance paradigm. 
We chose to examine smiles in this experiment because it has been 
shown that individuals can differentiate between subtle differences within 
smiles, like true and false smiles (e.g., Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & 
Claypool, 2008), felt, false, and miserable smiles (Ekman & Friesen, 1982), 
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and embarrassed, shameful and amused smiles (Keltner, 1995). These findings 
provide evidence that intentions of smiles indeed influence the expression of 
this emotion. This might be an important prerequisite for our arguing that the 
intention associated with an emotional expression influences the mental 
representation of this emotion. However, theoretically, other emotions should 
also be suitable for examining our hypothesis.  
There is already first evidence for our notion that different mental 
representation of an emotional expression exist: Recent research shows that 
there the mental representation of emotions differ between cultures (Jack, 
Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012). 
However, in comparison to these studies we assume that the mental 
representations of emotional expressions do not only differ between individuals 
but that the same individuals hold different mental representations about an 
emotional expression. Regarding smiling expressions, this would implicate that 
there exist a representation of what, for example, a felt smile or a mischievous 
smile looks like. We argue that depending on the group membership of the 
imagined expresser, different mental representations of a smile are activated. 
This should be the case because people attribute different intentions to the 
smiles of in-group and out-group members (as was already argued above). 
Whereas smiles shown in-group members should be interpreted as the wish to 
affiliate, those expressed by members of an out-group might rather be seen as 
expressing dominance, arrogance, or Schadenfreude.  
In order to examine the mental representations of in-group and out-
group smiles, we employed a reverse-correlation image classification technique 
(Mangini, & Biederman, 2004; Todorov, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Said, 2011). 
Recently, a number of studies using the reverse-correlation image classification 
technique has been published in social-cognitive research (e.g., Dotsch, 
Wigboldus, Langner, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, 
Banse, & Wigboldus, 2011; Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van Knippenberg, 2011). In 
an experiment employing this technique, participants are asked to select one 
out of two noisy images as belonging to a certain category of interest. The 
presented images consist of a constant base face superimposed by varying 
random noise patterns. By averaging all images selected, an individual 
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classification image is obtained. The final image constructed with this 
technique thus represents an estimate of the information relevant for this 
category and can be seen as an approximation of a mental representations of 
the target category (Mangini, & Biederman, 2004; Dotsch, et al., 2008). The 
reverse-correlation image classification technique is therefore used to assess 
which information is used by participants to classify stimuli into categories 
(Mangini, & Biederman, 2004).  
The reverse-correlation image classification technique has been used to 
visualize mental representations of in-group and out-group members (Dotsch et 
al, 2008; Imhoff, et al., 2011), traits (Dotsch et al. 2011; Todorov, et al., 2011), 
emotions (Mangini, & Biederman, 2004; Jack, Caldara, et al., 2012), and 
specific individuals (Karremans, Dotsch, & Corneille, 2011; Mangini, & 
Biederman, 2004). Our study visualized the mental representations of smiling 
in-group and out-group members and the different intentions attributed to these 
images by subjects uninformed about the existence of different groups. 
 
Overview 
We used the reverse-correlation image classification technique to obtain 
visualizations of what participants imagine smiling in-group and out-group 
members to look like. To this end, after undergoing a minimal group 
manipulation, participants repeatedly indicated which of two noisy, but smiling 
faces most resembled a member of either the in-group or the out-group 
(manipulated between subjects). Because we wanted participants to be able to 
tap into a mental representation in order to complete the reverse-correlation 
task, we presented photographs of arbitrary, neutral-looking men and women 
as in-group and out-group members prior to the reverse-correlation task. The 
images in the classification task were averaged per participant in order to 
obtain the personal classification image of a smiling in-group or out-group 
member, representing what that participant thought a typical smiling in-group 
or out-group member looked like.  
The stimuli used for the classification task consisted of the image of a 
smiling male face (different from all individuals shown in the group 
manipulation) as base face, superimposed with a random noise pattern. The 
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noise pattern altered the features as well as the expression of the base face 
differently on each trial. Because of the base face, however, each image was 
showing a smiling expression. This emotional expression was not mentioned in 
the instructions.  
After the image construction, a further sample of participants – blind 
with regard to the manipulation – rated each of these images on various 
variables designed to assess the meaning of the emotional expression, that is 
which intention (i.e., benevolent vs. malevolent) it expressed and what the 
underlying affect (i.e., positive vs. negative) was. We hypothesized that group 
membership would be the best predictor of the nature of the intention signaled 
by a smile but not predictive of the affect behind the smile. 
 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
Forty non-psychology students (23 females, 17 males) at Saarland 
University, Germany, participated in the experiment. The experiment lasted 
approximately 40 minutes. Participants were paid six Euros for compensation.  
 
6.1.2 Design 
The experiment followed a one-factorial design with two conditions 
(group membership: in-group vs. out-group) varied between participants. 
 
6.1.3 Materials 
The material consisted of the images used for the group manipulation 
and the stimuli in the reverse-correlation task. 
 
Group manipulation images. We presented two groups of photographs 
of arbitrarily selected Caucasian men and women as in-group and out-group 
members to participants. The two groups consisted of six morphs each, which 
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were created by morphing the photograph of each of six people with the 
photograph of a seventh person
14
. By doing so, the six members of a given 
group resembled each other to a degree that was noticeable but not blatant. 
This was done in order to enforce the creation of a mental image of the 
respective group in participants and to enhance the plausibility of the cover 
story. The photographs were taken from the Radboud Faces Database 
(Langner, et al., 2010), the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (Van 
der Schalk, et al., 2001) and our own collection (Paulus, Rohr, Neuschwander, 
et al., 2012) and displayed men and women with a neutral facial expression. 
Each of these persons was assigned a first name. The group images are 
displayed in Appendix E.  
  
Stimuli. Participants categorized 800 pictures that were presented as 
pairs side by side. Each picture consisted of the same base face with a random 
noise pattern superimposed. The base face was the male smiling face of the 
Averaged Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Database (Lundqvist & Litton, 
1998). For the creation of the noise pattern, see Mangini and Biederman 
(2004). Each pair consisted of one image for which the base face was 
superimposed by one particular noise pattern, and another image with the base 
face superimposed by the reverse of this noise pattern (for details see Dotsch et 
al, 2008). Since the base face expressed a smile, all images showed a smiling 
expression (see Figure 7 for an example of a stimulus pair). 
 
6.1.4 Procedure 
Image Creation. Participants in the image creation phase participated in 
groups of up to five people. After arriving to the lab they were seated 
individually in front of personal computers, separated by partition walls. 
Before the image creation, a minimal group manipulation was conducted.  
At the start of this manipulation, participants were informed that the 
first part of the experimental session would be an assessment of their 
                                                 
14 The morphing factor was 50% 
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perception style. The ostensible test of perceptual style was the same as 
employed in Experiment 3b. Assignment to perception style was randomized.  
After the perception test, participants were informed that the goal of the 
main experiment was to examine how the individual perception style 
influences the recognition and the categorization of other people possessing the 
same or a different perception style. The two groups of morphed faces were 
then presented to the participants with the group labels basal and focal written 
beneath the images. Accordingly, participants were told that the members of 
one of those groups possessed a basal perception style, and the others 
possessed a focal one. To enhance the manipulation, within the group of people 
that had the same perception style as the participant, a silhouette with the label 
“Me” was embedded. (To parallelize, within the other group, a silhouette with 
a first name, differing from the one of the participant, was included.) After 
familiarizing the faces, participants completed several trials in which they had 
to categorize these pictures as in-group and out-group members. This learning 
phase was implemented so that participants would create a mental image about 
the in-group and out-group on which they could base their decision in the 
image creation task. The assignment of perception style to group was fixed. 
Figure 7 Exemplars of stimuli employed in Experiment 4 
 
After participants had successfully learned the categorization of the 
morphed faces, the image creation task started. Participants were shown the 
pairs of noisy images side by side and were asked to select the image that most 
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resembled a member of the focal group (see Figure 7 for an example). Thus, 
half of the participants always selected the image that resembled an in-group 
member and half selected the image that resembled an out-group member. Note 
that all participants could refer during the reverse-correlation task to a mental 
image that was based on exactly the same exemplars shown during learning. 
Participants worked through 400 trials. After each block of 80 trials, the 
participants were reminded to always select the pictures that resembled a 
member of the focal group and the overview of the focal group was presented 
again. 
After finishing the entire experiment participants were thanked and 
dismissed. They were completely debriefed via email after the completion of 
the data collection. 
The selected images were later averaged per participant to create the 
classification images which visualized the mental representation of an in-group 
or out-group member, respectively, for each participant. Each of these images 
thereby displayed a smiling expression since the base face was expressing a 
smile. 
 
Image rating. The 40 images (i.e., 20 images created on the basis of the 
categorizations of those participants that were instructed to select out-group 
members and 20 images of participants that were instructed to select in-group 
members) obtained were rated by an independent groups of participants (N = 
29) on the meaning of the displayed smile,  
For the assessment of the meaning of the smile, we gave descriptions of 
seven possible meanings to the raters and asked them to indicate how much 
each face expressed each of these meanings. We chose these meanings based 
on the literature concerning different types of smiles (Niedenthal, et al., 2010; 
Ekman, 2001) and on our own considerations. Descriptions of these meanings 
are displayed in Table 4. The meanings contain information about intention 
(benevolent vs. malevolent) as well as felt affect (positive vs. negative) of the 
expresser. Intention and felt affect are thereby (at least in part) independent of 
each other: A smile can signal a positive intention but the expresser can 
experience negative affect (e.g., a shameful smile) and vice versa (e.g., 
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mischievous smile). Since we were mostly interested in the intention and not 
the affect signaled by a smile, we phrased the description of the meanings of a 
smile with a focus on intention and not felt affect. Each meaning, however, 
nevertheless contains information about the intention and the underlying affect. 
We hypothesized that group membership would only be predictive of the 
nature of the intention and not the underlying affect. 
 
Table 4 Meanings of Emotion Items employed in Experiment 4 
Item The smile shows… 
Enjoyment smile The smile shows that the person is happy about 
something that is not related to the presence of 
another person. 
Affiliative smile The smile shows that the person is happy about the 
presence of the other person. 
Shameful smile The smile shows that the person is ashamed about 
something. 
Superior smile The smile shows that the person feels superior. 
Mischievous smile 
(Schadenfreude) 
The smile shows that the person is happy about the 
misfortune of another person. 
Scheming smile The smile shows that the person has dishonest 
intentions.  
Polite smile The smile shows that the person is just smiling 
because it is expected in the particular situation. 
 
Before the start of the rating of the meaning of the smiles, information 
about the different meanings was given and participants rated two images 
(created by student researchers with the reverse-correlation procedure) to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure. Faces in the main experiment were 
presented in random order. Participants indicated on scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 10 (very much) to which extend the smile signaled each of the seven 
meanings (see Table 4). The rating scales for each meaning were presented 
below each other on the computer monitor. Thus, each face was rated on each 
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of the seven meanings before the next face was presented. Participants showed 
a high internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .91).  
To obtain indicators of discriminant validity, a further sample of 
independent participants (N = 30) rated (a) the intelligence of the displayed 
person, (b) the clarity of the image, and (c) the intensity of the emotion. These 
ratings were collected independently to prevent influence of the prior rating of 
emotion meaning. The intelligence, image clarity, and emotion intensity were 
collected in consecutive blocks, i.e., each of the 40 classification images were 
rated on one variable before the next variable was assessed. Intelligence was 
rated on a scale ranging from 1 (stupid) to 10 (smart). Clarity and intensity 
were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high). As with the 
emotion meaning ratings, participants completed two practice trials before they 
rated the classification images. The raters showed satisfying internal 
consistency (Intelligence: Cronbach’s Alpha = .92; Clarity: Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .94; Intensity: Cronbach’s Alpha = .96) 
 
6.2 Results 
The ratings for each of the seven meanings of a smile, as well as the 
clarity, intensity, and intelligence ratings were averaged across raters. This 
resulted in one mean score for each of these variables for each classification 
image. The values for the items scheming, mischievous, and superior were 
reversed such that a higher value indicated a more benevolent and less 
malevolent intention.  
Since we predicted that the meanings contain information about the 
intention as well as the affective state of the perceiver, we submitted the seven 
meaning variables to a principal component analysis in order to test the 
hypothesized structure. As predicted, this resulted in a two factorial solution 
with the first factor explaining 67% of the variance and the second one 
explaining 23%. The two factors with the respective loadings, after 
VARIMAX-rotation, of the seven variables are displayed in Table 5.  
 
6 Visualizing smiles 
 
98 
 
Table 5 Factor Loadings for the Meanings of Emotion Items (PCA; VARIMAX 
rotation) in Experiment 4 
 Factor1 
(intention) 
Factor2 
 (affect) Item 
Enjoyment smile .56  .81 
 
Affiliative smile .64  .73 
 
Shameful smile .43 -.85 
 
Superior smile 
(reverted) 
.95 .16 
 
Mischievous smile (Schadenfreude) 
(reverted) 
.96 .07 
 
Scheming smile 
(reverted) 
.93 
 
.32 
 
Polite smile .90 -.07 
 
Note: Numbers printed in bold indicate the higher factor loading of each 
Meaning of Emotion Item 
 
As can be seen, the variables that were mainly descriptive for the 
intention signaled by a smile showed high positive loadings on the first factor 
(mischievous, superior, scheming, affiliative, polite). We therefore interpreted 
the first factor as representing the intention (benevolent vs. malevolent) 
signaled by a smile. The second factor, in contrast, was interpreted as 
indicative for the affective component of a smile since the meanings describing 
positive affect showed high positive loadings (affiliative, enjoyment) and the 
meaning describing negative affect had a negatively signed loading (shameful). 
Please note that the loadings of the item “shameful”, which were substantial on 
both factors, had a positive sign for factor one and a negative sign for factor 
two, indicating the presence of positive intention and the absence of positive 
affect. Since several of the meanings had substantial loadings on both factors, 
we extracted factor score variables. A higher value on the first factor 
(intention) indicated more benevolent intention whereas a higher value on the 
second one (affect) indicated more positive affect.  
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In order to assess the influence of group membership, intensity of the 
emotion, clarity of the expression, and intelligence of the expresser on the 
respective factors, we conducted multiple hierarchical regression analyses on 
both factor scores separately. We hypothesized that group membership would 
be the best predictor for the intention signaled by a smile (Factor 1) whereas 
intensity would predict the affect behind the smile (Factor 2). As can be seen in 
Table 6, the results mainly supported our hypotheses. Group membership (out-
group = 0, in-group = 1) was a significant predictor of the factor intention in 
Step 1and remained to be a significant predictor after intensity was entered in 
Step 2, clarity in Step 3, and intelligence in Step 4. The signs of the Betas show 
that in-group smiles were associated with a more positive intention than out-
group smiles (see Figure 8 for sample images for the respective groups).  
 
 
Figure 8 Exemples for classification images obtained in Experiment 5. The 
images are selected based on their values of the factor intention. The left image 
displays the median out-group image, the right image the median in-group 
image with respect to the distribution of this factor. 
 
Intensity, which was clearly a non-significant predictor of the factor 
intention in Step 2, surprisingly reached significance in Step 3 and Step 4. 
However, we believe that this change in significance is due to a suppression 
effect caused by the correlation between clarity and intensity. Clarity was a 
significant predictor when entered in Step 3, but failed to reach significance 
Out-group In-group 
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after intelligence was entered in Step 4. The results showing that group 
membership significantly predicted intention above and independently of the 
other variables throughout the analysis therefore support our hypothesis that 
group membership influences the intention signaled by a smile. 
The same analysis was also run on the factor affect. The results show 
that intensity was the only significant predictor in Step 2, in Step 3 in Step 4. 
Group membership never predicted the affect shown in a smile, even if it was 
the only predictor. These results support our hypothesis that the affect shown in 
a smile is inferred from the intensity of the expression. In-group and out-group 
membership, on the other hand, is not associated with the affective component 
of the smile.  
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Table 6 Results of the hierarchical regression analyses (Beta-weights and R²) in Experiment 4 
 Factor 1 (intention)  Factor 2 (affect) 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Group .40  .40  .38  .32   .20  -.04  -.04  -.04  
Intensity   .01  -.34  -.32     .69  .72  .73  
Clarity     .63  .45       -.07  -.09  
Intelligence       .22         .02  
R² .16  .16  .43  .44   .04  .45  .46  .46  
Note: Group: out-group = 0, in-group = 1; numbers printed in bold are associated with p < .05. 
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6.3 Discussion 
The results of this experiment support the hypothesis that emotions 
expressed by in-group and out-group members are associated with different 
intentions. By employing the reverse-correlation image classification technique 
we visualized participants’ mental representations of smiling in-group and out-
group members. Independent participants then rated the intention of the smile 
shown by these images. The results demonstrate that the intention signaled by 
the respective smile differed as a function of group membership: As predicted, 
the mental representations of in-group smiles expressed a more benevolent 
intention than those of out-group smiles. The affective content of these smiles 
did not differ. These results show that group membership influences which 
intention is associated with an emotional expression. 
Importantly, the effect found in this study occurred even though 
participants in the image creation task were not instructed to base their decision 
on the nature of the smile but rather on arbitrary group images. The emotional 
expression was neither task relevant nor mentioned. However, the resulting in-
group and out-group images show that the smiles influenced participants’ 
categorizations. Therefore, we assume that this influence occurred 
unintentionally and unconsciously; it is caused by an association between 
group membership and expected intention of a shown facial expression. This 
association influences the visualized mental representation of group members 
which in turn influences the decision.  
Interestingly, the mental representations of in- and out-group members’ 
smiles did not differ in underlying affect but only in signaled intention. As 
argued above, a certain meaning might be indicative of a benevolent intention 
but is associated with a negative affect (e.g., shame) and vice versa. Examining 
the influence of group membership and intensity on the intention and the 
affective component of the mental representations, group membership 
predicted the intention signaled by the smile whereas intensity predicted the 
felt affect of the expresser. The more intensive the expression in an image was 
rated, the more the smile expressed positive affect. This effect was independent 
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of group membership. The finding points to an association between group 
membership and intention and not group membership and affect.  
Therefore, this result provides evidence that the interaction observed 
with the approach avoidance task (most likely) occurs because in-group and 
out-group emotions are interpreted as signaling different intentions. 
Accordingly, they elicit different reactions. However, this conclusion is still an 
indirect one since the results obtained with the reversed correlation technique 
only point to an association between group membership and intention of an 
emotion. They do not provide direct evidence that this association also 
influences the interpretation of presented emotional expressions. However, 
since mental representations reflect previous experiences as well as 
expectancies (Jack, Caldara, et al. 2012), it is plausible to assume that the 
effects obtained in the approach and avoidance tasks are (at least in part) based 
on the anticipation of a benevolent or malevolent intention. This seems 
particularly likely because intergroup situations are often characterized by 
competition and conflict (e.g., Campell, 1965; de Dreu, 2012; Deutsch, 1949; 
Tajfel, et al., 1971; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979). In such a situation, it is natural to 
expect a malevolent intention. 
Apart from providing evidence that group membership influences the 
intention associated with an emotion, the results obtained in this experiment 
might also be of interest for another field of emotion research, namely emotion 
recognition. It has repeatedly been found that emotion recognition is influenced 
by the group membership of expresser and perceiver of an emotion. Typically, 
emotions are recognized better if perceiver and expresser of an emotion share 
cultural group membership, suggesting an influence of a cultural dialect (for a 
meta-analysis on this effect see Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2002). Interestingly, 
however, this effect also occurs if group membership is only established with a 
minimal group paradigm (Young, & Hugenberg, 2010). This in-group 
advantage was explained by motivational processes. However, we propose a 
different reason for the difference in recognition rates: We consider it possible 
that emotions expressed by western in-group members are recognized more 
accurately than those expressed by western out-group members because the 
mental representations for the respective emotions differ between in-group and 
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out-group members. Assuming that a posed facial expression of a western 
stimulus set rather resembles the mental representation of an in-group emotion 
than that of an out-group emotion, this might result in a mismatch between 
mental representation and visual input if the expresser is labeled an out-group 
member. This mismatch might then impair emotion recognition compared to a 
situation in which visual input and mental representation match (see Jack, et 
al., 2012 for a similar argument). However, this assumption is very preliminary 
and needs further empirical support. 
Taken together, the results of this experiment reveal an association 
between group membership and intention signaled by an emotional expression: 
The mental representations of in-group members’ smile showed more 
benevolent intentions than that of out-group members. Importantly, this result 
occurred even though the emotional expression was not relevant for the 
ongoing task, suggesting an automatic process. The finding of this experiment 
therefore supports our assumption that group membership influences reactions 
to emotions because it automatically influences which intention is associated 
with an emotional expression.  
However, this experiment as well as all others reported in this thesis so 
far employed visual material. Emotions expressions were manipulated by 
employing images of emotional expressions. Therefore, we cannot conclude if 
this effect can be generalized to other modalities or if it is restricted to the 
visual domain. Furthermore, even though indirect, the dependent variables 
assessed so far required performing an artificial task (Experiments 1 – 3). 
These variables therefore constitute very artificial reactions. We think it would 
be interesting to examine if the interaction between group membership and 
emotional expression also influences natural everyday behavior. The last 
experiment was designed to overcome these limitations. 
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7 Automatic affective reactions in the voice 
 
The last goal of this thesis was to assess if the automatic interaction between 
group membership and emotional expression also occurs if the stimuli are 
presented in a non-visual modality and the affective reaction occurs only 
incidental. For this, we conducted an experiment that was a modified version of 
one employed by Weisbuch and Ambady (2008): Group membership and 
emotional expression were manipulated by presenting short stories instead of 
visual material. Participants’ task was to read these stories aloud while their 
voices were recorded. The affective coloring of the voices constituted our 
dependent variable. Therefore, the affective reaction was only a by-product of 
an everyday occurring behavior. The nature of this experiment thus clearly 
differs from the others reported in this thesis in material used and dependent 
variable assessed; since it is the only one employing these methods, it should 
be seen as showing possible directions that the project could take rather than 
drawing final conclusions. Accordingly, the results should only be taken as a 
first indicator for the observed effect
15
. 
In the original experiment by Weisbuch and Ambady (2008), which 
was part of a larger set of studies, the authors found concordant affective 
reactions in the voice recordings of participants that read about an emotional 
life event of an in-group member, but divergent reactions if the protagonist in 
the story was a member of an out-group. Group membership was established 
through team allegiance: The protagonist was either a supporter of the same 
football team as the participant or supporter of the rival team. Because of this 
group manipulation, we think that it is likely that participants consciously 
altered their voices when reading the short stories. This assumption is based on 
the fact that there exists a strong, openly expressed rivalry between the two 
employed football teams in the northeastern United States (Weisbuch & 
                                                 
15
 We also have to note that we tried to replicate the results reported in this chapter with a 
different set of voice recordings and ratings. Unfortunately, the expected effect did not 
emerge again. However, since the second data collection differed from the first in various 
aspects (experimenters, recording locations, recording quality), and the power of this 
experiment was very low (n = 52), we believe that no final conclusion can be drawn regarding 
the replicability of the results. 
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Ambady). Because of this, participants might have felt hard-pressed to express 
their sympathy and antipathy to the respective groups by altering their voices. 
We therefore believe that the findings reported by Weisbuch and Ambady are 
not necessarily based on an automatic process. Accordingly, these results do 
not provide evidence that the automatic influence of group membership on 
affective reactions can be found with non-visual material. 
In order to examine this question, we replicated the experimental design 
with an ethnical intergroup situation. We assume that this manipulation should 
heighten participants’ motivation for a controlled process. This effect, as well 
as a moderation of non-automatic measures by the motivation to control 
prejudiced responses has repeatedly shown before (e.g., Banse, & Gawronski, 
2003; Dunton, & Fazio, 1997; Fazio, et al., 1995). Based on these findings we 
argue that finding an influence of group membership on affective reactions 
would allow us to conclude that this effect was uncontrollable. Finding 
nevertheless an interaction between group membership and emotional 
expression would allow us to conclude that this process is hard or impossible to 
control. Furthermore, in our experiment, no information about the relationship 
between the two groups was provided. Therefore we created a situation in 
which the influence of group membership on the consecutive reaction should 
be unintentional. Finding an influence of ethnic group membership on affective 
reactions to emotional expressions in this situation would allow us to assess the 
automaticity (in the sense of controllability and unintentionality) of this 
process. We believe that these modifications of the design constitute an 
important change to the original study in which an intergroup situation was 
created that was explicitly competitive in nature and asked for an open 
expression of a negative attitude against the out-group.  
 
Overview 
The design of the experiment closely followed that used by Weisbuch 
and Ambady (2008): German participants read aloud a short story while their 
voices were recorded. The protagonist of the story was either a Turkish or 
German young men who experienced either a happy or fearful life event. An 
independent sample of raters later rated the valence of the voice recordings.  
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We hypothesized that the voice recordings would show a concordant 
affect if the protagonist was German and a divergent affect if he was Turkish. 
Importantly, we expected this to be the case even though group membership 
was only casually mentioned and participants did not report strong negative 
attitudes towards the out-group (either because they were controlled, not 
accessible or not existent). 
 
7.1 Method 
7.1.1 Participants 
Voice recordings. Seventy-eight voice recordings were obtained from 
unknown men and women that were approached at public places. Two of these 
recordings had to be excluded for the ratings because of a severe cold of one 
reader and severe problems with reading of another. Therefore, the final set 
consisted of seventy-six voice recordings from 39 females and 39 males with 
19 voice recordings in each of the four conditions. The distribution of males 
and females on the four conditions was approximately equal. The age range 
was 15 to 76 years with a median of 34.5 years. All participants were native 
Germans. 
 
Ratings. The voice recordings were rated by 27 (22 females, 5 males) 
independent raters. All raters were psychology students at the Saarland 
University, Germany; their mother tongue was German. The age range was 19 
to 40 years with a median of 21 years. Participants were given course credit for 
participation. 
 
7.1.2 Design 
The design followed a 2 (ethnicity: German vs. Turkish) by 2 (emotion: 
joy vs. fear) design with all factors varied between participants. The rating of 
the voice recordings served as the dependent variable. 
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7.1.3 Material 
The material for this experiment consisted of the short stories, the 
recording device, and a questionnaire. 
 
Short Stories. The short stories participants were asked to read aloud 
were developed after those employed by Weisbuch and Ambady (2008). They 
featured a young man who was either of Turkish or German origin and who 
experienced a happy or fearful life event. The complete short stories are 
displayed in Appendix F. 
At the beginning of the story the protagonist was introduced with his 
first name (Peter vs. Ahmed) and some general information about his life was 
given. This paragraph, which was kept the same for the happy and the fearful 
life event, finished with the information that the protagonist had moved to 
Cologne (from Düsseldorf or from Istanbul, respectively) when he was a child. 
Therefore, the first paragraph served the purpose to inform the reader about the 
group membership of the protagonist. 
The second paragraph contained the emotional information. It informed 
the reader that this day was special for Peter/Ahmed either because he was 
going to a very important soccer match of his favorite soccer team or because 
he was going to find out if he had cancer. We tried to keep this paragraph as 
similar as possible for the two emotions. The text was 170 and 171 characters 
long.  
 
Recording Device. The voices were recorded with a Zoom H2 digital 
voice recorder and with an EM-9600 cardioid microphone. They were later 
edited on the computer with Audacity software. Each recording was clipped so 
that the information about the group membership of the protagonist was cut off 
and the recording began with the emotional information. This was done to 
ensure that the judgments of the raters were not influenced by the ethnicity of 
the protagonist. Each sample was normalized and converted into mono 
recording. 
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Questionnaire. After the voice recording, participants filled out the 
German version of the Subtle and Blatant Prejudice Scale (Pettigrew, & 
Meertens, 1995) designed to assess their personal attitudes towards Turkish 
immigrants.  
 
7.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure consisted of two parts, the collection of the voice 
recordings and the rating of these.  
 
Voice Recordings. For the voice recordings, participants were approach 
at public places by one or two female experimenters and asked if they would be 
willing to participate in a short experiment. If they agreed, the experiment was 
implemented on the spot. Participants were told that the experiment was part of 
a study project in the context of German philology and designed to measure the 
natural speech pattern of German speakers. The participant was informed about 
the general procedure and that the anonymity of her/his data was assured. The 
experimenter asked the participant to select one of four envelopes containing 
the four short stories as well as the questionnaire
16
. This was done to assign 
participants to conditions and to enhance the impression of anonymity. After 
the selection, the experimenter asked the participant to read the short story in a 
natural way aloud into the microphone. In order to avoid anticipation effects 
and to provide anonymity, the experimenter put on headphones while the 
participant was reading the story. After the reading was finished, the 
participant filled out the questionnaire, was debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
 
Ratings. The ratings of the voice recordings were obtained in the 
laboratory. Participants were assigned to rate either the fearful or happy voice 
recordings. Participants were tested in groups of up to four people. After 
arriving to the lab they were seated individually in front of personal computers, 
                                                 
16
 We prepared 20 envelopes per condition; ten of these were reserved for female and ten for 
male participants. This resulted in 80 envelopes together. Therefore, at the end of data 
collection, the four envelopes might have contained the same stories.  
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separated by partition walls. They were asked to put on headphones. The voice 
recordings and ratings were implemented in an E-Prime experiment. The 
instruction for the rating was given at the computer, asking participants to rate 
the general tone of the voice while ignoring the content.  
Each trial of the rating started with a fixation cross that was displayed 
for 1 second. Afterwards, one of the voice recordings was replayed. Then a 
rating scale appeared, ranging from one (very negative) to six (very positive). 
The next trial started after the answer was given.  
Before the rating of the critical voice recordings, each participant rated 
four voice recordings which were obtained from members of the psychology 
department at Saarland University in order to serve as practice trials. Then 38 
critical voice recordings were rated in a random order. 19 of these recordings 
featured Peter as protagonist and 19 featured Ahmed.  
 
7.2 Results 
Our dependent variable was analyzed in two different ways: In the 
standard analysis, the voice recordings were treated as cases, whereas in the 
alternative analysis the raters constituted the cases. 
 
7.2.1 Standard Analysis 
The ratings of the voice recordings showed satisfying internal 
consistency (joy: Cronbach’s Alpha = .89; fear: Cronbach’s Alpha = .76). 
Therefore, a mean rating value including all individual ratings was calculated 
for each voice recording. Examining the mean rating separately for the joy and 
fear conditions, three voice recordings in the fear condition were identified as 
outliers (more than 1.5 interquartile ranges above the third quartile of the 
distribution). These were excluded in the analysis. Therefore, the main analysis 
focused on 19 voice recordings in the happy/Turkish, 19 voice recordings in 
the happy/German, 17 voice recordings in the fear/Turkish and 18 voice 
recordings in the fear/German condition.  
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The mean rating was analyzed in a 2 (Ethnicity: Turkish vs. German) × 
2 (Emotion: happy vs. fear) complete between participants ANOVA. As 
predicted, the main effect for emotion was not significant (F < .05; n.s.). 
Unfortunately, also neither the main effect for ethnicity (F (1, 69) = 1.74; p = 
.19), nor the interaction (F (1, 69) = 1.71; p = .2) reached statistical 
significance even though the means were in the predicted direction (see Table 
6).  
We also calculated a moderation analysis to examine if the level of 
explicit prejudice moderated the interaction between emotional expression and 
ethnicity. Emotional expression, ethnicity and prejudice were entered into a 
regression analysis with the mean rating as criterion in Step 1, followed by the 
two-way interactions. The three-way interaction was entered in Step 3. The 
results show that level of prejudice was a significant predictor for the mean 
rating variable throughout all steps of the regression analysis (all βs > - .27, |t|s 
> 2.28; ps < .05) with higher levels of prejudice associated with less positive 
ratings. No other predictor reached significance (all βs < .13; ns). 
 
Table 7 Mean ratings as a function of emotion and ethnicity in Experiment 5. 
(In parentheses: standard deviations in the standard analysis, standard 
deviations in the alternative analysis) 
  Emotional content  
Group membership Happiness  Fear  
German 3.82 (.91/.43) 3.59 (.40/.41) 
Turkish 3.42 (.72/.28) 3.58 (.40/.24) 
Note: Ratings were obtained on a scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 6 
(very positive) 
 
7.2.2 Alternative Analysis 
We also analyzed the data collected in this experiment in a different 
manner, that is, we treated the raters as cases and the voice recordings as 
variables. This procedure has also been used by other researchers (e.g., Dotsch, 
et al., 2008; Imhoff, et al., 2011). However, the results obtained with this 
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analysis should be treated cautiously since this procedure is not as conservative 
as the standard one. Please note that the means in this analysis are exactly the 
same as in the analysis reported above. However, the standard deviation differs 
since the means are calculated across voice recording in this analysis and not 
across raters (see Table 7). We excluded the same voice recordings as in the 
standard analysis.  
The 2 (Ethnicity: Turkish vs. German) × 2 (Emotion: happy vs. fear) 
ANOVA with the first factor varied within and the second between participants 
revealed a significant main effect for ethnicity (F (1, 25) = 13.14; p = .001, ηp² 
= .34). The means show that the voice recordings featuring the Turkish 
protagonist were rated as containing more negative affect than those featuring 
the German one. The main effect for emotion did not reach statistical 
significance (F < 1; n.s.). However, with this analysis, the ethnicity by emotion 
interaction reached significance, F (1, 25) = 12.91; p = .001, ηp² = .34. The 
interaction shows that the short stories which were hypothesized to elicit 
negative affect (German/fear, Turkish/happiness) were indeed associated with 
lower positive affect ratings than the emotion/group combinations which were 
hypothesized to elicit positive affect (German/happiness, Turkish/fear). The 
means indicate that the affect in the voice recordings featuring the German 
protagonist was more positive for the happy than the fearful life event. This 
pattern did not reach significance: t (25) = -1.45; p = .08 (one signed). The 
pattern was reversed for the German protagonist but also failed to reach 
significance: t (25) = 1.35; p = .08 (one signed).  
 
7.3 Discussion 
Cautiously interpreted, the results of Experiment 5 provide first 
evidence that group membership influences affective reactions to emotions 
automatically even if non-visual material is employed and the affective 
reaction is only a by-product of a naturally occurring behavior. In this 
experiment, participants read aloud short stories featuring a young man of 
Turkish or German background, who experienced either a happy or fearful life 
event. The results show that ethnic group membership and the emotional 
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coloring of the life influenced the affective tone in the voice of a reading 
person. As predicated, short stories which were supposed to elicit negative 
affect (German/fear, Turkish/happiness) were indeed associated with more 
negative ratings of the tone of the voice than those which were supposed to 
elicit positive affect (German/happiness, Turkish/fear). This result, however, 
has to be taken with precaution since it was only found in a not very 
conservative analysis. If the data was treated in a traditional way, the 
interaction between group membership and emotion failed to reach 
significance. We will now first discuss the implications of the significant 
interaction and then the differences between the two different analyses. 
The significant interaction between group membership and emotion 
found in this experiment demonstrates that the automatic effect observed in the 
others is independent of the stimulus material employed. In all experiments 
reported in this thesis, the emotion experienced by an in-group member 
automatically elicited concordant affective reactions, whereas out-group 
members’ emotions resulted in divergent reactions. This effect occurred 
regardless whether emotional expression and group membership were 
manipulated by employing images of emotional expression (Experiments 1 – 4) 
or by presenting short stories (Experiment 5). The result of Experiment 5 
accordingly provides evidence that the findings obtained in the other 
experiments generalize to other modalities and are not limited to the visual 
perception of in-group and out-group emotions.  
Importantly, the emotional expression or the group membership and the 
emotional expression were not task relevant in all of these experiments. 
Furthermore, group membership was only subtly manipulated. Therefore, we 
believe that the interaction in each experiment was based on an automatic 
process. This arguing is supported by the finding that the nonverbal channel is 
hard to control consciously (Rosenthal, & DePaulo, 1979).  
The result of this experiment furthermore shows that the affective 
response elicited by an in-group or out-group emotion can be measured by 
assessing the affective coloring of the tone of the voice. This finding converges 
with studies which used this method to assess the occurrence of mood 
contagion (e.g., Neumann, & Strack, 2000). It therefore provides evidence that 
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the interaction between group membership and emotional expression not only 
influences short, artificial reactions like those measured in Experiment 1 – 4, 
but also more long-lasting truly affective reactions.  
This experiment differs from the others in another important aspect: In 
comparison to facial expressions, the short stories provided information about 
the emotion eliciting event. The emotion might accordingly not have been 
interpreted as directly elicited by or directed towards the perceiver (i.e., 
reader). It is therefore not clear if the interaction between group membership 
and emotion was again caused by an influence of group membership on the 
interpretation of the intention signaled by the emotion, or by a different 
mechanism. It is conceivable that the emotion experienced by the protagonist 
was again seen in the light of the relationship between the protagonist and 
perceiver or their respective groups, and accordingly interpreted as indicating 
dominance or submission. This assumption is particularly plausible for the 
happy life event; Participants might have automatically assumed that the 
protagonist was a supporter of a rival soccer team if he was an out-group 
member. This assumption is supported by theories arguing that group members 
strive to attenuate differences between in-group and out-group members (e.g., 
Brewer, 1991; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 
1978). If the protagonist was seen as a supporter of the rival soccer team, his 
happiness and excitement might accordingly have been interpreted as a sign of 
dominance and arrogance towards the reader’s in-group. For the fearful life 
event it is, however, hard to imagine that the group membership influenced the 
interpretation of the intention or implication associated with the emotion. 
Further research is therefore needed to assess if the affective reactions 
observed in this study were elicited by the intention associated with the 
emotion or by a different mechanism.  
Unfortunately, as already mentioned above, this study entails the caveat 
that the significant interaction was only found with one of two analyses. If the 
voice samples were treated as cases, no significant interaction emerged. Only if 
the raters constituted the cases, the interaction between group membership and 
emotional expression reached significance. Please note thereby that both 
calculations are based on the same mean values. The reason for the difference 
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between the two seems to be twofold: First of all, the factor ethnicity was 
varied between participants in the standard analysis but within participants in 
the alternative one; in this analysis, each rater indicated for short stories 
featuring the German as well as the Turkish protagonist how positive or 
negative the affective tone in the voice was. Therefore, the analysis of variance 
took into account the fact that each rater judged several voice recordings and 
did therefore not evaluate them independently but in comparison to each other. 
By employing a mixed design with ethnicity varied within and emotion varied 
between participants we were able to account for this dependency of the 
ratings. Second, in the alternative analysis, the variance between the voice 
samples was diminished. As indicated by the high standard deviation of the 
first analysis (see Table 6), the affective tone of the voice samples was quite 
variable. The variance between raters, however, was a lot smaller, as indicated 
by the lower standard deviation of the alternative analysis. The reason for the 
variability within the voice samples is obvious: The affective tone of the voice 
samples was not only influenced by the experimental manipulations (ethnicity 
and emotional life event) but also by numerous variables we could not control 
for (pitch of the voice, mood of speaker, background noise, recording quality, 
etc.). Therefore, the individual voice samples differed quite a lot. Since we 
obtained only a limited number of covariates (e.g., age, gender), we could not 
account for the error variance within the voice samples. As a result of the high 
variance, the analysis in which voice samples were treated as cases did not 
reach significance.  
Please note, however, that the standard analysis better accounts for the 
nature of the design used in the study: First of all, our manipulations were 
implemented completely between participants; each participant only read one 
short story and was not aware of the content of the others. Second, the 
manipulation affected the reader and not the raters. They experienced the 
affective reaction. Therefore, this analysis is more appropriate for the design 
employed. In the future, it might therefore be a good idea to record 
participants’ voices while reading a neutral text before reading the short stories. 
These recordings would allow us to assess the general tone of the voice which 
could then serve as a covariate, diminishing the error variance.  
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To sum it up, this experiment provides first evidence that the automatic 
influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotion also occurs if 
the material is presented in a non-visual modality and if the dependent variable 
is only indirectly assessed. This finding provides a first look-out on the 
direction this project could take. However, the results are only preliminary. 
Future studies are needed to examine if this finding can be replicated. 
Furthermore, the underlying mechanism is also in need of further clarification.  
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The goal of this thesis was twofold: First of all, we wanted to look at the 
mechanisms underlying the interaction between group membership and 
emotional expression. Specifically, we examined the hypothesis that group 
membership influences which intention is associated with an emotional 
expression, influencing the following reaction. Our second goal was to 
examine if group membership influences affective reactions to emotional 
expressions automatically. In this chapter, the results of the experiments 
conducted for this thesis will be summarized and then discussed with regard to 
our two research questions. Since we employed various different paradigms to 
examine our hypotheses, we will only discuss the commonalities and 
implications of our results here. Method specific conclusions are presented in 
the discussion paragraphs following each experiment. Finally, open questions 
and future directions will be addressed. 
 
8.1 Summary of the results 
Supporting our main hypothesis, the results from the experiments 
conducted for this thesis show that group membership influences affective 
reactions to emotional expressions because it influences which intention is 
inferred from an emotional expression. We hypothesized that the intention of 
an in-group emotion should be interpreted in the light of the positive, friendly 
relationship which typically exists between members of the same group, 
whereas the intention of an out-group emotion should be seen in the light of 
competition and rivalry which can typically be found between members of 
different groups (e.g., Campbell, 1965; de Dreu, 2012; Deutsch, 1949; Tajfel, 
et al., 1971; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979). Following this hypothesis, happiness 
expressed by an in-group member should be interpreted as signaling affiliation, 
whereas fear expressed by an in-group member should mainly be seen as a 
warning. By contrast, we expected that happiness expressed by an out-group 
member should be interpreted as a sign of dominance or arrogance, whereas 
out-group fear should be seen as a sign of submission. Accordingly, in-group 
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happiness and out-group fear should elicit more approach compared to 
avoidance reactions than in-group fear and out-group happiness. The 
behavioral pattern observed with three approach and avoidance experiments 
supports these hypotheses. The reaction times show that group/emotion 
combinations that were hypothesized to be approach related (in-
group/happiness, out-group/fear) activated more approach related behavior 
than avoidance related combinations (in-group/fear, out-group/happiness). 
Since previous research has shown that approach and avoidance reactions are 
caused by the intention inferred from the emotional expression (e.g., 
Wilkowski, & Meier, 2010), this pattern allows us to conclude that group 
membership indeed influences which intention in inferred from the expression, 
influencing the following reaction.  
This conclusion is further supported by an experiment in which we 
visualized participants’ mental representations of in-group and out-group 
smiles. The results support our hypothesis: As predicted, the mental 
representation of in-group members’ smiles showed more benevolent and less 
malevolent intentions than that of out-group members’ smiles. Interestingly, 
group membership did not influence the affective connotation of the 
expression. The results obtained with two different paradigms therefore allow 
us to conclude that in-group and out-group emotions are indeed associated with 
different intentions which then lead to different reactions towards the emotions 
expressed by in-group and out-group members. The generalizability of this 
finding to the results reported in other studies will be discussed below. 
Importantly, the set-up of our experiments also show that this effect 
occurred automatically: Even though either the emotional expression or the 
emotional expression and the group membership of the expresser were not task 
relevant, the experiments conducted for this thesis found that in-group 
emotions elicited concordant affective reactions whereas out-group emotions 
led to divergent reactions. This shows that the influence of group membership 
on affective reactions does not depend on a conscious goal to evaluate the 
stimulus and is not necessarily based on an intentional process.  
Another interesting finding of our experiments is that in all of them, the 
same effect occurred even though different intergroup manipulations were 
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employed such as an ethnical intergroup situation and a minimal group 
paradigm. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, images of German and 
Turkish/Arabic looking young men were presented as in-group and out-group 
members. Group membership was thereby only manipulated by employing this 
visual material – no other information about the intergroup situation (e.g., the 
rivalry between Germans and Turks in Germany) was given. The same is true 
for Experiment 5 in which only written information about the group 
membership was presented. In Experiment 3 and Experiment 4, a minimal 
group manipulation was realized which allowed us to employ the same images 
as in-group as well as out-group members. In all experiments, the same effect 
occurred, irrespective of the exact groups used. This allows us to conclude that 
the influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotions is not 
limited to ethnical intergroup situations but can occur in various different 
intergroup situations.  
Critics might object to this conclusion by pointing out that the critical 
interaction between group membership and emotional expression in 
Experiment 3b only occurred after a negative attitude towards the out-group 
was created. In the experiment in which a more traditional minimal group 
manipulation was employed (Experiment 3a), no influence of group 
membership on affective reactions to emotional expressions was observed. 
However, we argue that this difference between the two experiments occurs 
because the minimal group paradigm typically results in in-group favoritism 
but not in out-group derogation (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Otten & Wentura, 1999). 
As our manipulation of Experiment 3b shows, the interaction between 
emotional expression and group membership, however, seems to be based on a 
negative attitude towards the out-group. Therefore, we believe that this non-
significant result of Experiment 3a does not diminish the conclusion drawn 
from the other experiment but rather provides important information on the 
prerequisites needed for this interaction to occur. Based on the convergent 
findings of our experiments we therefore conclude that the influence of group 
membership on affective reactions to emotional expression can be generalized 
to most, if not all, intergroup situations in which a negative attitude towards the 
out-group exists.  
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One point important to note thereby is that in comparison to Experiment 
3a and 3b, in Experiment 4 a traditional minimal group manipulation was 
sufficient to influence the intention associated with an emotional expression. 
However, we assume that this difference between these experiments is a result 
of the nature of task participants had to carry out. In Experiment 4, which 
employed the reverse-correlation task, participants had to select one of two 
smiling faces either as resembling an in-group or an out-group member. To 
fulfill this task, a simple differentiation between in-group and out-group is 
sufficient. It is imaginable that participants always identified the face showing 
the more benevolent smile as an in-group member, and the face showing the 
more malevolent smile as a non–in-group member. Such an approach would 
result in the observed effect even if the out-group is only less positively 
evaluated than the in-group and not negatively per se. The same argument can 
explain the main effect in Experiment 3a: In this experiment, out-group 
members elicited a stronger avoidance score than in-group members. This 
effect might be based on the same mechanism as the one observed in 
Experiment 4; for the main effect to arise it is sufficient if members of the in-
group and the out-group are only evaluated differently. Different reactions to 
happiness and fear within one group, however, might be based on a special 
attitude towards the respective group, and not only on a difference between 
attitudes toward the two groups. Please note that this arguing does not diminish 
the conclusions drawn from Experiment 4; the results show that in-group and 
out-group members’ smiles are associated with different intention. If this 
process is based on in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both is not 
central to the implication of this finding.  
Our arguing that group membership influences reactions to emotional 
expressions because it influences the nature of the relationship between 
expresser and perceiver of an emotion is supported by studies examining facial 
mimicry. They find that manipulations of cooperation and competition generate 
the same effects on facial reactions to emotional expressions as manipulations 
of group membership: Participants in those studies reacted with concordant 
facial muscle activity to the emotions of an avatar in the cooperative and the 
neutral setting, but showed divergent reactions in the competitive setting 
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(Likowski, et al., 2011). Interestingly, this effect even occurred if cooperation 
and competition were only subliminally primed (Weyers, et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the same pattern was found if participants’ attitude towards the 
avatars was explicitly manipulated (Likowski, et al., 2008). The fact that such a 
direct manipulation of the nature of the relationship between expresser and 
perceiver has the same impact on reactions to emotions as a manipulation of 
the group membership supports the notion that group membership indeed 
affects reactions to emotions because it influences the relationship between 
expresser and perceiver.  
To put it in a nutshell, the results obtained with the experiments 
conducted for this thesis show that group membership automatically influences 
affective reactions to emotion. Furthermore, they suggest that this interaction 
occurs because group membership influences which intention is inferred from 
an emotional expression which in turn influences the affective reactions. These 
two implications will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.  
 
8.2 Intention and emotional expression 
As was already presented above, we argue that group membership 
influences the relationship between expresser and perceiver; as a result, 
different intentions are inferred from an emotional expression, leading to 
different reactions. To put it more precisely, if the relationship is of friendly 
and cooperative nature, like it is typically the case between members of the 
same group, happiness is seen as a sign of affiliation whereas fear acts as a 
cooperative warning. As a result, happiness elicits a positive affective reaction 
and fear a negative one. If the relationship between expresser and perceiver is 
however marked by competition and hostility, like it is typically the case 
between members of different groups, happiness is interpreted as a sign of 
dominance or arrogance whereas a fearful expression is seen as a sign of 
submission. As a result, negative affective reactions arise to the expression of 
happiness and positive affective reaction to the expression of fear. The results 
obtained from the experiments employing the approach and avoidance 
paradigm and from the one using the reversed correlation technique support 
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these hypotheses, showing that in-group and out-group emotions are associated 
with different intentions.  
Our explanation of the influence of group membership on affective 
reactions to emotions has several advantages over the other proposed 
explanations (see Chapter 3.2): First of all, it specifies which divergent 
emotional reactions should result from which emotional expression, a point 
which is not addressed by the comparison approach. Second, and most 
importantly, it sheds light on the mechanism by which group membership 
influences which meaning is inferred from an emotional expression. This 
specificity of our approach allowed us to come up with testable predictions, 
which were examined with the experiments conducted for this thesis. The 
results support our assumptions. 
We argue that our approach might also be suitable to explain the 
influence of group membership on affective reactions observed with other 
paradigms. The concordant and divergent facial reactions to emotional 
expressions shown by in- and out-group members reported in Chapter 3.1, for 
example, are in line with our predictions. Further support for this arguing 
comes from a study which examined the influence of competition and 
cooperation on facial reactions to emotional (see above). In the study 
conducted by Likowski and colleagues (2011), participants played a game of 
dice against an avatar in a competitive, a cooperative or a neutral setting. The 
avatar expressed happy, sad, neutral, or angry expressions after he tossed the 
dices. As already mentioned above, participants showed concordant facial 
reactions to the emotional expressions shown by the avatar in the cooperative 
and neutral setting, but divergent reactions in the competitive situation. The 
setup of this study allows us to conclude that these reactions were caused by 
the intention and implication of the emotional expression: If the avatar in the 
competitive setting showed a happy facial expression, for example, after 
tossing his dice, the participant could infer that it was an unlucky round for 
himself and that the smile indicated dominance rather than affiliation. Since the 
participant was in direct competition to the avatar, this had negative 
implications for him. Experiencing less joy and showing divergent facial 
muscle activity was therefore a sensible reaction. If, however, the avatar 
8 Discussion 
 
123 
 
showed the happy expression in the cooperative setting, the smile indicated to 
the participant that this cast had positive implications for both of them. 
Accordingly, he showed a concordant facial reaction which is a sensible 
reaction in this situation. This experiment therefore provides evidence that 
concordant and divergent facial reactions to emotional expression can also be 
explained by an influence of the relationship between expresser and perceiver 
on the intention inferred from an emotional expression. This finding therefore 
supports our assumption that this mechanism might be responsible for the 
influence of group membership on affective reactions reported with various 
paradigms. To draw a final conclusion, however, this arguing needs more 
empirical support. 
However, our experiments also differ to those obtained with Likowski 
and colleagues (2011) in important aspects: They provide strong evidence that 
it is indeed the relationship between expresser and perceiver which influences 
which intention is associated with an emotional expression. In our experiments, 
no information about the emotion eliciting cause was given (except Experiment 
5). The only contextual information was the group membership of the 
expresser. In this aspect our experiments clearly differ to those conducted by 
Likowski and colleagues: In this study, the event causing the emotional 
expression was obvious; the emotion of the avatar was caused by the outcome 
of the dice tossing. Our results therefore show that a manipulation of the 
relationship between expresser and perceiver is sufficient to influence the 
interpretation of the intention inferred from an emotional expression. No 
contextual information has to be given. 
One reason why the manipulation of group membership had such a 
strong influence on the interpretation of the emotional expressions in our 
experiments might be rooted in the intergroup situation per se: Seeing an 
emotional expression of an out-group member might be an unfamiliar 
experience for the participants. This arguing is supported by several findings. 
First of all, it has been demonstrated that facial expressions of emotions are a 
lot less frequently shown if the perceiver of the emotion is a stranger compared 
to if he is a friend (e.g., Buck, et al., 1992; Hess, et al., 1995; Wagner, & 
Smith, 1991). Second, the emotions employed in most of our experiments 
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(happiness and fear) were rather untypical expressions for out-groups (e.g., 
Hugenberg, & Bodenhausen, 2004). And last but not least, it has been found 
that an expression of happiness signals that a relationship is cooperative in 
nature (Van Doorn, Heerdink, & van Kleef, 2012). This signal was is in 
conflict with the competitive intergroup situation. The findings of all of these 
studies suggest that the emotional expressions shown by the out-group 
members constituted unexpected stimuli for our participants; accordingly, they 
might have looked for an explanation. Since the situation did not provide any 
cues about the emotion eliciting event, the participants might have considered 
the emotional expressions as directed towards them. As a result, they might 
have interpreted them in the light of the relationship between themselves and 
the expressers, leading to the observed effect. However, the assumption that the 
intention signaled by an emotional expression is more relevant in an intergroup 
than in an intragroup situation is rather speculative and requires further 
examination.  
The finding that group membership influences the intention associated 
with an emotional expression is not only of interest for researchers examining 
intergroup processes but also of theoretical relevance for theorists examining 
the meaning of facial expressions: They show that the same emotional 
expression is associated with different intentions. As far as we know, this point 
has not been discussed or thoroughly examined in detail yet; most discussions 
regarding the meaning of an emotional expression evolve around the debate 
whether an emotional expression communicates an emotional state or a motive 
(e.g., Parkinson, 2005). First evidence for the notion that one emotion is 
associated with different intentions can be found in studies in which 
participants were asked to freely describe the intention signaled by an 
emotional expression (e.g., Horstmann, 2003). The answers show that different 
intentions are inferred from the same emotional expression. Fearful faces, for 
example, were described as a “request to stop acting or to act differently, help, 
go away, or notice something” (Horstmann, 2003; p 161). However, in these 
studies, no emphasis was put on the reason for the different answers. 
Additional evidence for the assumption that emotional expressions are 
associated with different intentions stems from studies examining reactions to 
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smiles. It was found that participants can distinguish between true and false 
smiles (e.g., Bernstein, et al., 2008), felt, false, and miserable smiles (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1982), and embarrassed, shameful and amused smiles (Keltner, 1995). 
These results suggest that expressions which belong to the same emotional 
category can indicate different intentions or implications. In these experiments, 
however, slightly different expressions of the same emotion were used; 
therefore, the images employed different visual features. As long as we know, 
no study so far examined experimentally which factor apart from visual 
features determines which intention is inferred from an emotional expression 
(for a theoretical attempt see Niedenthal, et al., 2010). Therefore, our studies 
are the first to provide empirical evidence that a simple manipulation of a 
situational factor influences the interpretation of emotional expressions. 
Importantly, they thereby show that this interpretation does not depend on 
visual features since in our experiments the same visual input was given for in-
group and out-group members’ emotions (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4).  
At a last point we have to note that the firmness of our conclusion that 
affective reactions to emotions are influenced by the group membership of the 
expresser because group membership influences the intention associated with 
an emotional expression is mainly based on the findings regarding facial 
expressions of happiness. One might argue that the effects observed with the 
approach and avoidance paradigm are caused by a different evaluation of the 
intention signaled by the emotional expression and not by a different intention 
(this point was already discussed in Chapter 5). The results from our reversed 
correlation experiment suggest that this is not the case since the data from this 
experiment shows that and out-group smiles are visualized as expressing 
different intentions. However, strictly speaking, this result only allows us to 
conclude that happiness expressed by in-group and out-group members is 
associated with different intentions. It is conceivable that the mechanism 
responsible for the influence of group membership on reactions to emotional 
expressions differs between happiness and other emotional expressions. To 
examine if fear expressed by an out-group member is indeed interpreted as a 
sign of submission and interpreted as a warning if expressed by an in-group 
member needs further examination.  
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8.3 Automaticity of the finding 
The second goal of the experiments conducted for this thesis was to 
examine the degree of automaticity of the influence of group membership on 
affective reactions to emotions. We therefore wanted to assess if the interaction 
between group membership and emotional expression was based on an 
intentional process, if it was goal-dependent and if it could be consciously 
controlled. We implemented several steps to test these questions: First of all, 
the intergroup situation in all of our experiments was very subtly manipulated 
and no information about the nature of the situation was given. Additionally, 
we chose dependent variables which assessed the affective reactions of our 
participants in a rather indirect way, like the approach and avoidance behaviors 
measured in Experiments 1 – 3. By assessing the affective tone of the voice we 
furthermore collected an affective reaction which was only a by-product of a 
naturally occurring behavior. These manipulations should make an intentional 
responding unlikely.  
Furthermore, emotional expression was never relevant for the ongoing 
task and in Experiment 2 and Experiment 5 group membership was irrelevant 
as well. This allowed us to assess if the interaction between group membership 
and emotional expression was of “goal dependent” automaticity (Bargh, 1989). 
Finally, we introduced an ethnical intergroup situation. We assumed 
that participants’ motivation to control their reactions should be high in such a 
situation due to the social norm not to appear prejudiced (e.g., Banse, & 
Gawronski, 2003; Dunton, & Fazio, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Duntion, Williams, 
1995; Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1986). Finding nevertheless an influence of group 
membership on the affective reactions to the emotional expressions would 
allow us to conclude that this effect was uncontrollable.  
The results from our studies show that despite all these preventive 
methods, in-group members’ emotional expressions elicited concordant 
reactions whereas out-group members’ emotions triggered divergent ones. 
Furthermore, participants in the reversed correlation experiment (Experiment 
4) categorized those faces as out-group members whose smiles expressed 
negative intentions whereas faces showing smiles expressing positive 
8 Discussion 
 
127 
 
intentions were categorized as in-group members, even though emotional 
expression was not even mentioned. Based on these results we conclude that 
this interaction occurred automatic in the sense of unintentional, not goal-
independent, and uncontrollable. Importantly, from this it follows that the 
process underlying this interaction, namely the influence of group membership 
on the intention associated with an emotion also occurred automatically. 
This finding and conclusion constitutes an important extension to 
existing studies which reported an influence of group membership on affective 
reactions to emotional expressions because (as we see it) none of them 
provided evidence for an automatic process. On the contrary, a closer look at 
the set-up of most of these experiments suggests that an intentional process 
might have played a role in the occurrence of the observed effect: In most of 
the experiments reporting an influence of group membership on affective 
reactions to emotional expressions, group membership was manipulated either 
by highlighting the rivalry between the two respective groups (e.g., Epstude, & 
Mussweiler, 2009), or by employing groups for which participants held a 
strong negative attitude which was socially accepted (e.g., Weisbuch, & 
Ambady, 2008; Leach, et al., 2003). Because of this nature of the intergroup 
situation it seems conceivable that those manipulations triggered a conscious 
reasoning about the meaning of the emotional expressions in participants, 
leading to the observed effects. Those experiments in which group membership 
was more subtly manipulated often employed an evaluation task so that the 
unconditional automaticity of the process could not be assessed (e.g., 
Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2008). Our experiments overcome these limitations. 
Therefore, they are the first to show that the interaction between group 
membership and emotional expression is automatic in the sense of 
unintentional, non-goal dependent and maybe even uncontrollable. 
Finding that the influence of group membership on affective reactions 
to emotional expressions occurs automatically is of high theoretical relevance 
because it shows that automatic reactions to emotional expressions are not 
influenced by the valence or the specific emotional content alone like other 
researchers have suggested (e.g., Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Rohr, et al., 2012; 
Rotteveel, & Phaf, 2004; Rotteveel, et al., 2001; Wilkowski, & Meier, 2010). 
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On the contrary, this result indicates that the social meaning of the emotional 
expression is also extracted automatically. Depending on the relationship 
between expresser and perceiver, the same expression can automatically elicit 
divergent reactions. These results suggest that researchers employing 
emotional expressions as stimuli should pay extra attention to the context in 
which they present those stimuli. The facial expression of a stimulus person 
who resembles a disliked person for the respective group of participants, for 
example, might distort the results observed in an experiment designed to 
measure automatic reactions to emotional expressions. Such factors might also 
be responsible for the contrary behavioral reactions to anger and fear 
expressions reported in the approach and avoidance literature. 
With the finding that group membership automatically influences the 
intention inferred from an emotional expression our experiments also add to 
studies examining the influence of emotions on social processes in real life 
settings (e.g., van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; van Doorn, et al., 2012; 
van Kleef, 2009). In these studies, mainly non-automatic processes were 
measured. The results from the studies show that emotional expressions 
regulate social interactions like negotiation situations by providing information 
about the affective state as well as the intention of the expresser. Interestingly, 
they also provide evidence that the intention exerts more influence on reactions 
to emotions if information processing is deep whereas the affective component 
of an emotion is more influential if information processing is shallow. This 
conclusion is based on various different manipulations of the level of 
information processing, for example a manipulation of power. The results show 
that individuals with low power, which should enhance deep information 
processing, responded more to the intention signaled by the expression whereas 
individuals with high power, which leads to low information processing, 
attended more to the affective information (van Kleef, et al., 2004; van Kleef, 
De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). This finding fits well to our results: 
Since a competitive intergroup situation forms a positional threat to the power 
status, the intergroup situation might have enhanced deep information 
processing, thereby putting more weight on the intention signaled by the 
emotional expression. In comparison to the study by van Kleef and colleagues, 
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however, our results show that this process can occur automatically. Therefore, 
our finding that the intention signaled by an emotional expression is extracted 
automatically adds an important point to studies examining the function of 
emotions in real life settings. 
However, the findings from our experiments are not only of theoretical 
but also of practical relevance because they imply that automatic divergent 
reactions to out-group emotions might also arise in intergroup situations in 
everyday life. The smile of an out-group member waiting at the bus stop, for 
example, might automatically elicit a feeling of suspicion, even if the perceiver 
of this smile is not reasoning about the exact intention of the emotional 
expression. Even though this automatic reaction might be rather small and may 
not be noticed by the interaction partner, it might still influence future 
interactions. It has been shown, for example, that others are liked less if they 
show less concordant facial reactions to the emotional expressions of others 
(e.g., van der Velde, et al., 2010) compared to if they mimic more. 
Furthermore, the feeling of suspicion or safety elicited by a smiling or 
threatening out-group face might trigger corresponding cognitions in the 
perceiver, influencing more open behavior. The interaction between group 
membership and emotional expressions might thus influence intergroup 
relations on a broader scale. Even though these considerations are only 
speculative, examining these assumptions further might add important insights 
into intergroup processes.  
 
8.4 Open questions and future directions 
Our results provide evidence for our notion that group membership 
influences the interpretation of the intention signaled by an emotional 
expression. Moreover, they show that the interaction between group 
membership and emotional expression is based on an automatic process. New 
research questions arise from this notion. Those shall be presented and 
discussed below. Concretely, we will describe research questions related to the 
relationship between expresser and perceiver of an emotional expression and 
those that follow from the role of the emotional expression.  
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8.4.1 The nature of the relationship between expresser and perceiver of 
an emotion 
Our results show that the group membership of the expresser of an 
emotion influences the affective reactions to these emotions. Furthermore, they 
provide evidence that this effect occurs because group membership influences 
the interpretation of the intention signaled by the emotional expression. We 
thereby argue that this effect arises because group membership influences the 
relationship between expresser and perceiver of an emotion: If expresser and 
perceiver share group membership, the relationship between them should be 
friendly and cooperative. If they however differ in group membership, the 
relationship should be rather hostile and competitive. Because the intention 
signaled by an emotional expression is interpreted in the light of this 
relationship, different interpretations arise. Since group membership and the 
relationship between expresser and perceiver play such an essential part in our 
arguing, new research questions arise from this factor.  
One interesting question would be to address the influence of 
participants’ individual levels of negative attitudes towards the out-group (i.e., 
prejudices) on our results. It is conceivable that variations in this individual 
difference might influence our effects. If the different reactions to in-group and 
out-group emotions are caused by the attitude towards the respective groups, 
this effect should be larger if the out-group is associated with a strong negative 
attitude and the in-group with a strong positive one compared to if in-group 
and out-group members are evaluated (more or less) similarly. Unfortunately, 
the moderation analysis of Experiment 5 – the only experiment in which we 
assessed individual attitudes towards in-group and out-group members – did 
not yield any effects. The only indication that our participants held negative 
attitudes towards the out-group members which might then have influenced our 
results was therefore obtained in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3a/b in which 
we observed a main effect of group membership: Out-group members elicited a 
stronger relative avoidance reaction than in-group members. As was already 
discussed in Chapter 6.4, this main effect has been found to correlate with 
individual attitudes. A similar main effect was observed with the alternative 
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analysis of Experiment 5. Moreover, Experiment 3a and 3b show that a 
negative attitude towards the out-group might play a key-role in the interaction 
between group membership and emotional expression. However, since we did 
not conduct any supplementary measurements of individual attitudes, the 
assumption that the interaction between group membership and emotional 
expression was caused by individual levels of prejudice remains speculative. It 
should therefore be the subject of future research. 
Another interesting topic related to the relationship between expresser 
and perceiver of an emotion is the exact nature of the negativity of this 
relationship. We argue that – at least in our experiments – the intergroup 
relation was characterized by cooperation and friendliness in an in-group 
situation and competition and hostility in the case of an out-group situation. 
Depending on this relationship, the same emotional expression should then be 
associated with different intentions, leading to different reactions. This 
assumption is supported by the results of Experiment 3a and 3b which show 
that negative information about the out-group was necessary to observe the 
expected interaction between group membership and emotional expression. 
However, it might be that a simple negative attitude towards the out-group is 
not enough to produce the expected effect: Recent research from the field of 
implicit attitudes suggests that negative attitudes towards out-groups can have 
different connotations (Degner, Wentura, 2011; see also Degner, Wentura, 
Gniewosz, & Noack, 2007; Wentura & Degner, 2010). Referring to Peeters 
(1983; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), this research differentiates between an 
automatic evaluation component of other-relevant negativity and possessor-
relevant negativity. The former one refers to negative traits that are 
unconditionally negative for the social environment of the trait-holders, but not 
necessarily for themselves (e.g., to be aggressive, to be intolerant); the latter 
one refers to negative traits that are unconditionally negative for the trait-
holders, but not for their social environment (e.g., to be lonely, to be 
incapable). Degner and Wentura found prejudice towards Turks to be of the 
other-relevant type whereas “ageism” (i.e., prejudice towards the elderly) was 
of the possessor-relevant type. The results obtained in the experiments 
conducted for this thesis fit well into this arguing. Since we hypothesized that 
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emotions expressed by out-group members are interpreted in the light of a 
hostile, competitive relationship, the rationale underlying our experiments 
implicitly hypothesizes an other-relevant negativity towards the out-group. It 
would be hard to explain how an emotional expression shown by an out-group 
member whose negativity does not directly affect the perceiver would produce 
a divergent affective reaction. As a result of the assumption that an other-
relevant negativity associated with the out-group members is responsible for 
the influence of group membership on affective reactions to emotions, the 
negative information about the out-group which we provided to participants in 
Experiment 3b was of the other-relevant type. However, since we did not 
contrast this out-group to one possessing self-relevant negativity, the arguing 
that the connotation of negativity plays a role in the interaction between group 
membership and emotional expression is only preliminary. In order to support 
this arguing with empirical data, we would have to conduct an experiment in 
which we systematically manipulated the type of negativity associated with the 
out-group. This would be an interesting point for future research.  
A third topic related to the relationship between expresser and perceiver 
of an emotion which would be interesting to examine is the overlap between an 
intergroup manipulation and a manipulation in which competition and 
cooperation between expresser and perceiver of an emotion are directly 
manipulated. The similar results observed by us and by researchers examining 
the influence of competition and cooperation on reactions to emotions 
(Weyers, et al., 2009; Likowski, et al., 2011) suggest that both manipulations 
similarly affect reactions to emotional expressions. Emotions expressed by out-
group members as well as by individuals in a competitive situation evoked 
divergent reactions compared to emotions shown by in-group members and 
individuals in a cooperation situation. These findings are supported by theories 
suggesting that intragroup relations are typically associated with cooperation 
whereas intergroup relations are rather associated with competition (e.g., 
Bourgeois, & Hess, 2008; Campell, 1965; de Dreu, 2012; Deutsch, 1949; 
Tajfel, et al., 1971; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979). The results from experiments 
examining the minimal group paradigm, for example, show that individuals 
prefer to maximize the difference between resources allocated to in-group and 
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out-group members than to maximize the in-group resources if this also results 
in a maximization of the out-group resources (e.g., Tajfel, et al. 1971). This 
finding indicates that even minimal intergroup situations are characterized by 
intergroup competition. However, in order to support the reasoning that an 
intergroup situation has the same effect as a manipulation of cooperation and 
competition, it would be important to empirically show that both manipulations 
yield the same effect. One possibility to test for this would be to prime a 
cooperative or competitive mindset in participants and then let them rate the 
intentions signaled by emotional expressions.  
Taken together, there are several points related to the relationship 
between expresser and perceiver of an emotion which inspire future research, 
namely the influence of prejudice, the type of negativity associated with the 
out-group and the overlap between an intergroup manipulation and one 
manipulating competition and cooperation. 
 
8.4.2 The emotional expression 
In the previous paragraph we discussed future research questions 
related to the relationship between the perceiver and the expresser of an 
emotion. However, this is only one factor of the interaction. Obviously, there 
are also points related to the other factor – the emotional expression – which 
should be discussed. 
The first point thereby relates to the question if concordant and 
divergent affective reactions to in-group and out-group emotions depend on the 
exact emotional expression employed. In the experiments conducted for this 
thesis, we examined the influence of group membership on reactions to fearful 
and happy facial expressions or experiences. Our results show that group 
membership influenced which intention is associated with an emotional 
expression. We chose happiness and fear for several reasons; the most 
important ones were that (a) these emotions are associated with different 
intentions which (b) should be associated with different affective reactions. 
Finally, (c) the group membership of the expresser should influence which 
intention is inferred from the emotional expression. Only this constellation 
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allowed us to test our hypotheses. However, since there are obviously more 
emotional expressions, it would be interesting to examine the influence of 
group membership on the reactions to these other expressions. Depending on 
the exact expression and the intentions associated with this expression, the 
hypothesized reaction might differ. We assume that a sad facial expression, for 
example, would elicit reactions comparable to a fearful expression. This should 
be the case because a sad expression can be seen as a request for help but also 
as an attempt to manipulate the perceiver of the emotion (consider the 
“Dackelblick” [puppy dog eyes]; see also Horstmann, 2003). These two 
intentions should elicit different reactions and it is conceivable that the 
relationship between expresser and perceiver of an emotion influences which 
intention is mainly inferred from a sad expression. An expression of disgust, in 
contrast, signals the wish to reject something and the request to go away or do 
something differently. These intentions are not necessarily associated with 
different affective reactions. Therefore, we would predict that group 
membership should not influence the reactions to a disgust expression. 
However, this assumption needs empirical support. 
Another point related to the emotional expression which would be 
interesting to examine is the ambiguity of the situation in which the expression 
is shown. As was already discussed above, in our experiments employing 
visual material, no clue about the emotion eliciting event was given. A next 
logical step would therefore be to examine how group membership influences 
affective reactions to emotional expressions if the emotion is clearly elicited by 
the interaction partner or clearly elicited by a different source. The similarity 
between the results obtained by Likowski and colleagues (2011) and those 
found in our experiments already show that the same behavioral pattern occurs 
if the elicitor of the emotional expression is obvious to the perceiver compared 
to if the cause of the emotion is ambiguous. However, in the experiment by 
Likowski and colleagues, the emotion eliciting cause was confounded with the 
manipulation of the relationship; the competitive and cooperative nature of the 
relationship was based on the dice tossing game, which was the elicitor of the 
emotional expression. Therefore, this result does not provide sufficient 
information how an emotion elicitor, which is not related to the relationship 
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between expresser and perceiver, would influence the interaction between 
group membership and emotional expressions. To examine this question, 
further studies are needed.  
One possible operationalization thereby would be to manipulate the eye 
gaze of the expresser of an emotion: An averted eye gaze informs the perceiver 
of the emotional expression that he is not the cause of it. As a result, the 
emotional expression might gain a totally different meaning; most likely, it 
would not be interpreted in the light of this relationship. There already is 
empirical support for the assumption that the gaze direction has informative 
value and influences the interpretation of emotions. It has been shown, for 
example, that the eye gaze helps individuals to understand what their 
interaction partner refers to when speaking (e.g., Hanna, & Brennan, 2007). 
Referring to the signal function of emotions, it has also been argued that the 
eye gaze helps individuals to infer the intention signaled by an emotion. 
Supporting this assumption, fearful expressions, which generally signal an 
avoidance tendency, were recognized better if presented with an averted 
compared to a direct gaze whereas the opposite pattern emerged for anger 
expressions (Adams, & Kleck, 2003). Additionally, fear with averted gaze and 
anger with directed gaze were rated as more intense than the opposite 
combinations (Adams, & Kleck, 2005). These results suggest that the eye gaze 
influences the interpretation of the emotional expression. Accordingly, the 
interaction between group membership and emotional expression should differ 
depending on the gaze direction. Manipulating the eye gaze would furthermore 
have the benefit that no other information about the situation has to be given. 
This would allow us to employ the same paradigm as used in our experiments. 
To sum it up, apart from the relationship between expresser and 
perceiver of an emotion, there are several connecting research questions 
regarding the emotional expressions shown by in-group and out-group 
members. It would, for example, be interesting to examine the influence of 
group membership on affective reactions to different emotions than the ones 
employed in the experiments conducted for this thesis. Furthermore, a 
manipulation of the eliciting event of the emotional expression by gaze 
direction would provide an interesting extension to our results. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
The results of the experiments conducted for this thesis provide 
evidence that affective reactions to emotional expressions are automatically 
influenced by the group membership of the expresser. Even though emotional 
expression (Experiment 1, Experiment 3), and group membership and 
emotional expression (Experiment 2, Experiment 5) were task irrelevant and 
subtly manipulated, an interaction between emotional expression and group 
membership occurred in our experiments. The data show that emotions 
expressed by in-group members elicit concordant reactions whereas the same 
expressions shown by out-group members elicit divergent ones. Importantly, 
the same pattern occurred even though different paradigms, different dependent 
variables, and different groups were employed. Furthermore, our experiments 
provide evidence that this effect occurs because emotions expressed by in-
group members are associated with different intentions than those expressed by 
out-group members: The results from three experiments employing an 
approach and avoidance paradigm show that the intentions signaled by in-
group emotions are interpreted in the light of the positive, cooperative 
relationship characterizing in-group situations, whereas the intentions signaled 
by out-group emotions are interpreted in the light of the negative, competitive 
relationship which typically exists between members of different groups. This 
finding is supported by an experiment employing the reversed correlation 
technique. The results of this experiment show that the mental representations 
of in-group and out-group smiles are associated with different intentions. This 
finding provides further evidence for our hypothesis that the group membership 
of the expresser influences which intention is associated with an emotional 
expression.  
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Appendix A – Validation study of the Saarland University 
Emotion Database 
 
For the Saarland University Emotion Database (SUED), short video clips were 
taken from 43 individuals. From these clips, we extracted photographs which 
were then validated. In a later stage of development, the photographs were 
edited again in order to increase their perceptual quality, and then newly 
validated
17
.  
 
A1 Creation of the database 
A1.1 Description of the image set 
43 individuals were videotaped for the stimulus set (5 Arabic females, 
11 German females, 12 Arabic males, 15 German males). Each expresser was 
videotaped while showing seven emotional and one neutral facial expression, 
resulting in 344 video clips. The exact facial muscle configuration for each 
expression was instructed based on the FACS (Ekman, 2007). We later 
extracted frames from these videos to obtain still images of the emotional 
expressions. We chose the emotions joy, surprise, anger, fear, sadness, disgust 
and contempt, since these are seen as the basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1972). 
Expressers were videotaped against a uniform gray background, wore black T-
Shirts and no make-up or jewelry. We also ensured that no dominant facial hair 
was visible.  
A1.2 Development of the stimulus set 
Models for the dataset were either approached on campus or recruited 
through notices on campus boards and through the internet. In order to create a 
                                                 
17
 Since these edited photographs were employed in the studies conducted for this thesis, the 
sections describing the validation phase and the results will be based on the second validation 
phase, whereas the section reporting the creation of the database will describe the creation of 
the video clips as well as the photographs in the diploma thesis. 
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stimulus set with highly recognizable prototypical emotional expressions, 
expressers were trained before the recording session. They received a training 
manual designed in PowerPoint that explained the basic expressions and the 
required muscle configurations, gave instructions on how to exert them, and 
showed prototypical images of the respective emotions. The training manual 
was developed after the Directed Facial Action Task by Paul Ekman (e.g., 
Ekman, 2007). Expressers were asked to practice the emotional expressions at 
home with a hand mirror for at least one hour. After arriving at the recording 
studio, expressers received another 15 to 30 minutes of training by one of two 
certified FACS (see above) coders until the emotional expressions met our 
requirements. Thereby particular attention was paid to the activation of the 
critical action units for the respective emotion (see Langner, et al., 2010). Then 
the recording session started during which feedback and instructions were 
repeatedly given by one of the FACS coders. 
Each recording of an emotional expression started with a neutral 
expression. Since we wanted to obtain dynamic emotional expressions that 
were standardized as much as possible, we replayed two low sounds to 
participants as an orientation: Participants were asked to start the emotional 
expression with the first sound, reach the apex of the expression with the 
second sound (which was one second later) and hold the apex for at least 5 
seconds. Several versions of each emotional expression were recorded. 
The video clips were later screened by the FACS coders and the best 
take of each emotional expression for each expresser was selected. This video 
clip was edited with Adobe Aftereffects to a standard length of 6 seconds 
consisting of one second of neutral expression before the onset of the 
emotional expression, approximately one second of movement until the apex 
was reached, and an apex of approximately 4 seconds. For the still images, the 
video frame showing the most prototypical and intense expression was 
extracted and edited with Adobe Photoshop for cropping and color balancing 
(see also the RAFD for such an approach, facedb.blogspot.com). The 
preliminary validation study showed satisfying recognition rates for the video 
clips as well as the still images. However, the luminance and chromaticity of 
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the images did not meet our requirements. Therefore, the images were edited to 
improve their overall quality. The edited images then were newly validated
18
.  
 
A2 Validation of the database 
The validation of the database was conducted in two phases. Sample 1, 
which consisted of psychology students, rated a random subset of the images 
whereas Sample 2, consisting of non-psychology students, rated all images. All 
participants indicated for each presented image which emotion was expressed 
and how intense, natural and arousing the expression was. Furthermore, 
attractiveness and typicality ratings for the respective group of the expressers 
were obtained with the neutral facial expressions to ensure that these ratings 
were not influenced through emotional aspects. 
 
A2.1 Method 
Participants. Eighty-seven psychology students (69 female and 18 
male) and 31 non-psychology students (20 females, 11 males) participated in 
the validation study. Psychology students were given course credit and non-
psychology students were paid eight Euros for participation. The age range was 
18 to 42 years with a median of 21 years. 
  
Procedure. All ratings were administered on the computer screen. The 
session started with the ratings of the emotional expressions: participants 
indicated for each presented image which emotion was expressed as well as 
how intense, natural and arousing it was. In each trial of this rating phase, one 
of the images was presented for 3.5 seconds, followed by the question asking 
which emotional expression was shown
19
. To indicate their answer, 
                                                 
18
 We also excluded the expressions of 15 individuals due to low recognition rates. The 
validation data is therefore based on the expressions shown by 28 individuals (7 German 
females, 4 Turkish/Arabic females, 9 German men, 8 Turkish/Arabic men). 
19
 This presentation duration was chosen to keep the expression comparable to the video 
clips, so that the recognition rates of the photographs can also be taken as an approximation 
for the recognition rates of the video clips. However, usually dynamic stimuli yield better 
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participants had to select one out of nine boxes. Eight of the boxes were 
marked with the labels of the expressions and one with “other” (see Frank & 
Stennett, 2001 for this procedure). The arrangement of boxes on the screen was 
counterbalanced between participants but held constant for one participant. 
After the rating of the emotional expression, participants were asked to judge 
the intensity of the emotional expression on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
intensive at all) to 5 (very intensive). The same was done for the naturalness of 
the expression. Finally, participants rated how arousing the emotional 
expression was by clicking on the respective manikin of the self-assessment-
manikin scale (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Then the next trial started. Images were 
presented in random order with the restriction that neither the same emotional 
expression nor the same individual was presented consecutively. Sample 1 
rated only 128 out of the 224 images due to time constraints. Sample 2 rated all 
images.  
After the emotion rating, participants judged each individual on 
attractiveness and typicality. For this, the neutral expression of the individual 
was presented. Attractiveness of each individual was rated on a scale ranging 
from 1 (very unattractive) to 5 (very attractive). Then, the typicality of the 
Turkish/Arabic individuals and subsequently the typicality of the German 
expressers for the respective group were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very 
untypical) to 5 (very typical). Images were presented in random order. 
 
A2.2 Results 
Each image was rated by at least 66 raters. We calculated separate 
ANOVAS with (a) the recognition rates of the expressions, (b) the intensity, (c) 
the naturalness and (d) the arousal as dependent variables.  
Expressions. For each image, a raw recognition rate was calculated by 
the ratio between the number of selections of a targeted expression and the 
number of its presentations. Recognition rates are displayed in percentage in 
                                                                                                                                 
recognition rates. Thus, the rates of the photos might be regarded as very conservative 
estimation of the real recognition rates. 
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Table 2. The average recognition rate was 76% with a median of 79%. All 
expressions were recognized above chance (ps < .001) with chance level set at 
33%, which is a conservative criterion (see Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). 
Joy had the highest recognition rate (89%) and contempt the lowest (48%). 
This pattern, as well as the recognition rates of the emotional expressions are 
comparable to those reported for other sets (e.g., Beaupré & Hess, 2005; Biehl, 
Matsumoto, Ekman, & Hearn, 1997; Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Goeleven, De 
Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008; Langner et al., 2010; Tracy, Robins, & 
Schriber, 2009; van der Schalk, et al., 2011).   
 
Table 1 Raw recognition rates (in %) for the complete set and the German and 
Turkish/Arabic expressers separately (standard deviations in parenthesis). 
 All German Turkish/ 
Arabic 
Joy 98  (2) 99 (1)  98 (1) 
Anger 89  (7) 92 (6) 85  (8) 
Anger 84  (7) 87 (6) 81  (8) 
Neutral 78  (14) 77 (15) 80  (14) 
Fear 74  (14) 72 (15) 78  (12) 
Fear 71  (12) 73 (13) 69  (10) 
Disgust 67  (12) 71 (11) 62  (12) 
Contempt 50  (14) 47 (15) 50  (12) 
       
All 76  (18) 77 (19) 75  (17) 
 
For the main analyses, the raw recognition rates were arcsine 
transformed (Winer, 1971). For readability, however, raw recognition rates are 
reported. An ANOVA with expression (joy, surprise, anger, fear, disgust, 
sadness, contempt, neutral) and ethnicity (German vs. Turkish/Arabic) as 
between factors yielded a significant main effect of expression: F (7, 208) = 
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65.80; p < .001. Planned contrasts showed that joy had a significant higher 
recognition rate (ts > 7.90; ps < .001) than all other emotions whereas contempt 
had a significant lower recognition rate than all other emotions (ts > -5.47; ps < 
.001). The recognition rates of all other expressions were in-between. Neither 
the main effect of ethnicity nor the interaction reached significance (all Fs < 
3.52; ps > .06).  
In order to correct for response biases in the raw recognition rates, we 
also calculated unbiased hit rates (Wagner, 1993). The unbiased hit rate 
corrects for participants’ possible tendencies to overuse a certain emotion label 
in the rating. If a participant, for example, tends to classify every negative 
emotion as anger (maybe because of a perception bias), this will heighten the 
recognition rate for angry expressions; however, this is not caused by the high 
recognizability of the expression but by the bias of the participant and his 
heightened use of the label. To correct for this bias, the unbiased hit rate sets 
the number of correctly identified expressions in relation to the number of 
presentations of this certain expression and to the number of selections of this 
expression by participants. The unbiased hit rate can vary between 0 and 1 
whereby a hit rate of 1 means that each presentation of a certain emotion was 
correctly identified and that the respective emotion label was only used for this 
expression. We calculated unbiased hit rates for each participant for each 
emotional expression shown by German and Turkish/Arabic expressers 
separately. The unbiased hit rates were arcsine transformed before the analysis. 
Unbiased hit rates are displayed in Table 2. 
A 8 (expression: joy, surprise, anger, fear, disgust, sadness, contempt, 
neutral) x 2 (ethnicity: German vs. Turkish/Arabic) ANOVA with all factors 
varied within participants yielded a significant main effect of expression: F(7, 
111) = 111.82; p < .001. Planned contrasts showed that joy had a significant 
higher unbiased hit rate than all other expressions (Fs > 72.07) whereas 
contempt had a significant lower unbiased hit rate than all other expressions 
(Fs > 37.01). In contrast to the raw recognition rates, a significant expression 
by ethnicity interaction emerged: F (7, 111) = 6.52; p < .001. Bonferroni 
corrected single comparisons showed that surprise and neutral expressions 
were associated with lower unbiased hit rates if expressed by German 
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individuals compared to Turkish/Arabic individuals (|t|s > 3.01, ps < .001). No 
other difference between the two groups emerged (|t|s < 2.70, ps > .003). 
 
Table 2 Unbiased hit rates for the complete set and for German and 
Turkish/Arabic expressers separately (standard deviations in parenthesis). 
 
 All German Turkish/ 
Arabic 
Joy .93 (.09) .92 (.10) .93 (.10) 
Sadness .77 (.17) .80 (.18) .74 (.21) 
Anger .69 (.20) .72 (.19) .66 (.24) 
Surprise .67 (.17) .64 (.19) .69 (.21) 
Neutral .68 (.20) .65 (.22) .71 (.24) 
Fear .56 (.22) .57 (.22) .55 (.27) 
Disgust .60 (.26) .62 (.28)  .57 (.29) 
Contempt .37 (.29) .39 (.29) .36 (.31) 
All .66 (.12) .66 (.12) .65 (.14) 
 
 
Other Ratings. We also calculated 8 (expression: joy, surprise, anger, 
fear, disgust, sadness, contempt, neutral) x 2 (ethnicity: German vs. 
Turkish/Arabic) ANOVAs for the dependent variables naturalness, intensity 
and activated arousal. Each ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
expression: Fs(1, 208) > 56, ps < .001. Details of the respective variables are 
described below.  
For the naturalness of the emotional expression, neither a significant 
main effect of ethnicity nor a significant interaction with ethnicity emerged. 
The means show that joyful (M = 3.75; SD = .47) as well as neutral (M = 3.76; 
SD = .15) expressions were rated as above-average natural, whereas the means 
of the other expressions were distributed around the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 
3). For the intensity rating, also no significant main effect of ethnicity or 
interaction with ethnicity emerged. All expressions except neutral (M = 2.36) 
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and contempt (M = 2.60) were rated above the midpoint of the scale (M = 3.51 
to M = 4.07). On the arousal rating, German expressions (M = 3.96, SD = .66) 
were judged as significantly more arousing than the Turkish/Arabic ones (M = 
3.86, p = .65): F (1, 208) = 4.12, p < .05. Overall, happy expressions were 
judged to be the most arousing ones (M = 4.76, SD = .58) whereas neutral 
expressions were the least arousing ones (M = 2.78, SD = .29). No interaction 
between emotional expression and ethnicity occurred (F < 1). 
Comparing German and Turkish/Arabic expressers on their ratings of 
typicality and attractiveness revealed no difference in rating (t < 1.6). The 
individuals of both groups were rated as rather typical for their respective 
group (German: M = 3.68, SD = .37; Turkish/Arabic: M = 3.28, SD = 1.24) and 
as averaged attractive (German: M = 2.61, SD = .55; Turkish/Arabic: M = 2.59, 
SD = .47).  
 
A2.3 Discussion 
The results of the validation data show that we were successful in 
developing a stimulus set that includes emotional expressions shown by 
expressers of two ethnicities. The recognition rates of the new set are 
comparable to or even outperform those reported for other stimulus sets 
(Beaupre´ & Hess, 2005; Biehl et al., 1997; Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Goeleven, 
De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008; Langner et al., 2009; Tracy, Robins, 
& Schriber, 2009; van der Schalk, Hawk, Fisher, & Doosje, 2011). 
Importantly, and in contrast to other sets (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; van der 
Schalk, Hawk, Fisher, & Doosje, 2011), the recognition rates of the 
expressions shown by German and those shown by Turkish/Arabic individuals 
did not systematically differ. This is a major advantage of our set, since our 
research questions requires emotional expressions of in- and out-group 
members that do not differ per se in order to be able to examine the influence 
of group-membership on reactions to emotions.  
Additionally, the validation data of the SUED provides information 
about the typicality of the individual expressers. This is important information 
because in studies examining the influence of group-membership on reactions 
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to emotions it is often necessary that the stimulus-persons are highly typical for 
their respective group, especially in cases in which group membership is not 
explicitly mentioned in the experiment. The same holds for attractiveness: this 
factor can influence reactions to stimulus persons like other affective 
information (e.g., Marsh, et al. 2003) and should therefore be carefully 
controlled for when selecting stimulus material. Therefore we were successful 
in developing a high quality stimulus set of emotional expressions shown by 
German and Turkish/Arabic individuals. In addition, we provide valuable 
information that enables researchers to thoroughly control their stimuli for their 
experiments. 
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Appendix B – Stimuli employed in Experiment 1 and 2 
 
German expresser 
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Turkish/Arabic expresser 
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Appendix C – Stimuli employed in Experiment 3a and 3b 
 
Set1 
 
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
169 
 
 
Set 2 
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Appendix D – Group information given in Experiment 3a and 
3b 
 
Group information given in Experiment 3a 
 
„Um die vielfältigen Reize in unserer Umwelt verarbeiten zu können, müssen 
wir unsere Wahrnehmung strukturieren. Trotz der vielfältigen individuellen 
Unterschiede in der Art und Weise, wie komplexe Informationen 'sortiert' 
werden, lassen sich zwei grundlegende Wahrnehmungsstile unterscheiden, der 
sogenannte FOKALE Wahrnehmungsstil und der BASALE 
Wahrnehmungsstil. 
Beim fokalen Wahrnehmungsstil wird die Information ausgehend von 
hervorstechenden Merkmalen, den Figuren, strukturiert.  
Beim basalen Wahrnehmungsstil dagegen ist die Richtung der 
Informationsverarbeitung genau umgekehrt,  nämlich ausgehend vom 
Allgemeinen, dem Hintergrund, hin zu den spezifischen Reizen der 
Wahrnehmungsinformation.“ 
 
 
Group information given in Experiment 3b 
 
„Personen mit einem basalen Persönlichkeitsstil sind meist sozial verträgliche 
Menschen, die gerne Zeit mit anderen verbringen. Sie sind umgänglich und 
versuchen etwaige Konflikte einvernehmlich zu lösen. Daher haben sie oft 
einen großen Freundeskreis oder auch wenige, aber enge Freunde. Sie sind 
recht ausgeglichen und meistens positiver Stimmung. Sie halten sich an 
bestehende Regeln und Maßstäbe. Manchmal sind sie etwas ungenau und 
vergesslich.” 
 
„Personen mit einem fokalen Persönlichkeitsstil geraten oft in Schwierigkeiten 
mit ihren Mitmenschen, da sie sich häufig egoistisch und rücksichtslos, 
manchmal auch aggressiv anderen gegenüber verhalten.  Es ist ihnen wichtig, 
ihren Willen durchzusetzen. Oft fühlen sie sich dazu berechtigt sich zu 
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"nehmen" was ihnen zusteht. Dabei überschreiten Sie mitunter auch das 
Gesetz. Ihre Intelligenz ist meistens hoch; zudem sind sie oft handwerklich 
sehr geschickt.“ 
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Appendix E – Group images employed in Experiment 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
Appendix F – Short stories employed in Experiment 5 
 
Happy life event 
„Peter/Ahmet ist ein typischer 21-jähriger junger Mann, der sich in seiner 
Freizeit gerne mit seinen Freunden trifft und Fußball spielt. Normalerweise 
steht er um sieben Uhr auf, um sich auf den Weg in die Berufsschule zu 
machen. Momentan jobbt er zweimal die Woche abends in einem Café. Er 
wohnt noch bei seinen Eltern, mit denen er bereits als kleines Kind aus 
Düsseldorf/Istanbul nach Köln gezogen ist.  
Heute ist ein besonderer Tag für ihn, denn er freut sich auf das alles 
entscheidende Fußballspiel seiner Lieblingsmannschaft um den 
Meisterschaftstitel, das heute stattfindet. Er hat sich extra den Nachmittag frei 
genommen, um das Spiel live sehen zu können, da er von seinen Eltern Karten 
geschenkt bekommen hat. Zwei Stunden vor dem Spiel trifft er sich mit seinem 
Freund, der ihn begleiten wird. Er kann seine Aufregung kaum zurückhalten. 
Seinem Freund fällt sofort auf, dass er sehr nervös ist und einen 
außergewöhnlich freudigen Gesichtsausdruck hat. Damit sich die Zugfahrt zum 
Stadion nicht zu lange hinzieht, kaufen sie sich am Kiosk noch ein paar 
Zeitschriften.“ 
 
Fearful life event 
„Peter/Ahmet ist ein typischer 21-jähriger junger Mann, der sich in seiner 
Freizeit gerne mit seinen Freunden trifft und Fußball spielt. Normalerweise 
steht er um sieben Uhr auf, um sich auf den Weg in die Berufsschule zu 
machen. Momentan jobbt er zweimal die Woche abends in einem Café. Er 
wohnt noch bei seinen Eltern, mit denen er bereits als kleines Kind aus 
Düsseldorf/Istanbul nach Köln gezogen ist.  
Heute ist ein besonderer Tag für ihn, denn er fürchtet sich vor seinem 
Arzttermin bei einem anerkannten Spezialisten, für den er sich extra den 
Nachmittag frei genommen hat. Vor ein paar Tagen hat er sich einem Bluttest 
unterzogen und wird heute erfahren, ob er Leukämie hat. Zwei Stunden vor 
dem Arzttermin trifft er sich mit seinem Freund, der ihn begleiten wird. Er 
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kann seine Aufregung kaum unterdrücken. Seinem Freund fällt sofort auf, dass 
er sehr nervös ist und einen außergewöhnlich ängstlichen Gesichtsausdruck 
hat. Um sich abzulenken, gehen die beiden in ihre Lieblingskneipe, um sich 
dort ein Fußballspiel anzusehen und ein Bier zu trinken. 
